





Thomas Hobbes’s Theory of Crime and Punishment 
 
Signy Thora Gutnick Allen 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 










I, Signy Thora Gutnick Allen, confirm that the research included within this thesis is 
my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported 
by others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. 
Previously published material is also acknowledged below. 
 
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and 
does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s 
copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. 
 
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check 
the electronic version of the thesis. 
 
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree 
by this or any other university. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or 
information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the 
author. 
 
Signature: Signy Thora Gutnick Allen 











This thesis argues that over the course of his political writings Thomas Hobbes 
developed a complex yet coherent theory of crime and punishment. His account was 
designed not only as an element of his theory of the state, but also in response to a set 
of early modern debates concerning the nature of punishment in contractarian political 
thought. This argument challenges the claims, frequently advanced in the critical 
literature, that Hobbes was uninterested in the problem of crime, that his account fails 
to provide his sovereign with a right to punish at all, or that he considered punishment 
to be a non-civil activity located in a version of the state of nature. I claim by contrast 
that Hobbes’s accounts of the origins and location of the right to punish, of the purpose 
of punishment and of the nature of crime demonstrate that Hobbesian punishment is 
characterised by retained citizenship, due process and legal rights. Hobbes’s theory of 
political obligation draws a clear distinction between the punishment of criminals 
within the state, and the treatment of rebels and enemies outside it. As a result Hobbes 
is able to reconcile his commitment to subjects’ inalienable right to self-defence with 
a sovereign right to punish criminals. In addition to providing an account of this 
foundational aspect of Hobbes’s political theory, the thesis uses Hobbes’s discussion 
of crime to shed light on a number of related aspects of his work. In particular it argues 
that, once we have properly understood his criminology, we have strong reasons to 
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Where modern critical editions are available, I have quoted directly from these. When 
quoting from sixteenth and seventeenth century publications, I have not modernised 
the spelling or grammar. 
 
Gender 
In line with the authors of the works I cite, I have used ‘he’ and ‘man’ throughout. I 
have also, for simplicity, opted to refer to the Hobbesian sovereign as a single, male, 
individual. Hobbes was of course aware that sovereigns could be female, and 
according to his theory they could also consist of a council rather than an individual. 
However these possibilities do not impact the structure of his argument, and I have 
therefore set them aside.   
 
Bibliographies 
I have included all cited primary and secondary sources in the bibliography. Where 
sources are anonymous, I have listed them alphabetically according to title. Where 
works are pseudonymous and their authorship has not been definitively proven, I refer 
to the pseudonym in the notes and bibliography. I therefore refer to the ‘author’ of the 
Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos in the text, and to Stephanus Junius Brutus in the notes 
and bibliography. Where authorship of such texts has been demonstrated, as in the 
case of Henry Parker’s Observations, I have referred to the known author in the text, 
bibliography and notes. I have attributed the Horae Subsecivae to Hobbes in the 
bibliography and notes, but draw attention to its undecided status in the text itself. 
Where texts have been re-issued, I have referred in my notes to the edition used. 
Original publication dates are given in square brackets in the bibliography. Original 
titles and publication dates of primary sources are provided in the body of the text 
where relevant, with English titles in square brackets.  
 
Names 
In the bibliography and notes I refer to authors’ names, rather than noble titles. In the 
text itself names and titles are used interchangeably. Thus Edward Hyde, Earl of 
Clarendon is referred to as Edward Hyde in the notes and bibliography, and as 
Clarendon in the body of the text. Titles such as ‘Sir’, ‘Saint’ and ‘Reverend’ have 







Thomas Hobbes’s political theory is perhaps best known for his grounding of civil 
obligation in the consent of those who institute the state. The commonwealth, in this 
account, is the result of man’s realisation that life without authority is unsustainable. 
He thus provides his readers with a profoundly voluntaristic story about the origins of 
human society. But Hobbes did not believe that this self-imposed curtailment of 
natural liberty would be enough to ensure law-abiding behaviour. Throughout his 
works he consistently emphasised the importance of punishments and rewards in 
encouraging good citizenship. We read that ‘for the common peace, it is necessary 
that some right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or 
Counsell.’1 Elsewhere we find that it is not simply a right, but also a duty of the 
sovereign to ‘make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards’,2 for the 
‘Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes…[are] in their own nature but weak, [and must] 
be made to hold, by the danger…of breaking them.’3 Indeed, a commonwealth without 
punishment would be no commonwealth at all; without such coercive power, men 
cannot be expected to uphold their covenants, and life in the state would not represent 
a true departure from the state of nature.4 
Despite the foundational element that punishment plays in the Hobbesian 
commonwealth, Hobbes’s theory of crime and punishment has been neglected in 
comparison with other aspects of his thought. When this element of his work is 
examined, it is rarely treated as a coherent whole; features of the theory, such as the 
origins of the practice or its purpose, are examined in isolation from each other, 
                                                   
1 Hobbes 1983, p. 94.  
2 Hobbes 2012, pp. 542, 276.  
3 Hobbes 2012, p. 328.  
4 Hobbes 2012, p. 220. 
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resulting in the impression that Hobbes’s concerns in this area are incidental to his 
thinking. We find readers arguing that Hobbes was largely unconcerned with the 
problem of crime,5 while others have characterised his account of the punishment right 
as ‘perplexing’ and ‘evasive’, possibly indicative of an unfinished draft.6 It is 
frequently asserted that Hobbes fails to provide his sovereign with a true right to 
punish at all, with the consequence that his commonwealth falters from the moment 
of its establishment.7 Others have suggested that elements of his theory, such as his 
focus on deterrence, are most interesting for their supposed anticipation of later 
criminological theory.8 Above all, numerous readers have found it difficult to 
reconcile the account of the sovereign right to punish with the theory’s emphasis on 
the inalienable right to individual self-preservation. As a result, the status of 
punishment as a civil institution is frequently called into question, with readers 
insisting that this practice, which Hobbes so consistently associates with the state, in 
fact takes place in the state of nature.9 Hobbes’s accounts of punishment and of the 
representative nature of the sovereign, it is implied, are inconsistent. As a result the 
punishing sovereign and the punished individual must be locked in a battle which is, 
to all intents and purposes, the same as the natural war of all against all. Crime, on this 
reading, becomes a means of exiting the state, with any breach of the civil laws 
understood as a repudiation of the covenant itself.10  
                                                   
5 Hoekstra 1997, p. 624; Lloyd 2009, p.  295. 
6 Ristroph 2009, p. 615; Norrie 1984, p. 302; Hünig 2007, p. 232.  
7 Norrie 1984, p. 308; Schrock 1991, p. 854; Hyde 1995, p. 265.  
8 Cattaneo 1965; Norrie 1984; Norrie 1991.  
9 Kaplan 1956; Cattaneo 1965; Gauthier 1969; Ackerman 1976; Tuck 1979; Sanderson 1989; 
Watkins 1989; Heyd 1991; Lloyd 1992; Bobbio 1993; Cohen 1998; Sorell 2001; Brettschneider 
2007; Ristroph 2009; Ribeiro 2011.  
10 Kaplan 1956, pp. 391-2; Gauthier 1969, p. 148; Sanderson 1989, p. 101; Finkelstein 2001, p. 
357; Kahn 2004, p. 3; Ristroph 2013, p. 202. 
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It is the contention of this thesis that Hobbes did develop a full and coherent 
theory of crime and punishment. He addresses not merely the purpose of punishment, 
but provides a clear account of its origins. Furthermore, he relates both of these 
accounts to his analysis of human motivation and the purpose men have in joining 
together to create the state. I argue that this theory of punishment consistently 
emphasises its civil qualities: it is grounded in the rule of law and due process, and 
hence on the preserved political relationship between the punishing sovereign and the 
punished subject. As such, it can helpfully be contrasted with Hobbes’s account of 
hostility, both in the pre-political state of nature and also, more importantly, in the 
international sphere.  
While a proper understanding of this theory is crucial given its role in 
underpinning the Hobbesian commonwealth, examining his discussion of crime and 
punishment also yields insights into a number of related areas of his political 
philosophy. Once we take Hobbes at his word that punishment is meted out to citizens, 
we can better understand his presentation of those individual rights which are retained 
despite the institution of the commonwealth. The nature of these true liberties of 
subjects has been frequently misunderstood and mischaracterised. They are not, I 
argue, the basis of a political right to rebel against the sovereign. But nor are they 
politically irrelevant liberty rights which can be taken as entirely distinct from the 
covenant authorising the sovereign. Instead, they are best understood as instances of 
inalienable self-representation. They demonstrate that while Hobbes’s commonwealth 
is grounded in political representation, he did not believe that it was a necessary 
component of every aspect of civil life.  
In addition to a theory of punishment, Hobbes also provides a detailed account 
of the nature and origins of criminality. Furthermore, his discussion of the errors of 
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reasoning which might lead individuals to commit crime is also instructive in relation 
to his theory of human motivation more broadly: in analysing his explanation of the 
elements of criminal dispositions, we find that the problem of providing subjects with 
reasons to obey the law is embedded within his civil project at the deepest level. His 
primary categorisation of men, according to their internalisation of the principle of 
justice, is not exclusively related to the problem of obligation and sedition. It also 
serves as an explanatory key to the problem of law-breaking within society.  
The questions Hobbes addressed through his account of crime and punishment 
thus go to the heart of his work. In designing his penology Hobbes needed to present 
his readers with an institution consistent with his explanation of a state created through 
the wills of men aware of their own vulnerability. His account, therefore, is complex 
precisely because the problem of how to balance the existence of a harm-inflicting 
practice such as punishment with a theory of the state as designed to protect individual 
security is itself a difficult one. With the increasing appeal of social contract theory in 
the seventeenth century, it is unsurprising that the problem of explaining and justifying 
state punishment was one that generated debate among theorists of the state. Hobbes’s 
solution to the problems raised by these debates, I suggest, were unique, and his focus 
on the topic indicates that already from the origins of modern state theory the problems 
associated with crime and punishment were understood as some of the key questions 
any voluntaristic theory of the state had to answer.  
To assess Hobbes’s argument and the debates to which he was responding, I 
have adopted an approach which is both textual and contextual. My primary focus is 
on Hobbes’s political writings: The Elements of Law (1640), De Cive (1642) and 
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Leviathan (1651).11 Leviathan, as we shall see, contains the richest exposition of 
Hobbes’s thoughts on crime. It is also the text that, due to the introduction of the 
concept of the authorised sovereign, most clearly demonstrates the way in which 
Hobbes’s theory of punishment was formed by his theory of the state. I therefore 
devote most space to Hobbes’s final iteration of his political theory. Nonetheless, one 
of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that these questions were inherent in 
Hobbes’s thinking about politics and human community from the start. Wherever 
possible, I compare his treatment across the texts, mapping the development of his 
thought.  
It is important to add that Hobbes’s discussion of crime and punishment is not 
confined to these texts. There are important insights to be gained from his accounts of 
representation, deliberation and the will in Of Liberty and Necessity, Thomas White’s 
De Mundo Examined, An Answer to Bishop Bramhall’s Book, called ‘The Catching of 
the Leviathan and De Homine.12 Finally, Hobbes’s legal treatise A Dialogue Between 
a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common Laws of England and his history of the 
                                                   
11 All English quotations from De Cive are taken from the unauthorised 1650/1 translation made 
by Charles Cotton and published under the title The Philosophical Rudiments. This translation 
includes the additional explanatory notes Hobbes provided in the 1647 edition of De Cive. I have 
largely relied on the English Leviathan (1651), with occasional discussions of the phrasing in 
Hobbes’s Latin translation (1668) where this represents a relevant departure from, or addition to, 
the original. On Cotton’s translation see Malcolm 2002, pp. 234-58.  
12 While composed in 1645 as part of a debate with Bishop John Bramhall, Of Liberty and 
Necessity was only published in 1654. For a discussion of this debate and of the work’s publication 
history see Chapter 7 of Jackson 2007. Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, also known as De 
Loco, Motu et Tempore, was composed in 1642-3 as a response to the De Mundo Dialogi Tres 
(1642) by Catholic priest Thomas White. It remained unpublished until 1973. On these two texts 
see Chapter 4 of Edwards 2013. On Hobbes’s relationship with White see Peacey 1998, pp. 250-1 
and Collins 2002, p. 312. An Answer to Bishop Bramhall’s Book, called ‘The Catching of the 
Leviathan, while composed in 1668 in response to Bramhall’s 1658 critique, was only published 
in 1682. On the political context which may have prompted Hobbes’s ‘remarkable burst of 
productivity’ in the late 1660s see Parkin 2007, pp. 240-2. While elements of De Homine, intended 
as the second section of the trilogy The Elements of Philosophy, were composed in 1645, the work 
itself was only published in 1658. Martinich 2005, pp. 13-5. 
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civil wars, Behemoth, or The Long Parliament restate a number of his principles and 
contrast them with contemporary political and legal practice.13  
As an interpretive principle, I have attempted to explain developments in 
Hobbes’s thought primarily by reference to other elements of his theory; this approach 
has been particularly useful in explaining his shifting accounts of the relationship 
between self-preservation rights and the origin of sovereign rights, and between 
deliberation, responsibility and crimes arising from ‘sudden passion.’ However, where 
contradictions have arisen within individual texts, I have opted for the interpretation 
which best preserves the coherence of the theory as a whole, rather than one which 
requires that Hobbes was entirely consistent in his use of language. This commitment 
is particularly important when we come to the discussion of the operation of subjects’ 
true liberties in a commonwealth founded upon an authorisation covenant.  
In addition to analysing Hobbes’s works, I also aim to contextualise his 
comments by outlining the range of approaches to punishment available to early 
modern social contract theorists. I am particularly interested in how early modern 
thinkers attempted to justify punishment as a human institution in the context of 
political authority generated through agreement. I therefore do not explore divine right 
or patriarchal theories about the origin of the right to punish; such theories do not 
address the crucial questions motivating Hobbes’s exploration of the topic and 
therefore do not shed light on what he felt was at stake.14 As I suggest in Chapters 2 
                                                   
13 It is unknown when Hobbes composed the Dialogue; Alan Cromartie suggests that the main part 
of the text was written between 1668 and 1673. The full work was not printed until 1681, though 
an unauthorised manuscript of ‘A Dialogue betwixt a Student in the Common laws of Eng-land, 
and a Philosopher’ was in circulation by 1673. Cromartie 2005, pp. xv-xvii. Paul Seward argues 
that Behemoth was also written in or around 1668. Hobbes was unable to acquire a licence for print 
publication and the work was only printed posthumously in 1682, though a manuscript of the text 
was available through his publisher, William Crooke, from 1673. Seaward 2010, pp. 6-16.  
14 It is also for this reason that I do not fully explore and contextualise Hobbes’s discussions of 
divine punishment. As Hobbes makes clear in Leviathan, God derives his authority not from a 
covenant, but as a consequence of his overwhelming power. His right to punish sin, therefore, 
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and 6, contractarian thinkers were deeply aware of the ways in which punishment 
rights could be used to justify resistance to the state. In rendering punishment a purely 
civil institution, therefore, Hobbes was engaged not only in designing the elements of 
a functional commonwealth, but also in a specifically political intervention which 
delegitimised any link between punishment, war and political resistance.  
Chapter 1 discusses Hobbes’s definitions of crime and punishment; these 
contain within them the key features of the theory which he then outlines over the 
course of his works. Notably, crime and punishment are both defined in relation to a 
legal sphere distinct from the sovereign’s political power as the authorised 
representative of the commonwealth. Hobbes sets out a number of situations in which 
ordinarily criminal behaviour is excused, as when a starving individual is forced to 
steal to survive. Excuse, in Hobbes’s theory, is not associated with mercy, but rather 
with a correct understanding of the nature of the commonwealth-instituting covenant; 
men cannot alienate their right to self-preservation, and so the law and sovereign have 
no jurisdiction in times of genuine necessity. 
This link between the purpose of the state and its jurisdictional limitations is 
also a feature of the second chapter, which explores the origins of the right to punish. 
Here I argue that punishment is a unique example of a non-authorised sovereign right. 
Indeed, it is better defined as a practice, rather than a specific new right arising from 
the creation of the commonwealth. It is grounded in the right to all things retained by 
the sovereign, but to be understood as punishment it must be applied according to the 
strictures of natural law. While punishment is not an instance of authorised sovereign 
behaviour, nor is it a practice which takes place in a version of the state of nature. As 
                                                   
comes from the same source, and as a result the nature of divine punishment is significantly 
different from that which is found in the human commonwealth. Hobbes 2012, p. 558. At the same 
time, Hobbes did occasionally draw parallels between human and divine punishment, instances 
which I note at various points in the thesis.  
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a result, both the individual right to self-preservation and the legal processes which 
limit the scope of sovereign action are maintained. Subjects are neither expected to 
authorise their own punishment, nor to undergo any and all suffering as a result of 
breaking the law. This is a situation which arises, I argue, from the nature of the 
authorising covenant; subjects are specifically disallowed from authorising actions 
which will directly harm them, and it is a result of this caveat that they retain a right 
to resist punishment.  
Chapter 3 considers Hobbes’s account of the origins of crime. Criminals, I 
argue, can be characterised by their disregard for the law and its coercive powers. In 
acting upon this disregard they demonstrate their rejection of civil equality, according 
to which all subjects are equal before the sovereign’s laws. Both criminals and those 
who avoid crime primarily out of fear of punishment thus show themselves to be 
‘foolish unjust men’ because they act according to personal determinations of good 
and evil rather than common civil standards of justice.   
The question of human motivation also arises in the fourth chapter, which 
investigates Hobbes’s theory of deterrence. Punishment, according to Hobbes, is only 
capable of rendering certain actions, such as crime, less appealing to individuals. It 
cannot be used to assuage the feelings of anger experienced by crime’s victims. Nor 
can it act as a vehicle for demonstrating community disapproval. As a result, Hobbes, 
in contrast to his contemporaries, is committed to a purely forward-looking theory of 
punishment which makes no reference to standards of justice beyond those determined 
by the sovereign. However, Hobbes also recognised that a deterrent model of 
punishment is unable to provide reasons for obeying the law in general, rather than 
individual laws. Therefore it must be supplemented by a system of public instruction 
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which will teach the people that it is in their best interest to maintain the 
commonwealth through consistently just behaviour.  
Finally, I suggest that, while both crime and punishment should be understood 
as taking place within the state, Hobbes does have an account of when and why 
individuals can be expelled from the commonwealth. Therefore the fifth chapter 
explores Hobbes’s account of treason. In conflating the legal categories of enmity and 
treason, Hobbes provided a theory of obligation in direct contrast with that espoused 
by both the English common law and by jurists of international law. Moreover, his 
denial of the existence of the ius gentium, a separate sphere of law governing war and 
the treatment of foreigners, allows him to draw a strong distinction between the 
commonwealth as a site of legal protection and security, and the international sphere 
as marked by potentially dangerous hostility. He thus emphasises that while crime can 
be accommodated within the state, once an individual rejects the civil project 
altogether they are stripped of any legal protections and enter into a state of war with 
their former sovereign. 
Once we have understood the nature of rebellion in Hobbes’s theory, we are 
better equipped to understand why it is impossible to construct a right to rebel against 
the sovereign from his list of the true liberties of the subject. In Chapter 6 I provide an 
account of the ways in which Hobbes’s theory of state personality was designed 
specifically to meet the challenges posed by sixteenth and seventeenth century theories 
of popular sovereignty. I then provide an analysis of his true liberties of the subject 
which demonstrates that it is precisely because of the criminal/enemy distinction that 
a right to rebel cannot be constructed from them. 
It is a consistent theme of social histories of early modern crime and 
punishment in England that the application of punishments was often at odds with the 
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directions laid down by the law.15 Theory and practice, therefore, need to be examined 
as related but distinct aspects of the early modern experience. In providing a full 
discussion of one early modern political theory of crime and punishment, I suggest 
that understanding early modern attitudes also requires an awareness of how these 
were considered at an abstract level. Hobbes’s account of crime and punishment 
demonstrates that, with the influence of theories of natural rights and the social 
contract, the nature of these concepts was subject to radical re-categorisation in this 
period.  
  
                                                   
15 Lenman and Parker 1980; Sharpe 1980; Beattie 1986; Herrup 1987; Sharpe 1987; Walker 2003.  
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Chapter 1: Hobbes’s Definitions of Crime and Punishment 
 
Introduction: The Necessity of Definition 
Among the many criticisms of Edward Coke offered in the Dialogue, one of them in 
particular cuts to the heart of the penal enterprise. Coke, according to Hobbes, ‘no 
where defineth a Crime, that we may know what it is.’16 Furthermore, he suggests that 
this conceptual imprecision means that, in Coke’s understanding of the law, an ‘odius 
name sufficeth…to make a Crime of any thing.’17 The implication is that the term 
‘crime’ is not properly treated by common law thinkers as an interpretative legal 
category that can be used to explain why an action is wrong. Instead, it is used as 
something closer to a moral descriptor; crimes are bad actions, rather than actions 
being bad because they are crimes. Hobbes’s rejection of this indeterminacy was part 
of a larger project, in which he aimed to offer clear definitions of those terms which 
refer to positive law. This was an endeavour upon which he placed increasing 
emphasis over the course of his works. The critique of Coke in the Dialogue, a text 
which took aim at the claim by common lawyers to have unique access to legal reason, 
is thus particularly well placed. By the time he came to write it Hobbes had already 
set out an alternative theory in which crime was, rather than simply another term for 
‘odius’ action, defined in terms of the law-making power of the sovereign. Both crime 
and punishment are, according to Hobbes, primarily civil categories; they should 
                                                   
16 Hobbes 2005, p. 111. 
17 Ibid. Hobbes is correct to note that while Coke refers to ‘crimes’, as when he indicates that the 
Third Part of the Institutes will discuss ‘Criminall Causes’, and ‘felonies and other crimes’, he 
nowhere provides a definition of the term itself. In his assertion that Coke considers crimes ‘odius’, 
Hobbes may be referring to a passage at the end of the Preface to the Third Part of the Institutes, 
where Coke writes that ‘We shal first treat of the highest, and most heinous crime of High 
Treason…and of the rest of them in order, as they are greater and more odious then others’ or to 
Coke’s discussion of bail, where he refers to ‘odious and heynous crime’. Coke 2003, pp. 949, 
950, 951, 842.  
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therefore be understood in relation to subjects’ obligations derived from the 
commonwealth institution, and to the sovereign’s rights gained thereby.  
Coke was not peculiar in not employing ‘crime’ as a distinct category of action. 
As G. R. Elton has pointed out, the term, while in use in the early modern period, had 
no specific legal meaning, with actions against the criminal law instead classified as 
either felonies, on the one hand, or as trespasses and misdemeanours on the other.18 
The dictionaries of the period, such as Henry Cockeram’s The English dictionarie, did 
not place the term in a legal context; the 1642 edition, for instance, defines ‘Crime’ as 
‘a fault or an offence committed’ and ‘Criminall’ as ‘faulty’.19 Michael Dalton’s 
handbook The Coutry Iustice (1618) contains no entry for crime as such, while John 
Cowell’s legal dictionary The Interpreter (1607) also lacks an entry for the term. The 
same is true of Thomas Blount’s Nomo-lexicon, a law-dictionarie (1670) and of John 
Rastell’s  Les terms de la ley (1642).20 Elton, therefore, appears to be correct in 
suggesting that modern historians, when they compile and analyse statistics relating 
to crime rates in the early modern period, are ‘studying…something like an artificial 
construct’ and applying terminology which would not have been recognised by the 
period’s judges and jurists.  
                                                   
18 Elton 1977, p. 2. This basic division was one which reflected both the presumed mental state of 
the accused, with ‘felony’ indicating a malicious intent, and the penalties assigned, with those who 
had committed felonies subject to capital punishment. Herrup 1987, pp. xi, 3; Forster 1654, p. 4.  
Regarding the difficulty of defining early modern crime, see also Herrup 1987, p. 1 and Sharpe 
1984, p. 4.  
19 Cockeram 1642. Cockeram’s dictionary was popular, with twelve editions appearing between 
1623 and 1670. See Considine 2010, p. 24.   
20 Dalton 1618; Cowell 1607; Blount 1670; Rastell 1642. Hobbes had access to such legal 
handbooks. The Chatsworth ‘Old Catalogue’ contains an entry for the 1618 edition of Dalton’s 
The Coutry Iustice. In addition, it cites A profitable booke of Maister John Perkins felowe of the 
inner temple treating of the lawes of England (1560), Anthony Fitzherbert’s The newe booke of 
iustyces of peas (1541) and William Lambarde’s Eirenarcha: or the Office of the Justices of the 
Peace (1581). In line with contemporary usage, none of these works employ the terminology of 
‘crime’. Talaska 2013, pp. 79, 102, 83, 94.  
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Hobbes’s own strong insistence on the term’s usefulness, and his critique of 
the common law’s failure to employ ‘crime’ as a means of describing illegal action, is 
therefore a part of his broader critique of the legal thought and procedure of his age. 
His focus on clear definitions is of a piece with his larger project of rendering criminal 
justice in his own commonwealth both comprehensible and predictable through a 
singular emphasis on sovereign right and power.21 Punishment could thus be as strong 
a deterrent as possible, but the legal system would also ensure that citizens were given 
every chance to demonstrate that their actions were not only in line with the natural 
law but also, and more importantly, consistent with the will of the sovereign. The legal 
system, in failing to systematically define its terms, becomes an unpredictable tool in 
the hands of civil authority, an error which Hobbes was keen to rectify in his own 
theory.   
 
Hobbes’s Definition of Crime 
While Hobbes occasionally refers to ‘crime’ in the Elements,22 his first systematic 
definition of such acts is to be found in De Cive. Here he writes that illegal action, or 
‘fault’, ‘is that, which a man do’s, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of the City, 
that is, contrary to the Lawes.’23 Already, therefore, we see Hobbes collapsing the 
traditional categories of felony and trespass in favour of an all-encompassing division 
between actions in accordance with the law, and those which are against it. In this 
                                                   
21 See McBride 2007, p. 50 for a reading of Leviathan which frames it as a response to the Book 
of Job; Hobbes’s political theory, according to this interpretation, aims to to ‘create a political 
order that is based upon awesome power yet not opaque to human reason.’  
22 These mentions are cursory and assume understanding on the part of the reader. Thus we read 
that true mathematicians are ‘absolved of the crime of breeding controversy’, that because citizens’ 
property is to be made available to the sovereign ‘the land of one man may be transferred to 
another, without crime of him from whom it was taken’ and that while the expression of signs of 
hatred and contempt towards accused criminals is common, it is, properly speaking, ‘no part of the 
punishment for their crime’. Hobbes 1969, pp. 67, 140, 86.  
23 Hobbes 1983, p. 178.  
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account Hobbes himself declines to use the specific term ‘crime’; throughout his 
explanation he employs the terms ‘fault’ [culpa] and ‘sin’ [peccatum], defining an 
ever narrower category of sins in order to provide a definition of actions against the 
sovereign’s laws.24 Thus we read that ‘Sinne, in its largest signification, comprehends 
every deed, word, and thought, against right reason’ but that ‘when we speak of the 
Lawes, the word Sinne is taken in a more strict sense.’ This sense, or condition, is 
whether an action is ‘blameable’, a standard which in turn requires the determination 
of whose reason, regarding that blame, will be taken as authoritative.25 Sin as illegal 
action, therefore, requires a universal standard of right reason, and thus the presence 
of a sovereign capable of setting down law.26  
 By the time Hobbes came to write Leviathan he was ready to employ the 
terminology of crime more consistently, although the categorisation of crime as a 
specific type of sin remained. Thus we read in Chapter 27 that ‘A CRIME, is a sinne, 
consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that which the Law forbiddeth, 
or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not 
every sinne a Crime.’27 He provides a similar definition in the  Dialogue, where we 
again read that ‘All Crimes are indeed Sins, but not all Sins Crimes…a Crime is such 
a Sin as consists in an Action against the Law.’28 This shift in vocabulary is reflected 
in his Latin terminology; the Latin Leviathan (1668) discusses crimen as a type of  
                                                   
24 Hobbes 1984, p. 213. 
25 Hobbes 1983, pp. 177-8. 
26 At various points in the text Hobbes does use the term ‘crime’, as when he refers to the ‘crimen 
laesae maiestatis’ and in his explanation for the necessity of punishing crimes with adequate 
severity. Hobbes 1983, pp. 190, 204.  
27 Hobbes 2012, p. 452. Leviathan contains numerous uses of the term ‘crime’; in addition to the 
title of Chapter 27, ‘Of CRIMES, EXCUSES, and EXTENUATIONS’, the text contains over 40 
examples.   
28 Hobbes 2005, p. 42.  
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peccatum, rather than simply indicating, as we saw in De Cive, that the same term, 
peccatum, can mean different things in different contexts.29  
  Alongside this increasing use of the term ‘crime’, we also see an increased 
emphasis on such acts being, necessarily, sins of action due to the limitations of human 
knowledge. Thus we read that to ‘intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never 
appeare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his 
charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be 
argued by a humane Judge, it hath not the name of Crime.’30 The same emphasis on 
action, rather than intention, is present in the Dialogue’s statement that a definitional 
element of crime is that those who commit it can be ‘Accused, and Tryed by a Judge, 
and be Convinced, or Cleared by Witnesses.’31 By the time we come to the later texts, 
therefore, crimes are not merely actions against the law, but also actions which can be 
determined to be so according to judicial processes.  
This is not merely a consequence of the distinction between having intentions 
and acting upon them. As a result of this understanding of crime, certain instances of 
‘wickedness’ are not to be classified as crimes at all, as they cannot consist of 
recognisable acts. In the Dialogue, for instance, Hobbes argues that it is impossible to 
comprehend the ‘nature’ of the crimes of those accused of witchcraft,32 a position in 
                                                   
29 Hobbes 2012, p. 453.  
30 Hobbes 2012, pp. 452-4. We see the same division between crime as the subject of human 
punishment and sin as subject to divine punishment in the work of Hugo Grotius. Grotius 2005, p. 
995. 
31 Hobbes 2005, p. 42. Hünig 2007, p. 217 argues that limiting the definition of crime to ‘outward 
acts’ demonstrates Hobbes’s ‘systematic distinction between divine and earthly justice’ which was 
‘fundamental for the secularization of penal law.’ This was not a particularly original position for 
Hobbes to take, however. As Annabel Brett has pointed out, in the early modern Thomist tradition 
there was a ‘common insistence that the obligation of the law covers only…the ‘external acts’ of 
the human being’, a position bolstered by Aquinas’s insistence that, in contrast with the divine, 
human judgment was incompetent with regards to interior acts. Brett 2011, pp. 144, 148. See also 
Maus 1991 on Renaissance discussions of the inaccessibility of other minds, and Tuckness and 
Parrish 2014, pp. 154, 100 which notes that Hobbes’s definition of crime as outward action was 
‘largely in line with the post-Augustinian Christian political tradition’ for precisely this reason.  
32 Hobbes 2005, p. 91 
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line with his statement in Leviathan that witches have no ‘reall power.’ Witchcraft, 
being the result of ‘false beliefe’, cannot be considered a crime. While those claiming 
such power are ‘justly punished’, this is only the case when such individuals show a 
demonstrable ‘purpose’ to do ‘mischiefe’, and it is for this mischief that they are 
subject to penal procedures.33 We see Hobbes making the same argument with regards 
to heresy. In the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan he argues that it is ‘inequitable’ to 
punish a heretic unless he has specifically ‘contradict[ed] the words of the Creed’; 
‘false reasoning’ or potential ‘implications’ alone are not punishable acts.34 Perhaps 
most importantly, the law is unable to punish those breaches of the natural law which 
do not result in actions; in Chapter 3 we shall explore the possibility that men can be 
both unjust, according to the natural law, and yet consistently law-abiding. The 
sovereign has no recourse through the criminal law against such forms of injustice. 
The Hobbesian commonwealth thus requires a robust legal system aimed at the 
determination of the legality of actions, and in which judges have good reasons to 
convict the accused.35 
 It is this emphasis on crime as an actual, provable breach of the laws, rather 
than humanitarian concerns, that lies behind some of Hobbes’s advice regarding 
investigative procedures.36 In Chapter 14 of Leviathan he writes that a man is not to 
be required by the state to provide evidence against those  ‘by whose Condemnation’ 
                                                   
33 Hobbes 2012, p. 34. 
34 Hobbes 2012, p. 1214. On this point see Lloyd 1997, pp. 49-50. 
35 Related to this emphasis on action is Hobbes’s definition of sin as the formed intention of 
breaking the law, rather than merely the contemplation of sinful acts. See Kow 2005 and Hanin 
2012, p. 81. As Hobbes notes in Leviathan, to ‘be delighted in the Imagination onely, of being 
possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them by force or 
fraud’ is no breach of the natural law. Hobbes 2012, p. 452. See also Hobbes 2012, p. 108 on the 
blamelessness of mere thoughts, and Hobbes’s denunciation of the inquisition on the grounds that 
‘it is an error to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions onely, to the very thoughts, 
and consciences of men, by examination… notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and 
actions.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 1096.  
36 See Cattaneo 1965, p. 296 and Hünig 2007, p. 228. 
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he ‘falls into misery, as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor.’ This is not to prevent the 
suffering of those pressed in this way; rather, ‘the testimony of such an Accuser, if it 
be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature’ and hence cannot be 
trusted as an accurate description of the actions of the accused. For the same reason, 
‘Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies’. Hobbes notes that 
any response in such cases ‘tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the 
informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient 
Testimony.’37 Hobbes’s insistence upon the  neutrality of arbitrators is derived from 
the same concern; he argues that ‘in a controversie of Fact’ the judge should ‘give no 
more credit to one [witness], than to the other.’38 
  
Excuses and the Jurisdiction of the Law 
While Hobbes’s account of the difference between sin and crime might suggest that 
we can understand crime as simply the breach of the laws, his description of possible 
extenuations and excuses for acts normally considered criminal indicates that the 
motivations of the accused criminal are also relevant. Because crime is a civil 
category, possible only upon the introduction of civil law, its definition is in turn 
governed by the initial covenant creating the commonwealth. It is therefore to be 
understood in the context of the the built-in protections and exceptions contained 
therein. Crime is a breach of the law which subjects have themselves, through the 
                                                   
37 Hobbes 2012, p. 214. As Langbein 2006, p. 73 points out, it was in fact common for English 
jurists to condemn the use of investigative torture, and a point of pride that it did not feature in the 
common law. He notes, for instance, that according to Sir Thomas Smith it was commonly held in 
England that the use of torture was ‘servile’. However, such concerns did not necessarily emerge 
out of concern regarding the truth of coerced confessions, and Langbein points out that between 
1540 and 1640 there were over 80 instances of either the Privy Council or the monarch ordering 
the use of torture for investigative purposes. On the investigative uses of torture in civil law 
procedures, see Cohen 2010, pp. 42-3, 65.  
38 Hobbes 2012, p. 238.  
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authorisation of the sovereign, willed into existence. As such, all crime can be 
considered both a form of injury, in that it is the breach of a contract, and absurdity, 
in that it contradicts one’s previous, and authoritative, will.39 Crucially, criminal 
behaviour motivated by absolute physical necessity is not only excused, but is placed 
outside the classification of crime altogether. Hobbes’s definition of a crime as an act 
against the law, therefore, must be understood as operating within his already 
circumscribed definition of what the law is able to address.  
There are two means by which intention, or other contextual information, can 
bear on the legal process: excuse and extenuation. In the case of the former, the act is 
‘is proved to be [no crime] at all’ while the latter applies when ‘the Crime, that seemed 
great, is made lesse.’40 For an act to be excused, or re-classified as entirely non-
criminal, it must be determined that the law has no jurisdiction: ‘That which totally 
Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a Crime, can be none but that, 
which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed 
once against the Law, if he that omitted it be obligated to the Law, can be no other 
than a Crime.’41 By framing excuses in this way Hobbes is able to continue to define 
crime in relation to the law, while nonetheless allowing a range of legal, though 
ordinarily criminal, behaviour.  
The most striking case of this principle is the description of those actions which 
are permitted in order to preserve one’s life. Hobbes repeatedly argues that ‘no Law 
can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation.’42 Thus it is unsurprising that if a 
‘Man is assaulted, and fears present death’ any action he takes to protect himself, 
                                                   
39 On this point see Taylor 1938, p. 409.  
40 Hobbes 2012, p. 466. 
41 Hobbes 2012, p. 468.  
42 Ibid. 
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including  ‘wounding him that assaulteth him…to death’, is ‘no Crime.’43 However, 
not only is the state to excuse direct self-defence against an assailant, but it should also 
tolerate any actions undertaken when compelled ‘by the terrour of present death’ or 
when a man is ‘captive, or in the power of the enemy.’44 Thus being ‘destitute of food, 
or other thing necessary for…life’ is enough to excuse any action, provided that all 
other means of self-preservation, including charity, have been exhausted.45 In such 
cases the fact of having committed theft, for instance, cannot alone categorise an 
individual as a criminal.46  
As a result, crimes must, by definition, be not only acts against the law, but 
also actions undertaken by those whose bodily protection and basic existence are 
assured by the state. Hobbes was not unique among early modern natural law theorists 
in permitting a degree of illegal action for reasons of self-preservation. As John Salter 
has noted, we see a similar form of excuse in the work of Hugo Grotius. However, as 
Salter points out, Grotius’s position is based on a two-fold argument. While in cases 
of dire need a common right to the earth’s resources is reinstated at the individual 
level, rendering legal the theft of others’ surplus goods, the more common basis for 
excuse is that the criminal justice system contains within it the possibility of mercy 
dependent upon circumstance.47 Hobbes’s account, in which actions normally 
considered theft are rendered legal due to a revocation of the law’s jurisdiction, is 
therefore a departure from this approach. Instead, it is grounded in Hobbes’s theory of 
                                                   
43 Hobbes 2012, p. 464.  
44 Hobbes 2012, p. 468.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Salter 1999, p. 211. As Salter emphasises, according to Grotius theft in dire circumstances 
generally remains theft; the question is whether such injustice, given the circumstances, should be 
punished.  
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the purpose of the state, and is intimately linked to his wider project of creating an 
adaptive relationship between subjects’ rights and their security.48  
Actions are also only to be classified as criminal if individuals have the 
capability to be aware of the law and the punishments for its transgression. Hobbes 
argues that ‘the Law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself is not 
obligatory,’49 but it is important to stress that, in such cases, the defect must be found 
in the sovereign’s actions, or lack of them, and not in those of the subject. As Hobbes 
notes regarding ignorance as an excuse, ‘the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be 
considered as a want of means’ to know the law’s content and the consequences for 
law-breaking.50 Beyond cases in which the sovereign has failed to make the law 
known, Hobbes essentially restricts the excuse of ignorance to children and madmen; 
such individuals, Hobbes notes, lack ‘reason enough for the Government of [their] 
own affairs’ and thereby demonstrate that they also lack the reason to understand the 
natural law.51 As a consequence they cannot be expected to understand the civil law 
and its punishments.52  
                                                   
48 It is important to stress that even though the acts of subjects under genuine threat are placed, in 
this model, outside the law, this does not have an equivalent impact on their political status more 
broadly. See Chapters 2 and 6 for a fuller discussion of the true liberties of the subject, and the 
ways in which the Hobbesian state is able to accommodate both them and subjects’ citizenship.  
49 Hobbes 2012, p. 468. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Hobbes 2012, p. 468. 
52 The case of the sovereign who is negligent in informing his subjects of the law, and that of the 
individual whose actions are excused due to their necessity, suggest that the absence of legal 
obligation is a temporary or contingent condition. But Hobbes’s comments about children and 
madmen indicate that it can also be a permanent one. This treatment of their otherwise criminal 
behaviour is consistent with their relationship to the commonwealth more broadly: 
 Over natural fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than 
over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because 
they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the 
consequences threof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise 
the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a 
Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken 
away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom 
any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the 
means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; 
And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. Hobbes 2012, p. 422 
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We must also draw a distinction between those acts which Hobbes classifies 
as crimes, and those which are acts of treason or rebellion.53 As we shall see in Chapter 
3,  in some cases there appears to be some affinity between the ideas or dispositions 
which prompt crime, and those which are found among the treasonous. However 
Hobbes consistently notes that the positive law of the state has no jurisdiction over 
those who have rejected sovereign authority, and hence actions which make this 
rejection clear are not crimes in the ordinary sense of the term. 
Finally, there is one further case in which ordinarily criminal behaviour is to 
be excused: when it is committed by the sovereign. This is an absolute and 
foundational element of Hobbes’s theory, and it is worth examining Hobbes’s reasons 
for this blanket exemption. This is based on an opposition between law and power 
which is fundamental to any understanding of his account of crime. As we saw, to 
commit a crime is to break the law of the commonwealth. This ‘Civill Law’ has for its 
author the ‘Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth’ 54 Later in the same 
text Hobbes repeats, in the course of criticising common law principles, that ‘it is not 
that Juris prudentia, or wisdome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our 
Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law.’55 
What is immediately notable is that laws are attributed to the sovereign only 
indirectly: he has the power to make laws, but because he undertakes this act through 
                                                   
53 See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of the legal status of rebels and traitors.  
54 Hobbes 2012, p. 414 
55 Hobbes 2012, p. 422. In the Dialogue Hobbes omits this distinction, writing that ‘A Law is the 
Command of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, given to those that be his or their 
Subjects, declaring Publickly, and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear 
to do.’ This seems to be part of a larger project in this text of conflating the sovereign’s two 
possible grounds for action, law and power, as the Philosopher goes on to claim that ‘whereas they 
sometimes say the King is bound, not only to cause his Laws to be observ’d, but also to observe 
them himself; I think the King causing them to be observ’d is the same thing as observing them 
himself: For I never heard it taken for good Law, that the King may be Indicted, or Appealed, or 
served with a Writ, till the long Parliament practised the contrary upon the good King Charles.’ 
Hobbes 2005, pp. 31, 38-9.  
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his representative function, these laws are not his commands as such, but are rather 
attributed to the person of the commonwealth. The ability of the sovereign to avoid 
accusations of law-breaking is attributed to this power to make law as the 
commonwealth’s representative, rather than to a personal claim of extra-legal status 
in everything he does. This distinction means that, in some cases, the person of the 
sovereign can indeed be accused of acting against his own commands. As Hobbes 
explains in Chapter 21 
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of debt, or of 
right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service 
required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporall, or 
pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to 
sue for his right, as if it were against a  Subject, and before such 
Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign.56  
 
However, Hobbes notes that the accusation that the sovereign has acted against 
his own law is only possible when the ‘Soveraign demandeth [something illegal] by 
force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power’ and ‘declareth thereby, that he 
requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law.’ If, on the other hand, the 
sovereign acts on the basis of his ‘Power’, then there is ‘no action of Law: for all that 
is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every Subject, and 
consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against 
himselfe.’57 It is this power which is again referenced in Chapter 27 in order to argue 
that the sovereign can never be accused of crime: the sovereign, ‘having power to 
make, and repeale Lawes…may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, 
by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he 
                                                   
56 Hobbes 2012, p. 342. If we take the complainant in such cases to be the individual in question 
rather than the state, is possible that such suits are not to be understood as criminal. However, the 
vague nature of Hobbes’s comments leaves open the possibility of interpreting the sovereign’s 
failure to punish according to the laws of the commonwealth as a criminal act. 
57 Hobbes 2012, p. 342. 
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was free before.’58 Thus the sovereign’s immunity comes not from some specific grant 
associated with his position, but rather from his ability to choose to act according to a 
parallel source of authority, his authorisation, and from his associated political power 
to change the laws.59  
 In framing the power of the sovereign in this way, Hobbes provides an 
autonomous legal sphere which is, at least theoretically, distinct from the political. 
With the category of crime defined according to the standard of the former, rather than 
according to the more nebulous criteria of the sovereign’s individual wishes, we see a 
number of constraints placed on the definition of crime. These constraints come about 
not only through the mechanism of limiting the law’s jurisdiction, but also according 
to legal process itself.60 Hobbes writes that ‘No Law, made after a Fact, can make it a 
Crime…a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore 
cannot be Obligatory.’61 While the sovereign’s authorised power to change law may 
protect him from punishment, it cannot serve as a justification for the illegitimate 
charging of subjects. The requirement that crime be defined according to legal 
jurisdiction is thus protected from direct sovereign interference.62  
                                                   
58 Hobbes 2012, p. 416. 
59 Hobbes elsewhere emphasises authorisation as a reason why the sovereign cannot be punished, 
arguing in Chapter 18 that ‘no man that hath Soveraigne power can iustly be put to death, or 
otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the 
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.’ Hobbes 
2012, p. 270.  See also Goldsmith 1996, p. 284 which distinguishes between sovereign acts ‘within’ 
the law and those, such as legislating, which are political acts outside the legal sphere.   
60 In making this claim, I am not endorsing the opinion, put forward by Dyzenhaus 2001, Vinx 
2012 and Fox-Decent 2012 that the sovereign’s legitimacy is predicated on his acting according 
to the natural laws, but rather suggesting that certain types of sovereign activity can only be 
understood in relation to these laws.  
61 Hobbes 2012, p. 458. See Bacon 1853, p. 398, which states that ‘A law…ought to give warning 
before it strikes’. 
62 The sovereign, of course, has recourse to the laws of nature if he wishes to legitimately charge 
an individual according to unwritten law. Hobbes consistently emphasises the point that the laws 
of nature do not need to be explicitly set out by the sovereign for them to be binding in the 
commonwealth, as crimes against nature are mala in se. As he notes in Hobbes 1983, pp. 176-7, 
‘the naturall Law although it be disinguisht from the civill…yet so farre forth as it relates to our 
actions is civill.’ As a result, the civil law ‘punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe 
actually transgresse the lawes of nature.’ The sovereign is not entirely free to act as he wishes, 
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Hobbes’s definition of crime, as acts against the law where the law has full 
jurisdiction, suggests that the category of individuals capable of committing crimes is 
itself governed by the same principle. We have already seen this with regard to 
children and madmen unable to join the commonwealth; their actions are not crimes 
because they never agreed to be governed by the state’s laws. However, in a very 
different context the question of who was subject to the law was also a live topic in 
the early modern period. Francisco Suárez notes that because ‘law is made for general 
application within a given territory’ it is therefore ‘binding, for the period of their 
residence, on all persons actually living therein.’63 According to this model, in which 
legal obligation is determined territorially, the possibility that one’s actions are to be 
understood as criminal is based on residency, rather than on political or legal status 
within the commonwealth. In contrast, according to Hobbes’s theory legal obligation 
arises not simply from residency, but from the voluntary subjection of individuals to 
the state. Thus Hobbes defines civil laws as the ‘Lawes, that men are therefore bound 
to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in 
particular, but of a Common-wealth.’64 Obedience to civil law becomes a precept of 
natural law only through the act of covenanting: ‘every subject in a Common-wealth, 
                                                   
however. Punishments for breaches of the natural law are to be based upon ‘the law of naturall 
equity’, and once a given crime against natural law is punished, this equity demands that future 
crimes be treated in the same manner. A body of written law concerning the natural laws will thus 
grow over the course of a sovereign’s rule, providing guidance to subjects and binding future legal 
decisions. On the role of equity in ensuring consistency in punishment see Lobban 2012, p. 60. 
See also Hobbes 1969, pp. 189-90 and Hobbes 2005, p. 116.  Hünig 2007, p. 220 argues that 
Hobbes’s position is that ‘apart from the positive law there is no action per se that has the character 
of crime.’ It is important to stress, therefore, that actions against the natural law are indeed crimes, 
but only following the establishment of the commonwealth and only according to the sovereign’s 
definition of breaches of the natural law. Murder is always a crime, for instance, but only according 
to the definition the sovereign provides; killing as such is not necessarily criminal. See Hobbes 
1983, p. 101.  
63 Suárez 1944, p. 403. Gentili 1933, pp. 48-49 makes the same point regarding domicile and legal 
jurisdiction. However, see Grotius 2006, p. 137 for the argument that state law does not bind 
foreigners (though, as we shall see in Chapter 2, this does not mean that they are not liable to 
punishment).  
64 Hobbes 2012, p. 414. 
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hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law…and therefore Obedience to the Civill Law 
is part also of the Law of Nature.’65 
This account of legal obligation would appear to restrict the duty to obey the 
laws, and hence the possibility of committing crime, to citizens rather than mere 
residents. However, Hobbes elsewhere endorses something similar to Suárez’s 
account. In a discussion of exile he argues both that ‘If the Soveraign Banish his 
Subject; during Banishment, he is not a Subject’ and that ‘whosoever entreth into 
anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Laws thereof; unless he have a privilege by 
the amity of the Sovereaigns, or by special licence.’66 While residency alone might 
not be enough to require obedience, in many cases it can be taken as an implicit 
covenant of the type forming the Hobbesian commonwealth by acquisition.67 This in 
turn suggests that in most cases residents of a state will experience legal obligation, 
and will be understood to be committing crimes should they fail to act according to 
the laws. The law’s jurisdiction, therefore, applies teritorially, but Hobbes achieves 
this by linking territory to authority: men accept to be bound by the laws of the 
commonwealth in which they reside, and in doing so, they can be understood to be 
subjects.  
 
Hobbes’s Definition of Civil Punishment 
As with crime, Hobbes’s definition of punishment receives its fullest treatment in 
Leviathan, and it is again through the essential premises of the term that we find 
Hobbes elaborating his standards of criminal justice. In Chapter 28 punishment is 
defined as follows 
                                                   
65 Hobbes 2012, p. 418. 
66 Hobbes 2012, p. 346.  
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An Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath 
done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority 
to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of 
men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.68 
 
Within his definition, Hobbes already points to the elements of a full theory of 
punishment: the location of the right (‘publique Authority’); whom it is directed 
towards (men who have committed a ‘Transgression of the Law’); and its purpose (to 
render men ‘disposed to obedience’). These conditions will be further explored in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which will address the origins and location of the right to punish, 
Hobbes’s explanation of the origins of crime, and his argument for a deterrent practice. 
However, before these aspects of his theory can be fully explored, it is necessary to 
outline the ways in which this definition limits the acts which can be performed under 
the title of ‘punishment.’ 
 Civil punishment, in Hobbes’s account, can be performed only by one who has 
political authority over the punished individual, and thus who the individual in 
question himself recognises as authoritative.69 As a result, punishment can only take 
place in the context of an instituted commonwealth, and can be found neither in the 
state of nature, nor in a pre-political human community. This is a departure from the 
two major contractarian traditions of punishment which will be discussed in Chapter 
2: the Thomist theory of community rights, and the Grotian model of individual rights. 
Punishment, in these theories, can be carried out outside of the state, at the level of 
both state and non-state actors. According to the latter, the right to punish is naturally 
inherent in all men and therefore political authority is not required for punishment to 
take place; all that is necessary is that it be inflicted upon the guilty by the innocent.70 
                                                   
68 Hobbes 2012, p. 482. 
69 See Hobbes 2012, pp. 484, 486 for two consequences of this requirement: suffering inflicted by 
an usurper is not to be understood as punishment; nor is hostility undertaken against the sovereign.  
70 Grotius 2005, p. 955.  
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In the case of the former, punishment is identified with the natural right to self-
defence; it can therefore be carried out against those who do not recognise a given 
community’s will as authoritative.71 Thus a major implication of Hobbes’s definition 
is that punishment must be a civil practice; the relationship between punisher and 
punished is that between a subject and sovereign.  
 Linked to this civil relationship is the requirement that punishment can only 
follow a judgement which all citizens take as authoritative and legitimate precisely 
because of their political status. Hobbes expands on this requirement elsewhere in 
Chapter 28, noting that ‘the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent 
publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of hostile 
act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged…to be a 
transgression of the Law.’72 As we saw above, for a crime to have taken place, the law 
labelling it as such must have already been in existence at the time of the supposedly 
criminal act. This requirement is carried over into the discussion of punishment, with 
the stricture that ‘Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad 
it, is not Punishment…for before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law [and] 
Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression.’73 Moreover, the 
punishment inflicted upon an individual must itself conform to this judgement: if ‘a 
Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime 
committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment.’74 
Punishment is thus presented as being governed by the autonomous legal sphere noted 
above; to be understood as such, it must be regulated according to a series of 
promulgated laws setting out the rules men should obey, the procedures leading to 
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74 Ibid.  
 36 
conviction, and the nature of the harm to be inflicted. Actions against those who have 
not been determined to be guilty, therefore, are by definition not punishment. 
Finally, Hobbes insists that punishment must consist in the infliction of 
suffering upon the punished individual. The examples Hobbes provides of possible 
punishments, and those which he argues cannot be considered as such, might initially 
suggest that Hobbes envisages two distinct means of inflicting ‘evill’: the infliction of 
suffering, as in some forms of corporeal punishment, and the deprivation of a good, 
as when the punished individual is deprived of liberty, money or lands. However, we 
will see, not all deprivations of liberty or goods are to be understood as punishment. 
Even deprivation, therefore, must require some active suffering if it is to be considered 
punishment.75  
Hobbes sets out two major types of punishment, covering a number of 
practices. Corporal punishment consists of that which is ‘inflicted on the body 
directly.’ This is a wide category, including capital punishment as well as those acts 
which are not themselves intended to cause death,  including ‘Stripes, Wounds, 
Chains, and any other corporall Paine.’76 The deprivation of physical liberty inherent 
in imprisonment, when the latter is intended as punishment rather than as ‘the safe 
custody of a man accused’, also falls under the corporal label.77  Hobbes envisages 
such deprivation of liberty as encompassing an array of activities, reflecting the full 
                                                   
75 As Hünig 2007, p. 222 points out, the definition of punishment as the infliction of harm was 
standard at the time, and would remain so throughout the Enlightenment. See for example 
Grotius’s definition of punishment as ‘the Evil that we suffer for the Evil that we do’. Grotius 2005, 
p. 949. Hobbes does not include a standard Thomist element of the definition of punishment, that 
it be suffering inflicted contrary to the will of the condemned. See Calvert 1992, p. 263 and 
Koritanksy 2012, p. 105 for discussion of this element of the Thomist definition. However, given 
his distinction between punishments and privileges, discussed below, it seems clear that this is an 
implicit element of his theory, at least in its later iterations.  
76 Hobbes 2012, p. 488. 
77 Hobbes 2012, p. 490. The case of imprisonment indicates the importance of sovereign intention 
in distinguishing punishment not only from hostility, but also from protective actions. While 
imprisonment might feel like punishment, it is not necessarily to be understood as such.  
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gamut of early modern punishment practices. He notes that sites of imprisonment can 
include ‘a House, which is called by the general name of Prison; or an Iland, as when 
men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time 
men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, 
or any other such impediment.’78  
However, not all deprivations of corporeal liberty are to be understood as 
punishment. Drawing on Cicero’s argument in Pro Caecina that ‘exile is not a 
punishment, but a refuge and safe harbour from [it],’ Hobbes argues that a simple 
change of location, or ‘air’ is, itself, not to be termed an evil.79 However, through the 
infliction of what Hobbes considers to be quantifiable loss, exile can become 
punishment. Exile itself is described as a change of spatial and legal status, rather than 
the punishment of one who remains a subject. But when it is combined with pecuniary 
punishment, such as the simultaneous confiscation of lands, it is the latter element 
                                                   
78 Hobbes 2012, p. 490. Punitive incarceration had not, by this period, reached the levels it would 
in the eighteenth century. However Griffiths 2004, pp. 23-4 notes the increasing use, from the mid-
sixteenth century onwards, of Bridewells, or houses of correction, as a means of discipline for 
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imprisonment prior to the establishment of houses of correction, see Carrel 2009, pp. 312-4. 
Hobbes nowhere cites transportation to colonies as a form of punishment. While this might be 
expected, with transportation only becoming common in 1718 following the passage of the 1717 
Transportation Act, it was already being discussed by the early seventeenth century as a potential 
means of reforming convicts. William Crashaw, for instance, gave a sermon to this effect before 
the Virginia Company in London in 1610. While Hobbes was only a member of the Company 
from 1622, it is possible that he was aware of such discussions. Beattie 1986, pp. 619, 472; 
Malcolm 2002, p. 54. On English debates over transportation prior to the 1717 Act, see also Herrup 
2004. See Hobbes 2012, p. 540 where he recommends that the ‘poor, and yet strong’ are, if unable 
to find employment in the commonwealth, ‘to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently 
inhabited.’ It is important to emphasise, however, that this is not to be seen as a form of suffering, 
and nor does Hobbes place this transplantation in the context of a legal process or conviction.   
79 Hobbes 2012, p. 492. In this passage Hobbes provides one further reason why banishment is not 
to be considered punishment. Writing that ‘a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-
wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same’ Hobbes argues that this change 
in legal and political status is precisely what prevents pure exile from being considered an example 
of what is a fundamentally civil practice. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the different legal status 
of subjects and enemies, and the difference in treatment that results. On the definition of 
punishment as a civil practice precluding banishment being understood as punishment see Loxley 
2010, pp. 140-1. Cicero 1927, pp. 199-201 argues that ‘Exile is not a punishment’, and notes that 
as soon as the exile takes on a different political allegiance he loses his Roman citizenship.  
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which is to be considered punishment. This parcelling out of elements of civil sanction 
is, it seems, the only way to reconcile Hobbes’s more comprehensive stance on exile 
with his earlier inclusion of ‘Exile’ among the categories of punishment.80 We see the 
same concern that punishment be felt as an evil, and the danger of this element of 
punishment being neglected, in Hobbes’s second major category of punishment, that 
which concerned financial penalties. 
 
Punishments as Permissions: Hobbes’s Warning to Sovereigns 
Alongside these corporal punishments, Hobbes lays out the possibilities for pecuniary 
punishment consisting of fines or the deprivation of other goods such as lands. Just as 
he contrasted the penal loss of liberty from that caused by a need for safety, we also 
see Hobbes distinguishing the disciplinary loss of goods from that which is carried out 
by the state for other purposes. One obvious case is taxation.81 However, there is a 
more ambiguous case and one which, Hobbes suggests, can lead to a sovereign 
inadvertently undermining his own authority. Hobbes writes that ‘in case the Law, that 
ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall 
transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and 
exemption from the Law’; such practices, he writes, indicate that the given action is 
one which the law does ‘not absolutely forbid…but only to those that are not able to 
pay the money.’82  Clearly in such cases the aim is not deterrence, as is required by 
the definition of punishment, cited above. Defining the activity which requires such 
                                                   
80 Hobbes 2012, p. 488. Hyde 1995, p. 267 challenges this categorisation, arguing that as 
banishment constitutes a restriction on liberty, it should itself be considered a punishment. 
81 Hobbes 1969, p. 140; Hobbes 1983, p. 101; Hobbes 2012, pp. 536-8.  
82 Hobbes 2012, p. 488. 
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purchasing of privileges as a crime is not enough to render the subsequent cost a 
punishment.  
Hobbes here draws a contrast with cases where ‘a Law exacteth a Pecuniary 
mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine’; in such cases, ‘the payment of the 
mulct is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the 
transgression of a Law undispensable.’83 However, while in the case of natural or 
divine law it should be apparent that the payment required is to be understood as 
punishment rather than the price of a privilege, in the case of the positive law it is 
incumbent upon the sovereign to ensure that the distinction is clear. To achieve this 
Hobbes recommends various strategies; most importantly, if ‘the harm inflicted be 
lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, 
that harm is not within the definition [of punishment]; and is rather the Price, or 
Redemption’ of committing a crime.84 Hobbes is not condemning those rulers who 
choose to sell such privileges; rather, he is indicating that sovereigns should be clear 
in differentiating such sales from punishment in order to avoid undermining their own 
commands.  
This is a notable departure from Hobbes’s position in De Cive. In the earlier 
text, he writes that whether fines and other pecuniary measures are to be understood 
as punishments or simply as the cost of impunity is at the discretion of the sovereign. 
He notes that ‘there are some who think that those acts which are done against the 
Law, when the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe, are expiated, if the 
punished willingly undergoe the punishment.’ A consequence of this mind-set is the 
perception that ‘by the Law, the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment were set 
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instead of a price, whereby a licence might be bought of doing what the Law forbids.’ 
Such an attitude, Hobbes suggests, breeds the opinion that ‘no transgression of the 
Law were a sin, but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by 
his own peril.’ While we can read this account as a warning to sovereigns or as broadly 
condemnatory of those who frame the law in such terms, Hobbes argues that in fact  
the words of the Law may be understood in a twofold sense, the one 
as containing two parts…namely that of absolutely prohibiting, as, 
Thou shalt not doe this; and revenging, as, he that doe this, shall be 
punisht; The other, as containing a condition, for example, Thou shalt 
not doe this thing, unless thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus, the 
Law forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the 
first sense, he that doth it, sins, because he doth what the Law forbids 
to be done; if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to 
doe what is forbidden him, that performs the condition; For in the first 
sense, all men are forbidden to doe it; in the second, they only who 
keep themselves from punishment.85  
 
Most strikingly, Hobbes concludes that ‘what sense the Law is to be taken, depends 
on the will of him who hath the Sovereignty.’86  
 Hobbes’s thinking on punishment thus appears to harden between De Cive and 
Leviathan, with punishment much more clearly distinguished from permissions in the 
later text. As Chapter 3 will explore, Hobbes was, by the time of writing Leviathan, 
increasingly concerned with the potential for civil disruption posed by the powerful 
and wealthy. His rejection of the possibility of a legal system which separated crime 
from sin and conflated punishment with the cost of a privilege may have been part of 
this larger project.  
Indeed, it is also in the later text that Hobbes introduces a further example of 
the ways in which the sovereign might undermine his own authority by 
misunderstanding the nature of punishment; it is unsurprising that again the example 
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is one which particularly applies to the upper classes. Hobbes here appears to take 
seriously the risk, suggested in De Cive, that under some circumstances subjects might 
come to feel that, for the wealthy and powerful, ‘no transgression of the Law were a 
sin.’ The case of the duel is, when read in the context of Hobbes’s increasing concern 
over the importance of clear definitions and their application, a powerful illustration 
of Hobbes’s understanding that criminal behaviour can be the result of negligence on 
the part of civil institutions regarding the true nature and function of punishment in 
the commonwealth. 
For Hobbes it was a general principle that the sovereign, if not consistent in 
the punishing of crimes, was to be seen as partially to blame for future instances of the 
same act.87 Such a principle could, theoretically, apply to any criminal act. The 
example Hobbes gives to illustrate this principle, however, is a distinctly aristocratic 
one. He notes that, following logically from the previous argument about hope from 
impunity, ‘those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Lawmaker by 
other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same 
facts, condemned both by the Law, and the Lawmaker.’88 In setting out this principle, 
Hobbes is simply noting what must be the consequences of his earlier statements about 
the lawmaker as having both legal and personal, or authorised, authority; such 
confusion cannot be good for either the citizen or for the state. Hobbes notes in such 
a case the Sovereign is ‘in part a cause of the transgression.’89  
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In particular, Hobbes notes, ‘the Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is 
made capitall.’ However, because ‘he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and 
scorne…and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any 
charge, or preferrement in Warre’ engaging in this illegal activity is, in such cases, 
encouraged by the sovereign himself.90 Hobbes notes that the case of the duel suggests 
that men should understand that they ought to follow the law rather than the example 
of their sovereign. He nonetheless raises the real danger that princes, having been 
raised according to an aristocratic moral code which at times comes into conflict with 
the civil law, will occasionally act in ways which encourages the enactment of this 
code at the law’s expense. Sovereigns should thus beware, Hobbes warns in Leviathan, 
of treating punishments as debts, or as less serious than the ‘scorne’ of the person of 
the ruler; in both cases, the purpose of punishment as a deterrent is set aside, 
encouraging law-breaking and potentially undermining the institution of punishment 
itself.  
 
Natural and Divine Punishment 
While the definition Hobbes provides of punishment emphasises its civil nature, 
throughout his works he also uses the term to refer to two further distinct types of 
punishment: natural, and divine. While these differ from civil punishment in their 
causes and application, they share some features with the form of punishment outlined 
in Chapter 28 and it therefore important to briefly consider his use of these terms.  
 Hobbes is eager throughout his use of the term punishment never to stray too 
far from the basic features which characterise its civil application. Thus we read, 
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regarding the punishment of servants by their masters, that the servant ‘holdeth his life 
of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning and authorising 
whatsoever the Master shall do.’ It is this agreement which creates the master-servant 
relationship, and through which the servant experiences the bond of obedience. As a 
result when the Master shall ‘kill him, or cast him into bonds’ if the servant refuses an 
order, such acts have the name of punishment.91 Thus while the punishment of a 
servant does not conform to the qualification that punishment be carried out by public 
authority, there is nonetheless a relationship of authority between punisher and 
punished.  
 Similarly, Hobbes distinguishes between divine/natural and civil punishment 
on the basis of the authority of the punisher, noting that  
whereas to certain actions, there be annexed to Nature, divers hurtfull 
consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, 
or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some 
unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author 
of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore Punishment 
divine; yet it is not contained in the name of Punishment in respect of 
men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.92 
 
To present such negative consequences of human activity as punishment, Hobbes 
needs to locate an authority with respect to man to whom punishment can be attributed. 
It is in Chapter 31 that natural punishment is most fully explored, and we learn that 
‘seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments 
must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therefore 
follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.’93  Natural punishment, then, is not 
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only practised by a figure who has authority over man, God, but it is directed against 
those who break the law of nature. Thus we read that ‘Intemperance, is naturally 
punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of 
Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of 
Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter.’94 Indeed, non-criminal crimes 
by subjects, mentioned above, may themselves be a case of the natural punishment of 
sovereign negligence. Chapter 30 of Leviathan notes that ‘whereas many men, by 
accident unevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought 
not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as 
the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth.’95 If the 
sovereign fails to provide such charity, he may be ‘punished’ by subjects employing 
their natural right to self-preservation by theft; a breach of the natural laws is thus 
punished by natural right, all within the framework of the state.  
 However, there is one element of natural punishment which distinguishes it 
strongly from its civil counterpart: while the punishment of crimes by the sovereign is 
recommended as a crucial element of good governance, it is not, strictly speaking, 
required. Punishment only follows from the creation of a system of positive law within 
the commonwealth, and its application is determined by the representative of the state 
according to the principle of deterrence. As will be explored in Chapter 4, it is this aim 
of punishment which provides the impetus for the practice; while it can only, by 
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definition, be directed towards the guilty, it is not this status alone which provokes 
their punishment. Moreover, punishment only follows a legal conviction; it is not, 
therefore, necessarily linked to actual guilt, but rather to its public judgement.  This is 
a very different strategy from the one pursued by Hobbes in his account of natural 
punishment, in which he argues as follows:  
There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long 
a chayn of Consequences…[in] this Chayn, there are linked together 
both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such a manner, as he that will 
do anything for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains 
annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those 
actions, which are the beginning of more Harme than Good.96  
 
This model of punishment is thus subtly distinct from the model of civil 
punishment elaborated most fully in Leviathan: it is both closer to the privileges and 
permissions model presented in De Cive, and to a retributive model of punishment in 
which only the guilt of the individual is relevant to punishment practice.97  
 Hobbes’s second model of punishment which has God rather than man for its 
author is the divine punishment which follows death.98 Again, we see multiple 
occasions in which explicit parallels are drawn between civil and divine punishment: 
divine punishment is intended as a deterrent,99 and it is consequent to the breaking of 
divine law. Unlike natural punishment, and similar to its civil counterpart, the 
enactment of punishment is presented as strictly dependent upon the will of the 
punishing authority. We again see the rejection of a model in which punishment is 
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likened to debt. Thus we read in Chapter 38 that, with regards to salvation, ‘sin cannot 
be taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing 
vendible’.100 
 However, despite these similarities, there is one major question regarding civil 
punishment which simply does not arise when we consider that allotted by God. This 
is the question of the grounds of the authority of the punisher, and hence of the 
punished individual’s relationship to his own treatment. As we shall see in Chapter 2, 
the need to reconcile punishment with a commonwealth-instituting covenant which 
included an authorisation element led Hobbes to design a complex theory of the origin 
of the right to punish. In the case of divine punishment, Hobbes is able to forgo this 
entirely. He writes that ‘The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over man, and 
punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as 
if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; from from his Irresistible 
Power.’101 The divine right to punish is purely natural, and is thus both easy to locate 
and impossible to challenge. As we shall see, neither of these elements is characteristic 
of civil punishment. While Hobbes designated his Leviathan a ‘Mortall God’, in his 
definitions of crime and punishment, this mortality was at least as important as any 
claim to overwhelming power.  
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Chapter 2: Hobbes’s Account of the Right to Punish 
 
Introduction: The Paradoxical Origins of Punishment 
When Hobbes sought to explain or clarify an aspect of his political theory which his 
audience might find counterintuitive, it was not uncommon for him to turn to the 
example of punishment to illustrate his point. When explaining the consequences of 
sovereign authorisation in Chapter 18 of Leviathan, for instance, he notes that because 
subjects are ‘bound, every man to every man, to Own and be reputed Author of all, 
that he that… is their Soveraigne, shall do’, any man who attempts to overthrow this 
sovereign is in fact the ‘author of his own punishment.’102 Similarly, when in Chapter 
14 Hobbes wants to emphasise that, despite this authorisation, ‘no man can transferre, 
or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment’ 
because of the inalienability of the right to self-defence, he offers as proof the fact that 
in all societies penal authorities ‘lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed 
men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they 
are condemned.’103 
However, these examples have caused some difficulty for those interested in 
examining what such statements mean for Hobbes’s theory of punishment itself. In 
particular, questions about the relationship between authorisation and punishment 
have lead to accusations of an incoherence at the heart of the theory, with David 
Gauthier, for example, suggesting that it constitutes a ‘major weakness…which may 
lead us to suppose that sovereignty cannot be sufficiently founded on authorization.’104 
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Thomas Schrock similarly argues that Hobbes’s account of punishment and justified 
resistance results in a situation where, paradoxically, ‘The political philosopher of law 
and order justifies the lawless outrages of the Medellin Cartel.’105 As the examples 
above suggest, there are two related aspects of Hobbes’s theory of punishment which 
in particular have suggested that a flaw may be found. One is the origin of the 
sovereign’s right to punish in the context of, in Leviathan, the introduction of a new 
kind of social contract based on authorisation. The other is the right to resist 
punishment, retained by all subjects despite this authorisation. Both Hobbes’s 
contemporaries and more recent readers have argued that the right to resist punishment 
crucially undermines the sovereign’s ability to punish on both theoretical and practical 
grounds: to be the ‘author’, through the authorisation of the sovereign power, of one’s 
own punishment and to justly resist such punishment appears to place the punished 
criminal in a position of psychological absurdity, as well as potentially undermining 
both the sovereign right and ability to successfully enact punishment.  
The situation appears to be further complicated by Hobbes’s own statement 
regarding the origin of the right in Chapter 28 of Leviathan, that it ‘is not grounded on 
                                                   
Gauthier, on Hobbes’s own terms the explanation provided in the text ‘failed.’ Gauthier’s 
modification to the theory does not, however, reflect Hobbes’s thought as much as he believes. 
Hobbes is clear in Chapter 28 that ‘every man giveth away the right to defend another’ and agrees 
to ‘assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another.’ In other words, all men do grant the sovereign 
the right to use either their power or their non-interference to punish others. Thus the punishment 
right does depend on a common identification of the sovereign as a unique individual with rights 
attached to his station. However, because the very foundation of the commonwealth is a mutual 
agreement to each undertake the same initial covenant with regards to the sovereign, this grant 
cannot be the source of the right to punish as such; to authorise another’s punishment is not to 
authorise one’s own. For this element of the authorising covenant see Hobbes 2012, p. 200. 
Ristroph 2013, p. 191 appears to assume that Hobbes already has in place the type of agreement 
envisaged by Gauthier, in which one authorises the punishment of others, but not of oneself.  
105 Schrock 1991, p. 856. See also Copp 1980, pp. 588-9 for the accusation that the failure of 
subjects to authorise punishment indicates that the ‘sovereign cannot be said to be authorized by 
each subject to do whatever is necessary for peace’ and Hünig 2007, p. 232 on the alleged 
‘weakness of Hobbes’s rationale for the right to punish.’ 
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any concession, or gift of the Subjects.’ 106 This is despite his frequent use of the 
language of authorisation when referring to the practice, explored below, and despite 
the presentation throughout his works of punishment as the ultimate sovereign right. 
In De Cive he notes that ‘he that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right 
compels all men to all things which he himselfe wills…a greater command cannot be 
imagined’107; he frequently argues for the central role in successful governance played 
by the sovereign’s right and ability to punish law-breakers.108 A flaw in Hobbes’s 
theory of punishment, then, would appear to undermine his entire civil project. 
Moreover, it appears to be a flaw to which Hobbes himself draws our attention with 
his comments at the beginning of Chapter 28 where he notes that the question ‘by what 
door the Right, or Authority of Punishing…came in’ is one of ‘much importance.’109 
This question, according to numerous readers of Leviathan, has not been satisfactorily 
answered.  
This chapter aims to provide an analysis of the origin of the right to punish in 
Leviathan which is both faithful to the text and nonetheless demonstrates that there is 
no ‘major weakness’ in the account. It will suggest that to do so requires a fuller 
understanding of how Hobbes employs the related concepts of transfer of right, 
                                                   
106 Hobbes 2012, p. 482. The language of gifting is, in Leviathan, specifically linked to the process 
of authorisation; as will be examined below, the authorisation contract consists in the pledge ‘I 
Authorise and give up my right of governing my selfe’ to the newly-instituted sovereign.  
107 Hobbes 1983, p. 94.  
108 See Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan that ‘before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, 
there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, 
by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their 
Covenant’; he makes a similar statement in Chapter 21 when he notes that the ‘Artificiall Chains, 
called Civill Lawes…are in their own nature but weak’ but ‘may nevertheless be made to hold, by 
the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.’ It is in order to ensure that these chains 
bind that one of the rights of the sovereign cited in Chapter 18 is the right of ‘Punishing with 
corporall, or pecuniary punishment’ with the aim of deterring individuals from ‘doing dis-service’ 
to the Common-wealth. In Chapter 30 this right is also shown to be a duty, with Hobbes explaining 
that it ‘belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments 
and Rewards.’ Hobbes 2012, pp. 220, 328, 276, 542.  
109 Hobbes 2012, p. 482. 
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representation, and authorisation, a set of relationships which will be explored here.  
The chapter uses a close reading of Hobbes’s texts and an overview of contemporary 
accounts of the civil right to punish to demonstrate that the explanation we find in 
Leviathan, in particular, is designed to avoid both internal contradictions within the 
theory and any appeal to the concept of popular sovereignty. 
In putting forward this analysis I will argue against what will be termed the 
‘Authorisation Hypothesis’ and what will be labelled the ‘State of Nature Hypothesis.’ 
The first suggests that the right to punish is no different from all other sovereign rights 
in being authorised by future subjects and wielded by sovereigns in their capacity as 
civil agents.110 It encourages us to take at face value statements such as the one 
opening this chapter, in which criminals are understood to be the authors of their own 
punishment. While this thesis has gained some support among modern readers, such 
a reading would force us to understand Hobbes as sacrificing a fundamental feature of 
his later theory, the inalienable right to self-defence. The chapter will argue that 
accounts of Hobbesian punishment which argue that authorised punishment is 
consistent with the right to self-defence have misunderstood the nature of the antinomy 
                                                   
110 This remains a minority position in the literature, but is forcefully stated in Yates 2014. Orwin 
1975, p. 31 also argues that subjects have authorised their own punishment, reconciling this with 
the true liberties by arguing that authorisation does not, itself, create obligations with regards to 
sovereign commands. See also Hood 1964, p. 157 and Sheridan 2011, p. 151 which suggest that 
subjects are logically able to both authorise the infliction of punishment against themselves and 
others, and yet resist such punishment when it comes. Pitkin 1964, p. 905 argues that punished 
individuals, when resisting their sovereign, both authorise their punishment and will their 
resistance; their exercise of the true liberties of the subject is thus a paradigmatic example of 
‘disobedience.’ The point is repeated at Pitkin 1975, p. 46. This argument appears to entirely ignore 
the fact that subjects do not merely will to resist punishment but do so, Hobbes repeatedly 
emphasises, with right. Norrie, 1984, p. 305 makes the ambiguous claim that ‘the Sovereign’s right 
to punish…is derived from the prior consent of the individual via the social contract.’ Norrie does 
not elaborate on whether this is, as I argue, because punishment is a necessarily civil activity 
requiring the existence of the commonwealth, or because he believes the punishment right is 
authorised. See also Norrie 1991, pp. 24, 32 which argues that both punishment as an authorised 




between these two elements, framing it as a clash of rights when in reality it is a clash 
of representation.   
While I will argue that the case of punishment is a unique instance of non-
authorised sovereign action, this should not be taken as an endorsement of the second 
hypothesis, which posits that as a result of the fundamental incompatibility between 
punishment and self-defence, punishment is best understood as taking place in a 
version of the state of nature. This state of nature hypothesis, often found in the 
literature,111 takes as its starting point the claim that any civil relationship whatsoever 
between punished subject and punishing sovereign is impossible because it inevitably 
results in the kind of absurdity outlined above. Secondly, it suggests that the origin of 
the right to punish as it is outlined in Chapter 28 means that the right to punish is no 
different from the sovereign’s natural right to violence. As a result of these two 
elements, the hypothesis asserts, the punishment of subjects triggers a situation in 
which the subject in question leaves the commonwealth. The punished individual’s 
rightful resistance, therefore, is seen as a manifestation of his regaining the natural 
rights which were laid down at the sovereign institution. Through challenging the idea 
that punishment takes place in a version of the state of nature, the chapter demonstrates 
that while the origin of the right to punish is not directly found in the authorisation of 
the sovereign, the introduction of a theory of authorisation in Leviathan does not stand 
in the way of a Hobbesian model of punishment that is consistently based on 
citizenship, due process and legal rights even during the act of punishment itself.  
In putting forward this analysis, this chapter makes a further and perhaps 
bolder claim which has implications not only for our understanding of Hobbesian 
                                                   
111 The details of the hypothesis and its various permutations will be discussed in more detail 
below; major proponents of the state of nature hypothesis include Kaplan 1956; Cattaneo 1965; 
Gauthier 1969; Ackerman 1976; Tuck 1979; Sanderson 1989; Watkins 1989; Heyd 1991; Lloyd 
1992; Bobbio 1993; Cohen 1998; Sorell 2001; Brettschneider 2007; Ristroph 2009; Ribeiro 2011. 
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punishment, but for his broader political theory as well. In the case of punishment, it 
suggests, Hobbesian citizenship transcends the obligation/protection relationship upon 
which it is usually based. Understanding the origins of the right to punish, therefore, 
can also help us to understand the nature and limits of Hobbesian citizenship.  
 
Alternative Models of Punishment: Pre-Social and Pre-Political Accounts 
The question of how to explain the civil sovereign’s legitimate right to punish was the 
subject of much debate among early modern political theorists, both as part of a wider 
exploration into the origins of sovereignty and its associated rights, and due to an 
increasing concern with the limits of political obligation. As will be argued below, 
Hobbes designed a model of punishment which grounded it in a pre-political natural 
right, but which nonetheless asserted that it could not be found before the creation of 
the commonwealth. In doing so, he was both rejecting and appropriating from a range 
of alternative early modern accounts of the origin of the right to punish, a strategy 
which allowed him to avoid any appeal to a popular right of this nature.   
Prior to the publication of Leviathan, the assertion that the right to punish was 
not automatically located in sovereigns, but rather required a form of sovereign 
empowerment, was put forward by a range of political theorists arguing for various 
forms of social contract. While Hobbes’s account would therefore appear to fit into a 
well-established tradition, it is important to recognise that for many of these theorists 
this empowerment did not create a new right, or establish new conditions under which 
a broad natural right could be expressed and understood in a new way. Rather, they 
argued for the transfer of a specific punishment-right from individuals or groups to a 
newly-instituted ruler. Hobbes’s assertion in Chapter 28 that punishment must be 
inflicted by a public authority, rather than simply by one who has some authority over 
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another (a situation possible in the state of nature) is therefore a departure from this 
well-trodden theoretical path. We can see the contrast by setting Hobbes’s theory 
alongside those presented by Jacques Almain, Francisco Suárez, Hugo Grotius and 
John Milton. These thinkers, all influential theorists of both natural right and of the 
origins of sovereign power, reflect the range of schools of thought, from Scholastic to 
Republican, which appealed to a model based on pre-political right. Hobbes’s 
rejection of this account, therefore, marks a major divergence in the treatment of 
punishment by the early modern social contract tradition. 
In Hugo Grotius’s De Iure Praedae Commentarius [Commentary on the Law 
of Prize and Booty] (1603) we read that ‘the power to punish’ is one which does not 
‘essentially…pertain to the state.’ Rather, Grotius argues that because all rights held 
by the civil magistrate have their origin in the state, and all state rights must in turn 
come from individuals, ‘it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by private 
persons before it was held by the state.’112 It is only by recognising the right as natural, 
Grotius asserts, that we can make sense of the right which states have to punish 
foreigners. Punishment therefore does not require an established political relationship 
between punisher and punished. Moreover, he argues that the case of the punished 
foreigner is evidence that even in the punishment of subjects by their sovereign, the 
practice’s legitimacy does not rely upon the consent of the punished.113 Tuck suggests 
that in De Indis [On the Indies] (composed 1604/5) Grotius develops the right to 
punish from the universal right to self-preservation. However, by De Iure Praedae 
Commentarius it is clear that punishment is envisaged as a right distinct from that to 
                                                   
112 Grotius 2006, pp. 136-7.  
113 Grotius 2006, p. 137. See Grotius 2005, p. 966 for the assertion that this right, when employed 
by ‘private’ individuals according to the ‘bare Law of Nature’ is ‘not unlawful’ provided that is it 
employed to punish breaches of the law.  On the Grotian account of the the origin of the right to 
punish, and some of its classical predecessors, see van Nifterik 2009.  
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self-defence, and one which can be employed by any innocent individual against any 
wrong-doer, even if the latter does not pose a direct risk to the former.114  
We see a largely similar argument made by John Milton in his argument, in 
the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), that the setting up of ‘some authoritie, 
that might restraine by force and punishment’ was achieved through committing to a 
chosen magistrate that ‘authoritie and power of self-defence and preservation’ which 
was ‘originally and naturally’ in every individual. Milton’s explanation of the need for 
a sovereign authority is to an extent similar to that of Hobbes, as we see in his account 
of the dangers of each man acting as his ‘owne partial judge.’ However, in taking this 
natural judgment seriously by emphasizing that prior to the newly-instituted ruler’s 
jurisdiction each man had the right to ‘execute…justice...by the bond of nature’ the 
account provided by Tenure makes clear that there is a pre-political right to punish.115 
Both Grotius and Milton suggest that the civil authority to punish is of the same type, 
and not merely a modification or development of, a natural right held by all men, either 
to punish according to the natural laws or to self-defence. This right is, according to 
both men, simply alienated through the setting up of organized human community. 
The common agreement to create a commonwealth sets limits on who may employ 
their natural right, and in which circumstances, but is not the origin of the right as 
such.   
The case put forward by Grotius and Milton, in which the civil right is 
grounded in a simple transfer by individuals, is itself a variation of an earlier account 
found in Scholastic philosophy. Jacques Almain, in his Tractatus de auctoritate 
ecclesiae [Book Concerning the Authority of the Church] (1512), writes that, just as 
                                                   
114 Tuck 1993, p. 173. On this point see Rigstad 2004, p. 185 and van Nifterik 2009, p. 402. 
115 Milton 1649, pp. 8-9. 
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an individual has the right to commit those actions which are necessary for his self-
preservation, so too does a community have the right to self-defence. In the case of 
the authority to punish threats to this community, however, the sovereign has not been 
empowered by each individual on the basis of his or her natural rights, but rather by 
the community as a whole. While we can already identify elements taken up in 
Grotius, such as the requirement that a right be located before its transfer to the 
sovereign, Almain’s statement that ‘the community confers on the prince the authority 
to kill those whose life leads to harm to the commonwealth; therefore, that authority 
is in the community first of all, since no one gives another what he does not have’ 
emphasises that while we might understand this right to be pre-political, it is in no way 
pre-social. In order for a common defence to be permitted, there must be some 
commonality to defend.116  
Francisco Suárez also presents the right to punish as a natural and necessary 
development of the ‘power to govern’ a ‘perfect community’. The right is understood 
as an element of the broader power to legislate, a power which Suárez explicitly 
analyses to determine whether it is to be originally located ‘in individual men’ or ‘in 
the whole body of mankind, collectively regarded.’ While Suárez affirms the latter, it 
is important to recognise that this only applies to those communities which have 
consciously come together ‘through one bond of fellowship and for the purpose of 
aiding one another in the attainment of a single political end’; rights are located in 
unities, rather than in humanity universally understood. Because unities require 
governance, those rights and powers which enable governance, such as legislation and, 
therefore, punishment, emerge through the process of community formation itself. 
Prior to the community’s existence, this power is merely a potentiality, which can only 
                                                   
116 Almain 1997, pp. 135-6. 
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be realised within the civil condition. In explaining this somewhat mysterious process, 
Suárez specifically cites the right to punish as one of ‘several acts which appear to 
transcend human authority as it exists in individual men.’ In turn, this right can be 
transferred by the community as a whole to an individual, or group of individuals.117  
While all of these accounts differ from Hobbes’s, in that the right to punish is, 
in each, at some point located in a figure other than the sovereign, we can nonetheless 
draw out some elements of these models which Hobbes may have found appealing. 
From Almain and Suárez we find the crucial fact that punishment as such cannot exist 
before a unitary community exists; while the existence of a pre-sovereign unity or 
community was precisely what Hobbes found himself arguing against throughout his 
works, the crucial element here is that for punishment to exist, certain social or 
political conditions must be established. Punishment by definition, for all three men, 
is the defence of a group, rather than singular self-defence. It must be therefore be 
carried out in the interest of the group, rather than of particular individuals. While in 
each case there is an analogy drawn between individual self-defence and punishment, 
the rights cannot be conflated. Moreover, for both Hobbes and the Scholastics, 
punishment cannot take place in the state of nature; as a community right, it cannot be 
enacted outside the bounds of a formally constituted community.   However, this is 
not to say that Hobbes’s theory has no parallels with the model presented by Grotius 
and Milton. While Hobbes is clear that there can be no punishment before the 
establishment of the state, he nonetheless grounds the sovereign’s right in a natural 
right rather than in a newly-created right, a model whose transcendental overtones 
places it at odds with Hobbes’s own self-proclaimed scientific approach.  
                                                   
117 Suárez 1944, pp. 365-78. On the distinction between the natural, individual right to self-defence 
and the civic, community right to punish in Suárez’s thought see Reichberg 2013, pp. 189-91.  
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Despite employing elements of each of these models, Hobbes was clear that 
the right to punish could not be employed either against the civil sovereign himself or 
without his express authority. Both the pre-political and the pre-social models 
discussed above were explicitly linked to these possibilities: the Grotian (and, later 
Lockean) model allows for the punishment of others on an individual’s own authority, 
while the Scholastic and Miltonian models deliberately maintained a right for the 
community to act in its own defence against a tyrant if required. Hobbes’s account of 
punishment, then, seems designed to defang the more political elements of early 
modern theories of punishment, a move which required considerable finesse once we 
take into account his theory’s pre-existing commitments.  
In designing his account of the right to punish, Hobbes was both concerned 
with protecting individual true liberties, and hence with a maintaining the right to self-
defence even in the case of legitimate punishment, and with precluding the possibility 
of any non-sovereign individual or group holding the same right.118 It was this former 
requirement which particularly troubled Hobbes’s fellow royalists. Edward Hyde, Earl 
of Clarendon, for instance, rejected the very foundations of the Hobbesian sovereign’s 
right to punish, arguing in A Survey of Mr. Hobbes His Leviathan (1676) that the right 
is ‘indubitably inherent in the office of being Sovereign, and inseparably annexed to 
                                                   
118 Aside from the general point that there can be no punishment, and hence no right to punish, 
prior to the establishment of the commonwealth, Hobbes also took aim specifically at the argument 
that an individual right to punish, the ius zelotarum, was found among the people of Israel. In the 
Review and Conclusion of Leviathan Hobbes writes that because ‘amongst the Israelites it was a 
Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall Crime, should be 
stoned to death by the People’ such executions were not the result of ‘Private Zeale’ but of 
‘Publique Condemnation’. He concludes by insisting that ‘there is nothing…in any…part of the 
Bible, to countenance Executions by Private Zeal.’ Hobbes 2012, pp. 1136-8. On anti-monarchical 
discussions of the use of private zeal in precisely this period, see Dzelainis 2002. See for example 
Anthony Ascham, who claimed in his 1649 work Of the Confusions and Revolutions of 
Goverments [sic] that ‘such a totall resignation of all right and reason as Mr. Hobbes supposes, is 
one of our morall impossibilities, and directly opposite to that antient Ius zelotorum among the 
Jewes.’ Ascham 1649, p. 121.   
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it by God himself.’119 He nonetheless suggests that the theory would have been 
improved on its own terms if Hobbes had, ‘when he had the draught of the whole 
Contracts and Covenants’, inserted one ‘by which every man should transfer from 
himself the right he had to defend himself against public Justice, tho not against private 
violence.’120 This was a common position among the members of the Great Tew circle 
with whom Hobbes associated in the early 1640s, and was put forward by, among 
others, Dudley Digges in The unlawfulness of subjects taking up arms (1643).121 
However, as Richard Tuck has emphasised, this transfer of right was, while being the 
source of the obligation not to resist punishment, not the origin of the right itself. 
Along Grotian lines, these men considered the right to be an individually-held natural 
one.122 As we shall see, Hobbes would, over the course of his works also take up and 
then abandon elements of this royalist position.  
 
Punishment and Resistance Before Authorisation: The Accounts in the Elements 
of Law and De Cive 
 
 Leviathan contains the most detailed account of the origin of the right to punish, the 
definition of punishment, and the retained rights of subjects, including the right to 
resist punishment. However both the Elements and De Cive also provide explanations 
of the origins of the sovereign’s rights as being grounded in the mutual agreement of 
subjects. In these two earlier texts, this agreement consists in a simple transfer of rights 
                                                   
119 Hyde1995, pp. 265-6.  
120 Ibid. In the suggestion that Hobbes should have required subjects to give up the right to resist 
in order to properly empower the sovereign, we see the assumption that the rights to punish and 
resist punishment are necessarily contradictory. See Hyde 1995, p. 234, and Filmer 1995, p. 10.  
121 Digges 1643, pp. 4-5.  
122 On this point see Chapter 5 of Tuck 1979.  
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from subjects to the sovereign.123 Thus in the Elements we read that political union 
comes about when ‘every man by covenant [to all other men] oblige himself to some 
one and the same man… to do those actions, which the said man…shall command 
them to do; and to do no action which he or they shall forbid, or command them not 
to do.’124 As a result of this covenant, ‘he that is to command may by the use of all 
their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to 
unity and concord amongst themselves.’125 Because the aim of this union is security, 
Hobbes notes that whatever is necessary for this end is to be transferred to the 
sovereign; because  ‘the wills of most men are governed only by fear’ the erecting of 
a power of coercion is crucial.126 The creation of this power ‘consisteth in the 
transferring of every man’s right of resistance against him to whom he hath transferred 
the power of coercion.’ As a result, ‘no man in any commonwealth whatsoever hath 
right to resist him, or them, on whom they have conferred this power 
coercive…supposing the not-resistance possible.’127  
Hobbes does not at this point elaborate upon what the limits of this possibility 
might be; an earlier statement in the text about the nature of contracts more broadly, 
in which we read that ‘a covenantee [is not] to understand the covenanter to promise 
impossibles’,128 is the closest Hobbes comes in the Elements to defining a right to 
                                                   
123 In the Elements Hobbes distinguishes between relinquishing and transferring rights by noting 
that to relinquish a right is simply to declare that one will ‘no more do that action, which of right 
[one] might have done before’ while to transfer a right is specifically not to resist or hinder the 
individual to whom one has transferred the right in their enjoyment of it. Thus to relinquish a right 
to enter a building is simply never to enter it again; to transfer the right is much stronger, as one 
must not only never enter it, but not prevent the entry of the person to whom you have transferred 
your right. Hobbes 1969, p. 75.  
124 Hobbes 1969, p. 103. 
125 Hobbes 1969, p. 104. 
126 Hobbes 1969, p. 111. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Hobbes 1969, p. 81. 
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resist the sovereign’s commands on the basis of self-defence.129 We might of course 
read ‘impossibles’ as indicating the impossibility of quietly acquiescing to 
punishment, but Hobbes does not emphasise the point; if there is a right to resist harm 
carried out by the sovereign, it is not an explicit one.130 In Elements, therefore, there 
does not appear to be the same problem we supposedly encounter in the later work, in 
which a resisting subject is taken to will two contradictory actions, punishment and 
resistance. The sovereign in this account is granted the right specifically because the 
subject has given up the right to resist.  
The account of the origins of the commonwealth provided in De Cive is in 
many ways similar to that in the Elements; we read that the ‘submission of the wils of 
all those men to the will of one man…is then made, when each of them obligeth 
himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man…to 
which he hath submitted himself’ and that ‘he who submits his will to the will of 
another, conveighs to that other the Right of his strength, and faculties.’131 Despite the 
same basic components, through which all subjects’ wills are framed by their new 
sovereign through mutual compact and by which subjects are obliged not only not to 
resist but to aid their sovereign through their remaining power, there is one major 
change, either of content or of emphasis, in the version presented in De Cive. It is in 
                                                   
129Chapter 17 of the Elements does state that ‘As it was necessary that a man should not retain this 
right to everything, so also was it, that he should retain his right to some things: to his own body 
(for example) the right of defending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire, water, free 
air, and place to live in, and to all things necessary for life.’ This appears to directly contradict 
Hobbes’s account, in the same text, of the origin of the right to punish; it may be that Hobbes was 
still working out the extent to which a right to punish and a right to self-defence could co-exist in 
the same text, with the modified contract presented in De Cive his solution to this problem. Hobbes 
1969, p. 88. 
130 Tuck, defending a reading of  the Elements in which subjects have fully transferred their rights 
of resistance, notes that ‘the section referred to [i.e. the comment about oaths only covering the 
possible] which justifies this modification of his stated position, was added to the circulated copied 
of the Elements later by Hobbes, and is found in only two of the manuscripts…there is a strong 
implication that Hobbes’s original draft did not include the provision about the possibility of non-
resistance.’ Tuck 1979, p. 122.  
131 Hobbes 1983, p. 89.  
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this text that we first read the unambiguous statement that the subject, despite this 
mutual agreement, ‘is supposed still to Retain a Right of defending himselfe against 
violence.’132 This caveat, from Chapter 5, echoes a much stronger elaboration of this 
right found in Chapter 2 of the text, on the laws of nature concerning contracts. In this 
chapter we discover that ‘No man is oblig’d by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist 
him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his Body.’133 Hobbes grounds 
his claim in a psychological argument, noting that ‘When a man is arriv’d to this 
degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight, or 
fight.’ To expect otherwise would be to demand ‘impossibilities’ (an echo, perhaps, 
of the Elements), and this psychological reality is transformed into a right when 
Hobbes notes that as a result, men are not ‘obliged’ to bear either ‘death, (which is the 
greatest evill to nature) or wounds, or some bodily hurts.’134 This right is explicitly 
tied to punishment when, in language foreshadowing one of the quotations from 
Leviathan which opened this chapter, Hobbes writes that ‘they who are brought to 
punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are fettered, or strongly guarded, which is 
a most certain signe that they seem’d not sufficiently bound from non resistance by 
their Contracts.’135  
In addition to providing this more comprehensive account of resistance rights, 
De Cive also introduces a more complex presentation of the origin of right to punish; 
this is found in Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 we read: 
Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill 
me. Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, through you should offer to 
kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but 
there is need sometimes. The second way, none, neither is it ever 
needful…in a Civill State, where the Right of life, and death, and of 
all corporall punishment is with the Supreme…the Supreame himselfe 
                                                   
132 Hobbes 1983, pp. 88-9. 
133 Hobbes 1983, p. 58.  
134 Hobbes 1983, pp. 58-9. 
135 Hobbes 1983, p. 59.  
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[need not] contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment, 
but onely this, that no man offer to defend others from him.136   
 
In contrast to the account provided in the Elements, here the right of punishment is 
accorded to the sovereign through subjects giving up their right to hinder his 
punishment of others, rather than through their giving up their right to resist the 
sovereign’s acts against themselves. It is worth noting that the right of the ‘Supreame 
himselfe’ to punish does not emerge from the first type of contract, in which 
individuals make an agreement directly with him who will punish them (‘If I doe it 
not at the day appointed, kill me’); it is not even suggested that this type of agreement 
is universally entered into by all men (‘there is need sometimes’). Rather, the principle 
which it illustrates—that men cannot agree not to resist punishment—is framed as a 
reason undermining its use for this purpose, leading to the third type of contract, in 
which men simply agree not to resist the sovereign’s punishment of others.137   
This outline of a hypothetical contract is supplemented in Chapter 6 with a 
description of the specific transfer of rights which results precisely in the right to 
punish: ‘the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every 
man Contracts not to assist him who is to be punished…these kind of contracts men 
observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or their near friends are 
to suffer.’138 Thus, in the case of punishment, the agreement made is not to agree to 
endure any and all ill treatment by the sovereign, as we might interpret the account in 
the Elements, but rather to not prevent the sovereign from punishing anyone else. 
Subjects always have the right to resist their own punishment. This account, in which 
the inalienable rights of subjects limit the kinds of valid agreement they can make 
                                                   
136 Ibid.  
137 See Schrock 1991, p. 860, Ristroph 2013, pp. 201-2 and Yates 2014, pp. 241-2 for the argument 
that these are indeed examples of authorising covenants.  
138 Hobbes 1983, pp. 93-94.  
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regarding their bodily safety, indicates that already by De Cive Hobbes was aware that 
there might appear to be a theoretical, and not merely practical, conflict between 
punishment and resistance. At the same time, however, it indicates that he did not see 
this conflict as undermining his sovereign’s right to punish as such. As we read in De 
Cive, he does not see a ‘need’ for the sovereign to contract with his subjects that the 
latter will not resist his violence in order to gain either the right or the ability to punish. 
As we shall see, this is the same account that he provided both in the English Leviathan 
of 1651 and the Latin Leviathan of 1668. While the following account will rely on the 
English Leviathan, it is worth underlining at the outset that there are no differences 
between it and the Latin text which contradict the analysis provided here.  
 
The Account of the Right to Punish in Leviathan 
Hobbes’s presentation of the foundations of the commonwealth, and the legitimacy of 
the latter’s actions, changes drastically between his earlier works and the publication 
of Leviathan with the introduction, in the 1651 text, of a theory of sovereign 
authorisation as the source of the sovereign’s rights. Despite this, his discussion of 
punishment is explicitly excluded from this shift.139 Instead, the account of the right 
to punish is much more similar to that found in the two texts discussed above; it 
consists in a transfer of rights, rather than the authorisation of the sovereign. In Chapter 
28 Hobbes tells us that the question of ‘by what door the Right, or Authority of 
Punishing…came in’ is one of ‘much importance.’140 It is clear from what follows that 
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Chapter 20 of De Jure Belli ac Pacis [The Rights of War and Peace] (1625) begins ‘We come now 
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Hobbes is concerned that readers might assume that this right has come about through 
the process of authorisation which instituted the commonwealth in the first place. This 
act of institution is described in Chapter 18 of the same work, which opens as follows:  
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men 
do Agree, and Covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever 
Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right 
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their 
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that voted 
against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, 
or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own.141 
 
The implications of this initial authorisation are wide-ranging, with one major 
consequence being that any act in which a subject contradicts the wishes or acts of the 
sovereign is in fact an example of self-contradiction, or absurdity. This is due to every 
subject having agreed that the sovereign has the right to act for him in all matters, and 
accepting the sovereign’s actions as if they were an accurate expression of his own 
will. Hanna Pitkin has pointed out that the kind of representation described in this 
chapter must be understood as requiring active participation by subjects to enact the 
will of the sovereign, their wills now directly corresponding to the commands of the 
individual or assembly holding sovereign power.142 The institution has thus placed a 
potentially heavy burden on subjects. They are now forced not only to act according 
to the common good, as determined by the sovereign, but to do so out of a recognition 
that even if in a specific instance a different course of action might initially appear to 
                                                   
to…Punishment; which we shall the more accurately discuss, for as much as its Origine and Nature 
being misunderstood has given Occasion to many Mistakes.’ Grotius 2005, p. 949.  
141 Hobbes 2012, p. 264. 
142 Pitkin 1964, pp. 911-3. For an alternative interpretation of the nature of the authorising 
covenant, according to which all that representation and the requirement of non-contradiction 
obliges is that no subject prevent the sovereign from carrying out his purpose, see Warrender 1957, 
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be more personally beneficial, their own will, and hence their own acts, are already 
spoken for.143  
It is in the same chapter that Hobbes informs his readers that it is through ‘this 
Institution of a Common-wealth’ that are derived ‘all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, 
or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People 
assembled.’144 It might be expected, therefore, that the reader turning from such 
statements to the definition of punishment offered in Chapter 28 would assume that 
this ‘Right, or Authority’ also has its roots in the authorisation of the sovereign’s acts 
by the members of the multitude. Moreover, Hobbes repeatedly appears to refer to 
authorisation as the root of the sovereign’s right to punish: the definition Hobbes offers 
of punishment is that it is ‘an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath 
done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of 
the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to 
obedience.’145 Hobbes emphasizes the fact that punishment must be imposed by 
‘publique Authority’ and that this authority is the same which has all rights of 
judgment with regards to legal and illegal behaviour. It therefore appears logical to 
assume that just as the right of judgment is a result of the sovereign institution,146 so 
too is the right to punish. Furthermore, the aim of punishment cited in this definition, 
encouraging widespread future obedience, is consistent with the ‘end’ for which the 
initial authorisation was granted: to allow individuals to ‘live peaceably amongst 
themselves, and be protected against other men.’147  
                                                   
143 Brett 2003, pp. 220-33 suggests that we can, for this reason, best understand Hobbes’s subjects 
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144 Hobbes 2012, p. 264.  
145 Hobbes 2012, p. 482. 
146 For Hobbes’s discussion of the sovereign’s right of judgement, see comments in Leviathan on 
the rights of propriety, or rule-giving, and of judicature. Hobbes 2012, p. 274. 
147 Hobbes 2012, p. 264. 
 66 
Finally, even if Hobbes might be able to dismiss any parallels in language 
between the rights which emerge through authorisation and the right of punishing as 
mere coincidence, the language of authorisation is overtly used with reference to 
punishment in Chapter 18 when, as we saw above, Hobbes tells us that ‘if he that 
attempteth to depose his Sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he 
is the author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his 
Sovereign shall do.’148 From this phrasing, it initially seems clear that, just as the 
sovereign has the right to interfere with subjects’ lives in whatever way he wishes 
without accusation of injury, so too can the sovereign appeal to subjects’ initial 
authorisation when it comes to punishment. Given the previous discussion of the 
necessity of non-contradiction, this punishment of an attempted tyrannicide must be 
the will of the punished as well as that of the punishing sovereign. The punished 
individual must own the act of punishment while the sovereign, due to the process of 
authorisation, is nothing but the punished individual’s agent.  
It may come as a surprise, then, that Hobbes is unequivocal when answering 
the question of where the sovereign’s right to punish comes from, and that it does not 
emerge from the institution of the commonwealth in the manner of all other sovereign 
rights. However, a closer look at the problem of the resisting punished criminal will 
demonstrate why this must be the case for punishment to remain coherent not only in 
relation to Hobbes’s political theory, but to his psychology. In Chapter 14 of Leviathan 
we are told that the only motive an individual can have for joining society, with all the 
potential inconveniences that this entails, is that it is the best possible guarantee for 
‘the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as 
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not to be weary of it.’149 As a result subjects, when engaged in the transfer of rights 
and ownership of the sovereign’s actions which constitute the sovereign institution, 
can never be understood to have transferred their rights unequivocally. Such a move 
would potentially undermine the very purpose of the move into society in the first 
place; the parallel with Hobbes’s comments in De Cive is clear.  
This is such a foundational element of the theory that even if ‘a man by words, 
or other signes, seems to despoyle himselfe’ of the right to self-defence, ‘he is not to 
be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will.’150 As a result, any covenant 
which precludes a covenanter’s right to defend him or herself by force is automatically 
void, and so even ‘the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any 
right; nor is it obliging.’151 While a covenant may take the form of an individual 
agreeing with another ‘Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me’ this cannot be understood to 
mean that the maker of the agreement, when his fellow comes to act upon it, has given 
up the right to resist the attack, ‘for man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is 
danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death 
in not resisting.’152 Nor does this principle apply only to capital cases, where the risk 
of non-resistance is certain death. Hobbes also states, in his initial discussion of the 
subject’s inability to lay down his right to resist those who ‘assault him by force, to 
take away his life’,153 that just as an individual cannot be expected to recognize any 
personal good in death, ‘the same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and 
Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequence to such patience…as also 
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because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, 
whether they intend his death or not.’154  
This question of resistance brings us back to the case of the individual who has 
seemingly authorised ‘his own punishment.’155 If the right of punishing is directly the 
result of the sovereign authorisation, as the language used in this passage suggests, 
then the individual will have apparently forfeited the right to resist this punishment. 
This very act, which would amount to frustrating the sovereign in the pursuit of his 
ends, would be a case of self-contradiction. In other words, we should expect, 
according to Hobbes’s account of the impossibility of non-resistance, that any 
punished subject would be the author of two distinct and contradictory actions, 
punishment and resistance.  In fact, Hobbes has deftly sidestepped the question of self-
contradiction entirely by constructing his authorisation covenant in such a way that at 
the point of punishment, the specific act which harms the individual has not, as such, 
been authorised by the punished subject.  
As the original covenant which authorises the sovereign must, for the reasons 
cited above, include the unwritten caveat that the subject does not transfer the right to 
inflict unimpeded physical harm, imprisonment or death upon him, the authorisation 
covenant as explained above cannot itself provide the right to punish. There is 
therefore no logical or psychological contradiction between the sovereign’s 
punishment and the subject’s resistance. This is crucial: while cases of self-
contradiction through covenant breaking, or law-breaking, are possible in the state, 
such cases of contradiction are precisely those that are without right. A criminal’s 
actions contrary to the law are illegitimate, whereas the subject resisting punishment 
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is, despite acting against the sovereign, acting with right, and therefore without 
contradiction. However, this does mean that, if the punishing sovereign is to be 
understood as acting with equal right, Hobbes must provide that right from some other 
source. We are therefore left with two questions: how can an authorisation covenant 
be constructed to allow for resistance, and, relatedly, where has the right to punish 
come from?  
It might be objected at this point that framing the sovereign’s right to punish 
and the subject’s right to resist as contradictory is to fundamentally misunderstand 
Hobbes’s account of rights. We see this approach in Arthur Yates’s claim that 
‘subjects’ retention of the right to resist violence of all kinds does not pose an obstacle 
to prospective subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish.’156 This account, in 
favour of an authorised sovereign right to punish, echoes those interpreters who 
emphasise that Hobbesian rights are akin to Hohfeldian liberties, rather than claim 
rights.157 A clash of two rights, on this reading, does not undermine either right as 
such, as rights do not create obligations on others; rights may contradict each other 
without there being any limitation to the rights of either party. To make this claim 
regarding the rights to punish and resist punishment, however, is to misunderstand 
what it means to possess an inalienable right to self-defence. To understand why this 
is the case, we must turn to Hobbes’s account of representation, personation and 
authorisation. As I will argue below, the right to self-defence can be seen as a proxy 
for a right to represent oneself, and while contradictory rights may not be a problem 
for Hobbes, contradictory representation is. It is for this reason that we can understand 
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the authorisation contract as purposefully leaving a gap of both right and 
representation, as this is the only means by which such a right could be allowed for in 
Hobbes’s system.  
 
Representation, Punishment and Resistance 
Chapter 16 of Leviathan, ‘Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things Personated’, defines 
persons as those whose words and actions are to be considered either as their own, or 
as representing those of another. Thus the crucial thing to understand about Hobbesian 
persons, according to David Runciman, is to know to whom their actions are to be 
attributed.158 Those who act on their own behalf are labelled ‘natural persons’ while 
those who represent another are ‘artificial.’ Personhood, then, can be understood as a 
role; a lawyer may be an artificial person when representing a client in court, while 
being a natural person when billing the same client later in the day. Sovereigns, too, 
can be understood as engaging in these two roles; when representing the 
commonwealth, they are artificial persons, while in those actions which they do not 
undertake according to public authority they are natural ones.   
The relevance of representation to punishment becomes clear when we recall 
that while in his account of the institution of the commonwealth Hobbes specifically 
notes that the sovereign represents the body of the people, in doing so the sovereign 
also represents each and every member of it.159 In order to understand the mechanics 
of Hobbes’s move here, it is worth returning to the full original covenant. He writes 
that  
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 71 
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men so 
Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever 
Man, or Assembly of Men shall be given by the major part, the Right 
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their 
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted 
against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, 
or Assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to 
the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected 
against other men.160  
 
At first, the relationship between authorisation and representation in this passage is 
somewhat ambiguous. As Quentin Skinner in particular has argued, this agreement 
creates a new person who did not exist prior to the covenant. The ‘Person of them all’, 
or Commonwealth, is generated through a unity of representation, and this new person 
is represented by the sovereign when he acts in his artificial capacity. Despite this, 
however, it is not simply this new Person who owns, or is reputed author, of the 
representative actions of the sovereign; this role is also played by each individual 
member.  
The commonwealth is a person of a different type to those which we have 
encountered above; it is neither natural nor artificial but is rather a person ‘by fiction.’ 
In Chapter 16 Hobbes notes that  
there are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by 
Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may 
be personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things 
Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their 
Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their 
maintenance given them by those that are Owners, or Governours 
of those things.161  
 
Subsequent to this general account, Hobbes provides a list of different things, and 
people, who can be understood to be represented and act in this way. Importantly for 
our topic, the list concludes with the statement that ‘A multitude of men, are made 
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One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented…and it is the 
Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person.’162 The commonwealth, 
therefore, seems to be a person by fiction in the same way as a bridge, or church. 
However, this category of course forces us to ask who, in the case of the 
commonwealth, has authorised the latter’s representation; Hobbes is clear that persons 
by fiction cannot authorise their own representation, but this is not to say that 
authorisation does not take place at all in such arrangements. Instead, actors gain their 
authority from the owners or governors of this person. In the case of the 
commonwealth, this role is played by each member of the multitude, with the 
consequence that there are ‘many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, 
or doth.’163  
In making this claim, Hobbes is able to argue that the sovereign’s acts are 
owned by individuals while circumventing any direct agreement between the 
sovereign and each particular individual that he represents, a move which disallows 
the possibility that the sovereign might ever commit an injury against a subject.164 This 
transfer by future subjects to the sovereign of their capacity to represent themselves 
forces us to consider, however, what happens to subjects’ position as natural persons. 
Clearly, in the vast majority of cases subjects, when they act, should have their words 
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and actions taken as their own. Nonetheless, the liberty to self-govern in various 
situations is one which bounded by the acts of their representative; as Hobbes notes in 
Chapter 21, ‘The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in 
regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath pretermitted.’165 In most areas of their 
lives, therefore, subjects only represent themselves conditionally; once the law 
prescribes or bans given behaviour, to act on the basis of a contrary will is forbidden, 
as this would be a case of contradiction. While such undetermined areas are to be 
understood as sites of civil liberty, they are only free because the sovereign has not 
determined that there is any contradiction between his public will and the private wills 
of citizens; we might question, therefore, the extent to which subjects’ actions in this 
case are best understood as simply their own.  
This relationship between liberty and representation is made explicit in 
Hobbes’s discussion of the true liberties of subjects. In introducing this distinct 
category of liberties, Hobbes defines them as ‘the things, which though commanded 
by the Soveraign, [the subject] may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do.’166 
In other words, subjects break no contract in engaging in their liberties of this type. 
Defining the relationship between representation, authorisation and the liberties of the 
subject, therefore, is crucial in understanding the nature of the original 
commonwealth-instituting covenant.  
The grounds of this special category of liberty are, according to Hobbes, a 
proper appreciation of both ‘what Rights we pass away, when we make a Common-
wealth’ and ‘what Liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the Actions (without 
exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign.’167 Thus to own the 
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actions of another whom we agree has the right to represent us is precisely to limit our 
own liberty to act as we will; we cannot represent ourselves in ways which are 
contradictory to those actions undertaken by our representative. It is therefore in the 
concepts of authorisation and representation that we can locate the crucial difference 
between true liberties of subjects and those which, while still liberties, are alienable: 
in the case of common liberties of subjects, the sovereign retains the right or capacity 
to represent subjects as he or she sees fit, through the creation of laws. Such liberties 
only exist in the silence of the laws, and are therefore conditional upon this silence. 
Subjects technically remain represented by the sovereign in such matters at all times, 
but because sovereigns may not choose to exercise this ability, in cases where they do 
not subjects are entitled to represent themselves as they see fit. In the case of the true 
liberties of subjects, on the other hand, there is precisely no obligation because in this 
case, subjects have not consented to take the sovereign’s will for their own. They have 
not authorised actions which contradict their true liberties, because to do so would be 
to limit their right to self-presentation in precisely the way in which all ordinary 
liberties are limited. 
It is true that Hobbes himself largely frames his discussion of the true liberties 
of subjects as one which concerns contradictory rights, rather than contradictory 
representations. Thus we read that ‘It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all 
those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred’ and it this inability 
to transfer rights that provides the justification for the claim that ‘Covenants, not to 
defend a mans own body, are voyd’ and that if ‘the Soveraign commands a man 
(though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those 
that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, 
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without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.’168 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognise that this liberty to disobey consists precisely in 
the liberty to represent oneself in cases where the requirements of representation by 
the sovereign would result in harm. Individuals therefore fail to authorise their own 
punishment because of the covenant’s inability to demand the transfer of rights which 
in this case would create a relationship of representation.169  
This analysis relies on the argument that a single natural person cannot be 
represented, in a given act or situation, by more than one representative. While a 
natural person can of course be represented by numerous actors in discrete spheres, 
this cannot logically result in overlapping, and hence contradictory, representations. 
Hobbes is clear that this is true of persons by fiction: he writes that ‘where there is 
already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same 
people…For that were to erect two Soveraigns.’ In the same paragraph Hobbes draws 
the parallel with individual natural persons, noting that for a ‘man to have his person 
represented by two Actors,’ would, when ‘they… oppos[ed] one another…divide that 
Power, which …is indivisible.’170 In this context we may usefully consider the 
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sovereign’s role not only as a representative, but also as a figure capable of being 
represented. In his dispute with Bishop Bramhall on this point, Hobbes responds to 
the argument that his account of representation entails that ‘every king hath as many 
persons, as there be justices of peace and petty constables in his kingdom’ with the 
admission that  it is indeed true that ‘there be as many persons of a king, as there be 
petty constables in his kingdom’ and that were the situation otherwise  ‘he cannot be 
obeyed’.171 However, crucially, in such cases figures such as constables have been 
authorised by the sovereign power purely to carry out his specific commands; in any 
case of contradiction, it is clear whose will should be taken to be authoritative, in 
contrast to the case of the true liberties of subjects clashing with the authorised acts of 
a sovereign.172  
It is for this reason that what I have labelled the authorisation hypothesis 
cannot adequately explain the right to punish maintained by the sovereign. While such 
an account would seem to resolve the problem of Hobbes’s use of the language of 
authorisation with regard to the punished individual, it raises the much more 
intractable problem of how Hobbes’s account of personation and representation is to 
be maintained alongside the true liberties of subjects. This in turn suggests that as 
readers and interpreters we may be forced to make a choice between a reading which 
produces an internally coherent theory, and a reading which assumes that Hobbes was 
consistent and accurate in his use of language throughout the text.173 If we return to 
the case, cited above, in which the language of authorisation is explicitly related to 
punishment, we find that Hobbes uses this terminology in order to claim that punished 
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subjects cannot claim that their punishment is an injury towards themselves.174 As this 
is already the case simply through the lack of a contract between subjects and 
sovereigns, a feature of the political theory pre-dating the introduction of 
authorisation, Hobbes’s use of this later feature seems ultimately to be confusing and 
redundant, supporting my jettisoning of such language rather than of key features of 
the theory as a whole.175 It is true that taking authorisation and representation seriously 
appears to produce a striking result: there are whole areas of civil activity—the 
exercise of true liberties—in which subjects do not appear to be represented by their 
sovereign, a possibility which appears to be enabled by the circumscribed nature of 
the original contract. While perhaps surprising, this result does not in itself undermine 
the logical construction of Hobbes’s theory, and indeed seems to have resulted in his 
modifying areas of his account, such as the explanation of the origin of punishment, 
to accommodate it.  
This limitation upon the instituting covenant’s ability to provide the sovereign 
with all necessary rights explains why the account in Chapter 28, in direct contrast 
with the sovereign authorisation model of the origins of rights, tells us that ‘it is 
manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that 
represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the 
Subjects.’176 Instead, this comes about because, while subjects have laid down their 
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natural right to everything, which included the right of every individual to ‘do 
whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing 
any man in order thereunto,’ the sovereign has not, and in laying down their natural 
rights the subjects have ‘strengthened him to use his own…so that it was not given, 
but left to him, and to him onely.’177 This account directly parallels that which is 
provided in De Cive in which the sovereign’s acquisition of this right only requires 
that no others will interfere with his use of his natural right to enact violence upon 
others.  
Thus a version of the sovereign right to punish is able to slip through the cracks 
of the sovereign authorisation: while subjects cannot authorise punishment, they can 
nonetheless simultaneously agree to a different type of contract supplementing 
authorisation, one which does not require that they ‘own’ the actions which result and 
which therefore allows for the kind of psychological distinction between the wills of 
the sovereign and the subject which authorisation does not.  
 
The Role of Authorisation in Leviathan’s Account of Punishment 
While the nature of the sovereign authorisation means that it cannot be the origin of 
the right to punish and instead must be supplemented by a secondary contract 
resembling that found in De Cive, it nonetheless has an important role to play in 
defining both the nature of punishment itself and the legal relationship between the 
punishing sovereign and punished subject. Hobbes’s grounding of the sovereign’s 
right to punish in his natural ‘right to every thing’ has led to the tendency among some 
readers of Leviathan to assume that punishment therefore must take place in a version 
of the state of nature. In order to correct this assumption, it is necessary to turn back 
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to authorisation to demonstrate that it and the agreement which results in the right to 
punish are, rather than being at odds with each other, complementary and mutually 
reinforcing.   
Before presenting this analysis, however, it is necessary to quickly examine a 
few examples of the state of nature hypothesis, which demonstrate both the 
widespread nature of the basic argument, and the different ways it can function. In one 
of the most explicit cases, Corey Brettschneider writes that ‘Hobbes…thought of 
criminals as having violated the social contract and hence as ‘enemies’ of the polity.’ 
Brettschneider takes his point to its logical conclusion and states that ‘the state exists 
in a type of rights-based relationship…with individual criminals—the same 
relationship that exists among persons in the State of Nature.’178 Brettschneider’s 
argument is somewhat unclear, and allows for two distinct possibilities: that it is the 
criminal who, upon breaking the law, leaves the commonwealth, or that this alienation 
only takes place once the individual in question has been convicted, resulting in, on 
the part of the subject, the loss of safety and hence obligation to the sovereign.  
Others have argued for one or the other of these two possibilities. John 
Sanderson suggests that according to Hobbes ‘it was treasonous to disobey a law, for 
this involved a renunciation of the contract’ which instituted the commonwealth. 179  
Morton Kaplan uses a different strategy to argue for the same position, positing that 
for subjects, ‘the obligation to obey fails to bind as soon as the positive law of the 
sovereign is broken’ and explaining his reasoning by arguing that ‘in his discussion of 
the second law of nature Hobbes states that one is obliged to avoid injury; a penalty is 
an injury. Thus the obligation to obey is broken merely by disobedience.’180  It is 
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important to stress that in this reading, we are not simply speaking about a lack of 
obligation to the sovereign in the particular instance when subjects resist; for Kaplan, 
the argument is the broader one that ‘the obligation to obey the law exists only so long 
as the law is obeyed.’181 Gauthier’s understanding of punishment is similar; he argues 
that ‘the person punished, in violating the civil law, has violated an obligation 
undertaken in the institution of the sovereign, and so has already placed himself, in 
effect, in the state of nature with respect to the other members of civil society, as 
represented in the person of the sovereign’, that therefore ‘the sovereign is no longer 
acting as the representative of the person punished’ and thus that ‘he is placing himself 
in the position of an enemy in the state of nature with regards to that person.’182  
Andrew Cohen comes down on the opposite side, though with the same result, 
when he writes that ‘As soon as the sovereign comes to inflict violence on a subject, 
the reason for having constituted the sovereign is undone. The person who was once 
a subject is now thrown back into the state of nature with the sovereign. (Perhaps the 
sovereign no longer counts as a sovereign to that person).’183 Importantly Cohen 
introduces a third means by which the punishment process reverts to a state of nature, 
and it is the one which most clearly addresses the problem of self-contradiction. For 
Cohen it is not the simple risk of violence by the sovereign which removes one’s 
obligation; while individuals as subjects retain the ‘liberties of resistance’, when these 
are employed their use amounts to a renunciation of what Cohen terms ‘subject status’, 
resulting in the former subject having to ‘confront the sovereign in a state of war.’184 
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Thus, it can be the subject’s, rather than the sovereign’s choice to return to a state of 
nature, but only by engaging in very specific acts of resistance, rather than the 
committing of crimes more generally. S. A. Lloyd makes a similar argument when she 
states that when subjects are ‘exempted from obedience to commands…that they kill 
themselves, or not resist those who attempt to kill them’ it is because in such situations 
‘subjects cease to be members of the commonwealth, and resume all of their natural 
liberty, until such time as they again receive protection.’185 
Alice Ristroph’s analysis of Hobbesian punishment is more nuanced than those 
outlined above in that she is largely concerned with how a natural right to all things, 
held by the person of the sovereign, can be transformed into a political right to punish, 
linked to the artificial person of the commonwealth. Despite this, in making her 
argument, in which she suggests that the existence of resistance rights depends on the 
state of nature hypothesis, she falls into the same trap. Ristroph writes that ‘once a 
subject has disobeyed the sovereign, he and the sovereign are in the state of nature vis-
à-vis each other.’ This is because the ‘sovereign, a uniquely political and artificial 
construct, now exists in a version of the state of nature, and he possesses the broad 
right of mortal beings to do whatever seems necessary to preserve himself from 
imminent or future threats.’ As a consequence of this account, Ristroph concludes that 
‘if this is all punishment is—a conflict between two mere mortals in the state of 
nature—then both the sovereign and the criminal will have equal rights of self-
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preservation, and the criminal has as much right to resist punishment as the sovereign 
has to impose it.’186  
While the idea that the punished criminal exists in a state of nature with regard 
to the state is a tempting one, especially given the analysis presented above regarding 
the failure of the authorisation hypothesis, this cannot be the case. Ristroph’s 
explanation of the state of nature hypothesis succinctly illustrates many of its 
problems. The point about inflicting punishment upon a subject is that this process is 
more than simply ‘a conflict between two mere mortals’ in which anything goes. The 
sovereign and criminal’s rights are indeed balanced when it comes to imposing and 
resisting punishment, but whereas the subject is not limited in what he can do to 
directly resist, the sovereign, by the very fact that he is imposing punishment, rather 
than displaying hostility, is not permitted to ‘do whatever seems necessary to preserve 
himself.’ The sovereign’s acts, in other words, are bound by the limitations upon 
punishment properly conceived.  
It is by understanding these limitations that we can best perceive why this 
apparent asymmetry exists. The strategy Hobbes employs in granting his sovereign 
the right to punish, in which, as explained above, it is the result of the sovereign being 
left with an empowered natural right, led to consternation among some of Hobbes’s 
seventeenth century readers. Archbishop Bramhall, for instance, argued that such a 
justification meant that the sovereign may ‘lawfully kill any of his subjects…as freely 
as a man may pluck up a weed.’187 Bramhall’s thought seems to be that punishment in 
the commonwealth is a direct correlate of the right to all things in the state of nature; 
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his use of the term ‘lawfully’ suggests that he believes that this natural right has been 
transformed into penal law without significant modification or limitation. This reading 
initially seems to be supported by Hobbes’s explanation that ‘before the Institution of 
the Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he 
thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in 
order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is 
exercised in every Common-wealth.’188 Moreover, this retained right is to be used, 
Hobbes goes on, by the sovereign ‘as he should think fit, for the preservation of them 
all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits 
set him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of 
every one against his neighbour.’189 
While it would be difficult to argue that the practical consequences of a 
Hobbesian state would never lead to a situation in which innocent subjects are easily 
‘plucked’, this chapter is concerned with what rights subjects and sovereigns have in 
relation to each other, regardless of whether these are respected by specific regimes or 
those who live under them. From this perspective, the lawful killing of subjects is more 
complicated than Bramhall describes. Hobbes’s definition of punishment leads him to 
spend most of Chapter 28 setting out what does and does not fall under this label. Any 
punishment that has neither the intention nor the possibility of  ‘disposing the 
Delinquient, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes’190 cannot be termed 
punishment; nor can any ‘evill’ inflicted upon a condemned criminal which is in 
excess of the punishment cited in the law. An individual cannot be punished for ‘a 
Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it,’191 cannot be punished without 
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‘precedent publique condemnation,’192 and in no circumstances can any innocent 
individual be punished.193 As we can see, while the sovereign may retain a right to 
engage in any activity which he or she feels is necessary for self-preservation, this 
right is not directly analogous to that of punishing individuals within the 
commonwealth. Rather, punishment can be understood as a sub-set of the sovereign’s 
much more general retained right: punishment is a certain type of bounded hostility, 
rather than a specific or new right emerging alongside the commonwealth.194  
Thus while the right to all things is, as Hobbes states, clearly the foundation of 
the right to punish, the sovereign, if he is to engage in this right, must adhere to certain 
conditions.195 The gaining of the right, therefore, involves both the transfer of rights 
and the use of a retained right for a specific purpose. Hobbes explains these limitations 
upon the definition of punishment by turning to the natural laws he has already set out 
earlier in the text. In understanding these limitations, we can better appreciate the 
extent to which, in Leviathan, the establishment of the right to punish depends directly 
upon the institution of the commonwealth, and hence upon authorisation.  
It would therefore appear that, while the institution of the state is not the source 
of the sovereign’s right to pursue certain actions, it is the source of the definition of 
punishment which the sovereign must adhere to if he wishes these actions to be 
understood as such. Importantly, an examination of these limits demonstrates that, in 
contrast to Hobbes’s discussion of other rights which the sovereign gains through his 
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representative role, the label of punishment is limited by a mixture of natural laws and 
constraints originating in the original purpose of the commonwealth’s foundation. 
While natural laws play a role in the duties of the sovereign more generally, it is only 
in the case of punishment that they actually help to form the definition of the right 
itself. This definitional use of the natural laws is only possible because the right to 
punish is an instance of the sovereign’s natural right; by placing the emphasis on the 
sovereign’s natural person and his own need to ensure self-preservation, Hobbes was 
able to use the commonwealth’s institution as a pre-condition for the following of the 
natural laws by the sovereign. As a result, while the right of punishing is constrained 
by the natural laws alone, if the sovereign follows these (in other words, if he engages 
in actual punishment, rather than simply in purely hostile acts) punishment will also 
be used ‘for the preservation of them all’196 in alignment with the initial covenant 
instituting the commonwealth.  
The stricture against punishing innocent subjects is one of the clearest 
examples of this principle in action. Hobbes tells us that such an act would be a 
violation of no less than three natural laws, and it is only through the natural laws that 
he forbids such a practice. To punish an innocent, we learn, is against the natural law 
that ‘forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good,’ 
for the punishing of the innocent can bring no good to the commonwealth. Secondly, 
for the sovereign to punish an innocent subject breaks the natural law requiring 
gratitude; such an act would render ‘Evill for Good,’ as the sovereign was given his 
power by the consent of each subject, and these could in no way have intended for the 
sovereign to use this power to attack law-abiding individuals. Finally, it is in 
contradiction with the natural law which commands equity, or the ‘equall distribution 
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of Justice,’ a principle with which the punishment of the innocent is clearly at odds.197 
While the punishment of the innocent is the most obvious case in which the natural 
laws are marshalled to limit what the sovereign may do under the heading of 
punishment, it is far from the only one. Both the purpose and the degree of punishment 
have, Hobbes states explicitly, at their roots one of the natural laws already cited with 
regards to the punishing of innocents, that which commands that all revenge aim at 
some future good. It is this natural law which underpins the very concept of 
punishment as it is described in Chapter 28. Hobbes was principally concerned that 
punishment aim at deterring future crime, and it is through this lens that we can see 
his version of due criminal process. As stated above, punishment can only take place 
following ‘publique condemnation’ in which the accused’s action is ‘Judged by 
publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.’  
The role played by this particular natural law is even clearer when we look at 
Hobbes’s instructions that punishment be limited to those consequences already listed 
in the law, and in his description of the purpose of punishment. In Chapter 15 of 
Leviathan we are told that the seventh natural law is ‘That in Revenges (that is, 
retribution of Evil for Evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the 
greatnesse of the good to follow.’ As a result of this law, ‘we are forbidden to inflict 
punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of 
others.’ Any other action is simply an example of ‘glorying in the hurt of another’ 
which has no logical purpose, and is therefore against reason.198  
As the right to punish is a right inherent in the sovereign’s natural person, this 
comes as no surprise. The natural laws are intended to govern individual action; as we 
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read in Leviathan ‘A Law of Nature…is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by 
reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh 
it may be best preserved.’199 We see similar sentiments in De Cive when Hobbes states 
that ‘The Law of Nature, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right Reason, conversant 
about those things which are either done, or omitted for the constant preservation of 
Life, and Members, as much as in us lyes’200 while in the  Elements we are told that 
there ‘can…be no other law of nature than reason, nor no other precepts of Natural 
Law, than those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same may be 
obtained, and of defence where it may not.’201 However, it is important to remember 
that while the laws of nature are a ‘means of the conservation of men in multitudes’202 
and are therefore examples of behaviour which will reinforce the means of the 
commonwealth to achieve the ends for which it was set up, Hobbes acknowledges that 
men living in the state of nature should not be expected to follow the laws of nature, 
as their lives are governed by uncertainty to the extent that following these may in fact 
endanger them.203 Thus the institution of the commonwealth has created a situation in 
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which the right to all things retained by the sovereign can reasonably be tempered by 
the very laws of nature which, as we have seen, provide punishment with key elements 
of its definition. The existence of the commonwealth has in this way modified the 
sovereign’s natural rights because, as a natural person, his safety is much better 
protected in the commonwealth; sheer hostility can no longer be justified, and is thus 
morally, if not necessarily practically, limited. The right left to him is therefore limited 
by the natural law, and it is the intersection of natural right with natural law which 
creates a right to a specific set of actions.  
These parameters stand in stark contrast with the actions a sovereign may, 
according to natural law, take against those outside the commonwealth, a label which 
applies both to rebels who have, through words or actions, declared their wish to leave 
the state as well as to those who were never subjects in the first place. The rights a 
sovereign has with regard to such individuals are explicitly set against those he has 
over subjects. Immediately after presenting the reasoning behind the prohibition of the 
punishment of innocent subjects, Hobbes tells us that ‘the Infliction of what evill 
soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the 
Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the 
Law of Nature.’204 Again, this is due to the original right of nature retained by the 
sovereign; we are told that ‘against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth 
capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre.’205 
In the case of rebellious former subjects, this ‘warre’ is extended ‘not onely to the 
Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently 
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innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted.’206 It is worth noting that this 
description of the rights of the sovereign contravenes the parameters for punishment 
in a number of ways. Not only is hostility against living innocents permissible, but the 
purpose of this action, while still guided by the overall good to the commonwealth, is 
described in terms which Hobbes does not apply to punishment proper (Hobbes terms 
actions taken against rebels ‘vengeance’).207 The extension of hostility towards the 
descendants of rebels highlights the previous point regarding the treatment of 
innocents outside the commonwealth.  
As we can see, both of these sets of activities—those directed at punished 
subjects and those directed at enemies—are consequences of the sovereign’s retained 
natural right, but only one, that constituting punishment, has the limitations described 
above. These limitations, and hence the practice which they define, only ever apply to 
actions taken against subjects. The protections inherent in Hobbes’s definition mean 
that the distinction between punishment and hostility has very real implications for 
subjects, even after they have been convicted of a crime and are subject to punishment. 
It is precisely because those who are members of the sovereign community have made 
agreements which allow for the widespread application of the natural laws that they 
in turn qualify for treatment according to the standards of punishment, rather than 
those of hostility.  
Hobbes, then, appears to want to very clearly distinguish between the legal 
relationship between the punished subject and the sovereign, and that between the 
latter and an enemy in the state of nature, and it is here that the sovereign authorisation 
demonstrates the second way in which it complements the sovereign’s right to punish. 
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This is clear if we return to the case of the resisting subject. Importantly, according to 
Hobbes’s theory of authorisation the subject need not leave the state, and their subject 
status, in order to employ his or her resistance rights, as is suggested by, among others, 
Lloyd and Cohen and implied by Ristroph. As was discussed above, the caveat to the 
sovereign institution previously mentioned, that it is impossible to covenant not to 
resist violence upon oneself, results in a situation where a covenant lacking this caveat 
is void, as the right to self-preservation is inalienable. On the other hand, those 
covenants which do contain this caveat, either explicitly or implicitly (and hence leave 
a gap for resistance) stand, even in a situation in which the sovereign’s authority is 
challenged.208 The covenant instituting the sovereign is, as was argued above, a valid 
covenant of this second kind, and therefore there is no need to leave the state to gain 
the right to resist, as it was never given up in the first place. Acting on one legitimate 
aspect of the covenant does not, according to Hobbes’s description of the 
commonwealth institution, require leaving it. Indeed it is unclear why the non-
existence of obligation in one area of one’s life would impact areas of actual 
obligation, and so the rights of resistance which Hobbes allows subjects are not means 
by which one leaves the commonwealth, provided that they are used only when 
necessary.  
As a result, the criminal is, assuming he or she has not also been designated a 
traitor, still a citizen while undergoing punishment, just one who is not expected to 
agree to, or own, certain actions by the state. Hobbes is explicit on this point: in 
Chapter 28, he writes that ‘the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not 
to Enemies.’209 As a result, unlike enemies, citizens are not expected to legitimately 
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undergo any and all hardships decreed by the sovereign. This is true even if we take 
the case of capital punishment, raised by Brettschneider; while death is arguably the 
worst possible outcome for a Hobbesian individual, the strictures in Chapter 28 
forbidding excessive punishment still apply. As a result, if the punishment for a given 
crime were simple hanging, the individual (or rather, his descendants) would have 
recourse against the state if this hanging were preceded by torture. Hobbes addresses 
this point clearly. As we saw in Chapter 1, in Chapter 21 he notes that ‘If a subject 
have a controversie with his Soveraigne…concerning any penalty, corporall, or 
pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, 
as if it were against a Subject.’210  This is only true because the punished individual 
remains a citizen throughout the process; that is, because the relationship between 
criminal and state is precisely not the same as that between two individuals in the state 
of nature. It is only the continued artificial, rather than natural, nature of the sovereign 
which protects the criminal from treatment which really would be permissible towards 
an enemy of the commonwealth: ‘all infliction of evill.’211  
The clear importance of the sovereign institution in explaining why 
punishment takes the form that it does, as regards both what it may consist of and who 
can be subject to it, helps to explain the language of authorisation which, as was 
pointed out above, occasionally characterizes Hobbes’s discussion of punishment. 
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Punishment can only be undertaken by ‘publique authority’ not because the right 
comes about through authorisation, but because of the complementary nature of the 
two types of contracts discussed in this chapter; both, in their own way, empower the 
sovereign. Thus while the sovereign may not be acting as the representative of the 
punished subject in the act of punishing, the maintenance of a civil relationship 
through the continuation of authorisation means that he is nonetheless to be understood 
as a public authority, and as the only individual empowered to punish not because of 
authorisation, but through subjects laying down their right to defend others from his 
judgements.  
While those who argue for the state of nature hypothesis appear to be mistaken, 
they do remind us of an important point: that in the case of punishment, the 
obligation/protection nexus upon which Hobbesian citizenship is based, is, on the 
surface, broken. If we leave aside the legal protections offered to punished subjects, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in many ways the punishing sovereign and the 
resisting subject are not acting like sovereigns and subjects at all. The former is, rather 
than protecting, attempting to harm, and the subject is doing everything possible to 
avoid conforming his actions to the will of the sovereign. However, as the discussion 
of the sovereign institution suggested, Hobbesian citizenship cannot be reduced to this 
precise relationship or exchange persisting moment by moment. This is explicitly 
indicated by Hobbes himself when, in the Review and Conclusion to Leviathan he 
added a further law of nature. Hobbes declared that ‘every man is bound by Nature, 
as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself 
protected in time of Peace.’212 He provides little detail, but the point stands: even when 
the sovereign cannot actively protect the citizen, the citizen owes obligation due to 
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past protection. Similarly, I would argue, the case of punishment suggests that even in 
cases where the citizen does not offer obligation—indeed, the opposite—the sovereign 
must provide some degree of protection, based on past obligation. Both this pattern of 
past obligation, and the protection it engenders, fall under the label of ‘citizenship.’  
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Chapter 3: The Hobbesian Criminal 
Introduction: Locating the Hobbesian Criminal 
In Chapter 27 of Leviathan, Hobbes provides three reasons why an individual might 
commit a crime. These consist, he states, in ‘some defect of the Understanding’, ‘some 
errour in Reasoning’, or ‘some sudden force of the Passions.’213 While Hobbes’s 
analysis differentiates between these, they share a common result: all cause 
individuals to disregard the law’s authority, and hence to dismiss civil equality before 
it. In considering the Hobbesian criminal, we are primarily concerned with the kinds 
of mental or moral defects which might occur, and be understood as defects, in civil 
subjects. Hobbes does, in the descriptions he provides of the state of nature, note that 
different men will have inclinations towards more or less peaceable actions, and an 
analysis of Hobbes’s account of motivation suggests that we can draw some important 
parallels between those whose behaviour is to be ‘condemn’d’214 in the state of nature 
and those who commit crimes in the state. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise 
the extent to which individual dispositions, and in particular those linked to 
criminality, cannot be divorced from their civil surroundings.  
An attempt to locate and explain the Hobbesian criminal, then, is not simply a 
matter of examining the account Hobbes provides for the roots of conflict in the state 
of nature, or the motivations men might have to reject civil authority altogether. The 
problem of crime is a civil one which must be understood and managed in the context 
of sovereign rule. Noel Malcolm and Gabriella Slomp have both recently drawn 
attention to the extent to which Leviathan in particular can be read in the context of 
Renaissance mirror for princes literature; the text is intended to provide guidance to 
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the sovereign of the commonwealth.215 Part of this guidance, for Hobbes, consists in 
helping his reader to understand not only why certain individuals might display 
specific manners or passions, and the kinds of actions that these might in turn provoke, 
but also the ways in which these passions interfere with the proper deliberation of the 
citizen.  
In setting out the basis for his analysis of man’s need for the state, Hobbes tells 
us that there is a ‘genrall inclination’ in all mankind, ‘a perpetuall and restlesse desire 
of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.’ The root cause of this aspiration is 
man’s need to ensure ‘the means to live well.’ 216 However, once this basic need is 
met, constantly active and striving man will find that he has other desires, which in 
turn require power to satisfy. It is here that man differentiates himself from his fellows. 
In the state of nature there is a degree of necessitated conformity in men’s actions, as 
all men either compete for resources, or act in the knowledge that others may do so.217 
After the institution of the sovereign, however, men’s actions are driven by their 
particular psychologies and desires, as the constant struggle which characterizes the 
state of nature has been brought to an end and they are free to engage in other pursuits. 
These different desires will determine the extent to which individuals will conform to 
the established political order and hence behave, on the whole, as law-abiding citizens.  
Therefore, while in the state of nature there are three main causes of war which 
have their bases in human nature—the passions of competition, diffidence and glory, 
and the individual dispositions which are governed by these218—we cannot simply 
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turn to these impulses to explain criminal action within the commonwealth, as both 
the causes and consequences of these passions have changed with the introduction of 
the state. This transformation can be illustrated by the case of diffidence. We are told 
that in the state of nature, men who ‘use Violence’ for this reason do so primarily to 
defend their ‘persons, wives, children, and cattell’ from those whose major motivation 
is competition.219 As such, diffidence is an entirely reasonable and expected response 
to a situation in which a(n unknown) number of men have a ‘known disposition’ to 
war. Hobbes even suggests that, while in the state of nature there is no ‘Propriety, no 
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct’220 and that therefore all acts are, despite their 
motivation, done with right, the diffident individual is particularly justified in his 
actions, as he acts in response to a concrete threat.  
Once the sovereign has been instituted, on the other hand, we see a change in 
both the causes of, and the right to act on, diffidence. Hobbes does not insist that men 
recklessly leave themselves vulnerable to crime; he notes that his reader ‘when taking 
a journey…armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, 
he lockes his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests.’221 Such acts betray 
what ‘opinion’ most men have of their ‘fellow subjects.’ They are not in themselves, 
however, dangerous to the peace of the commonwealth and therefore are acceptable 
responses to potential risk.222 However, the more extreme consequences of diffidence 
are, in the state, crimes; in Chapter 27 we read that while to kill in immediate self-
defence is ‘no Crime’, to ‘kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatenings, I 
may argue he will kill me when he can…is a Crime’ precisely because the 
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circumstances have changed.223 What would in the state of nature qualify as justified 
diffidence is, in the state, a form of criminally-motivating passion. In cases where the 
threatened individual has ‘time, and means to demand protection, from the Sovereign 
Power’224 the degree of diffidence experienced by the individual in question is 
inappropriate for the situation in which he finds himself. The passion of diffidence has 
shifted from a necessary precaution to a passion which has real potential to unsettle 
the peace, and the individual who is thus primarily motivated has changed from the 
most laudable individual in the state of nature to a suspicious, potentially dangerous 
member of the commonwealth. The presence of the coercive power of the state has 
decreased the potential number of men whose diffident dispositions are a reasonable 
response to the outside world, and, in doing so, has changed how we should see such 
men.  
In drawing up our picture of the Hobbesian criminal, then, there are certain 
factors which we must take into account. Criminals are those who already live in a 
society in which the sword of justice is in effect; they are subject to punishment for 
breaking laws, and they are, in the majority of cases, aware of this fact. Therefore, the 
reasons to commit crimes can also be understood, conversely, as reasons to ignore the 
threat of punishment. Hobbes, in Leviathan, tells us that ‘those things which we neither 
Desire nor Hate, we are said to Contemne.’225 Criminals are those who demonstrate 
contempt for the law’s coercive power; their actions are not finally determined by the 
threat of punishment. The question of the extent to which the threat of punishment acts 
as a systematic deterrent will be dealt with below in more detail through an analysis 
of Hobbes’s treatment of the categories of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ men However, it is worth 
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noting at this stage that throughout his works, Hobbes suggests that this threat is the 
key reason for consistent law abidingness.226 It is therefore of primary importance to 
Hobbes to consider what could possibly cause some men to ignore it. Hobbesian 
subjects commit crimes for a range of reasons. However, a study of the reasons 
highlighted in his works brings us closer to understanding certain types of motivation 
which Hobbes saw as socially disruptive, and yet which nonetheless could be, unlike 
those which led to rebellion, accommodated and addressed within the state.  
 
The Roots of Criminality: Passions and Deliberation 
While the passions are the third and final explanation Hobbes provides for criminal 
action, the role he gives to them in explaining all action, whether criminal or law 
abiding, means that any discussion of human motivation and character must begin 
with a discussion of his model of passion and the will. Hobbes defines passion as 
conceptions, or the ‘motion and agitation of the brain’, which have subsequently 
proceeded to the heart and which thus become inclinations to act or not act in a given 
situation.227 They are the expression of an individual’s appetite or aversion towards an 
external object, and are therefore inevitably based on subjective individual 
judgement.228 We see as good that which we have an appetite for and evil that for 
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which we hold an aversion. The various passions included in Hobbes’s taxonomy are 
in turn different manifestations or constructions of these aversions and appetites; thus 
hope is defined in Leviathan as ‘Appetite with an opinion of attaining’ while fear is 
explained as ‘aversion, with opinion of Hurt from that object.’229 
The passions, then, reflect personal beliefs about how a given individual 
believes that a specific situation will affect him; we may generalise about the kinds of 
situations which will provoke fear or hope in most men, a project which Hobbes does 
not shy away from, but ultimately they relate to the experience and imagination of the 
individual. As such, they play an important role in man’s decision making. This 
process, labelled ‘deliberation’ by Hobbes, consists in the ‘advantages and 
disadvantages’ of a given act ‘show[ing] themselves this way and that, so appetite and 
aversion will alternate, until the thing demands that a decision be made.’ The ‘last 
appetite (either of doing or omitting), the one that leads immediately to action or 
omission, is properly called the will.’230  
According to Hobbes, we cannot control the specific passions that will arise in 
our deliberation. We can, however, consider the likely means to and consequences of 
the action which we are considering, which will in turn affect our deliberation and the 
likelihood of our will being, in the end, to act in a certain way. This type of deliberation 
depends, largely, on memory. Hobbes notes that from ‘Desire, ariseth the Thought of 
some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the 
thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to 
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some beginning within our own power.’231 Importantly, this process of remembrance 
does not simply consist in determining how to obtain that which initially provoked our 
desire. In some cases, this directed thought will consist of prudence, or in the 
determining of ‘the event of an action.’232 In such cases, an individual ‘thinketh of 
some like actions past, and the actions thereof one after another; supposing like events 
will follow like actions.’233 A key illustration used to demonstrate this process is that 
of punishment. In his discussion of prudence and imagination in Leviathan Hobbes 
notes that a man may have, when considering ‘what wil become of a Criminal…this 
order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes.’234  
When such a train of thought is integrated into deliberation, then, we can 
expect the passion of fear to result in an aversion towards crime, despite the initial 
desire to obtain a particular good. Thus deliberation can be a complicated process, 
involving memory and prediction as well as an instinctive reaction to an external 
stimulus. However, in all cases it results in the will to do or not to do; in the case of 
the prudent man who reasons correctly, the fear of punishment will generally lead to 
law abiding behaviour. 
The last, crucial feature of Hobbes’s theory of deliberation which we must take 
into account before exploring his discussion of the causes of crime is that the final 
passion, or will, can be determined from the action itself. If a man acts we must assume 
that this act reflects his will and is the result of a process of deliberation. Importantly, 
the will is not to be understood as the only passion which was experienced during the 
process of deliberation; Hobbes notes that an individual may, until the act is 
committed, go through a number of different inclinations, any number of which may 
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be quite powerful.235 This model of deliberation means that in order to understand 
certain types of activity, such as criminal behaviour, it is important to begin with the 
passions which would, in some individuals, play a stronger role in deliberation than 
the fear of punishment. Moreover, Hobbes suggests that some passions, when they are 
habitually experienced and acted upon, can tell us something about not only a specific 
deliberative process experienced by an individual, but also about their repeated 
deliberative habits. It therefore becomes important for Hobbes’s sovereign to not only 
understand, but mitigate against, both certain habitual passions which prevent 
deliberative processes from following the prudent course outlined above, and against 
the social and political circumstances which would encourage such passions.  
 
Dispositions and the Criminal Passions 
We are told in Leviathan that ‘in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of 
quarrell.’236 The three main passions which are both constitutive of, and fostered 
within, the state of nature are competition, diffidence, and a desire for glory. Men 
living precariously are driven to act by, and in reaction to, these three central 
motivations behind violence and domination. Thus we read that competition ‘maketh 
men invade for Gain…to make themselves Masters of other men’s persons, wives, 
children, and cattell’, while diffidence causes the same, but for ‘Safety…to defend 
them’.  Glory-seekers, on the other hand, invade for ‘Reputation’ and will resort to 
violence to gain ‘trifles, as a word [or] a smile.’237 The analysis Hobbes offers of these 
motivations makes it clear that he is speaking of types or patterns of behaviour 
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demonstrated by men, rather than of passions which individuals in the state of nature 
alternate between.  
This model of motivation in the state of nature undergoes some modification 
over the course of his writing on the subject. In the Elements, for example, we read 
that ‘some are vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their 
fellows’; in response ‘those men who are moderate, and look for no more but equality 
of nature’ will attempt to subdue these vain glorious troublemakers.238 As a result of 
this inevitable conflict ‘shall proceed a general diffidence in mankind, and a mutual 
fear one of another.’239 Here, then, we see that diffidence, or fear, is not a motivation 
which indicates a third disposition among men. The passion is rather a ‘general state’ 
which affects the vain glorious and the moderate equally, operating alongside their 
main motivating passion. In De Cive, we see a similar division as that presented in the 
Elements. Hobbes notes that ‘all men in the State of nature have a desire, and will to 
hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemn’d.’240 He 
goes on to make a simple division between the man who ‘practices naturall equality’ 
and is therefore ‘temperate’ and he who ‘will have a License to doe what he lists’, 
showing his actions to be derived from ‘Vain glory’ and his character to be 
aggressive.241 In sum, the conflict in the state of nature is the result of these two 
competing motivations. By Leviathan, the moderate man of the Elements and De Cive 
has become diffident, while the vainglorious man has been carved into two distinct 
characters, the acquisitive or competitive, and the glory-seeking.  
Hobbes’s various discussions of the state of nature suggest that even outside 
of the state, men have a tendency to form dispositions. Moreover, these dispositions 
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are, ultimately, reflections of individuals’ ability to recognise the natural equality of 
man. This is most explicit in De Cive, with Hobbes’s note about culpability, and in the 
Elements; in both texts we read that the moderate man is primarily motivated by the 
‘equality of nature.’242 In Leviathan, the diffident man is not thus described. However, 
Hobbes nonetheless suggests that while all men in the state of nature, despite their 
motivations, attempt to invade others and gain dominion over them, we can distinguish 
between those who take ‘pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of 
conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires’ and those who ‘would 
otherwise be at ease within modest bounds.’243 The actions of these men, who are 
acquisitive and violent due to their fear, are nonetheless limited by a recognition of 
natural equality, as indicated by their desire to acquire goods prudentially rather than 
for their own sake. As we shall see this model, in which troublesome behaviour is the 
result of passions linked to a rejection of natural equality, finds a parallel in the state, 
as some men attempt to overcome the civil equality found among citizens.244  
In Chapter 11 of Leviathan Hobbes identifies a number of types of behaviour 
or character, which he terms ‘manners.’ These correspond to men who are largely 
ruled by particular passions and modes of thought.245 While he notes that ‘the 
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voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also 
to the assuring of a contented life’ both the understanding individuals have of what 
constitutes this ‘contended life’ and the means by which it can be achieved will differ 
according to which passions are dominant in an individual’s psychology.246 Leviathan 
is the first time Hobbes introduces this explicit classification of manners into his 
political theory, and the means by which they are created is not fully explained in this 
text. However, this process, by which passions are transformed into habitual manners, 
is elaborated upon in De Homine, where Hobbes notes that dispositions, when they 
become ingrained by habit and thus ‘beget their actions with ease and with reason 
unresisting’, can be termed ‘manners.’247  
Importantly, these manners act as a form of deliberation, but it is deliberation 
which circumvents an extended consideration of advantage and disadvantage. As a 
result, certain passions which might be helpful in a given situation are not given due 
weight, as reason has become ‘unresisting’. The power of habit means that errors in 
judgement may be repeated in the future, including errors which concern an 
individual’s own best interest in a given situation. To develop a particular manner, 
then, is to limit one’s own scope for acting. A manner which has as its primary 
motivation fear of punishment would limit the likelihood of an individual committing 
a crime. A manner which is primarily vainglorious, on the other hand, may in fact 
increase this same likelihood by limiting the extent to which an individual’s 
deliberation will take seriously the risk of consequences for his actions.  
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In the same text, Hobbes argues that discussions of manners in this sense can 
only take place in relation to the state, with manners being judged according to the 
extent to which they help or hinder the state’s purpose. This should not be taken to 
mean that Hobbes does not believe that dispositions as such only exist in the state, 
merely that in discussing the consequences of the passions and the habits which are 
thereby formed, his concern will be the standard of civil obligation. As he notes in De 
Homine, ‘I say that good dispositions are those which are suitable for entering into 
civil society; and good manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was 
entered upon can best be preserved.’248 It is in this context that the question of 
dispositions and the passions will be approached.249  
Hobbes’s treatment of manners in Leviathan is also principally concerned with 
the extent to which they are ‘qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together 
in Peace and Unity.’250 He thus expands upon the discussion of passions which he 
outlined in Chapter 6, but here adds in the likely consequences of one’s actions being 
largely determined by one passion or another. The discussion, therefore, has moved 
beyond an account of the passions as motivations to action and has instead become a 
question of the types of action which can be expected from individuals whose 
deliberative processes have become primarily defined by these passions. Through the 
                                                   
248 Hobbes 1998, pp. 69-70. Compare this with Edward Reynolds’s assertion that ‘Passions may 
be the subject of a three-fold discourse; Naturall, Morall, and Civill.’ According to Reynolds, 
‘Morall consideration’ will take into account ‘how the indifferencie of them is altered into Good 
or Evill, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason, or of the violence of their owne motions’ 
while in ‘their Civill respects, we should also observe how [the passions] may be severally wrought 
upon and impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and 
remit them; how to discover, or suppresse, or nourish, to alter, or mix them, as may be most 
advantagious’ and ‘how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the 
Character and dispositions of these, whom we are to deale withall.’ Reynolds 1640, pp. 41-2. 
Hobbes’s account, by contrast, treats these moral and civil considerations as two elements of the 
same project.  
249 See Abizadeh 2011, p. 300 which differentiates between conflict provoked by disagreement, 
and conflict as the result of objectively problematic dispositions. I suggest that the latter is even 
more important in the state than it was in the state of nature.  
250 Hobbes 2012, p. 150. 
 106 
introduction of manners, Hobbes justifies the type of explanation he provides in this 
and earlier works for both the violence found in the state of nature, and, as will be 
examined below, his version of the individual whose disposition is fundamentally 
just.251  
Before turning to the just man, however, it is necessary to examine Hobbes’s 
presentation of manners in Chapter 11. In some cases, these correspond to types we 
have seen outlined in the state of nature, but others can only emerge upon the 
institution of the state. Just as competition was a source of discord in the state of 
nature, so it continues to be in the state: ‘Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, 
or other power’ in the commonwealth results in ‘Contention, Enmity, and War.’ Such 
individuals are likely to keep behaving as if the state were never instituted. They will 
‘kill, subdue, supplant or repell’ their adversaries, as their primary disposition-forming 
passion will not allow for a proper consideration of both the general danger to society 
of indulging in personal revenges, or of the risk of punishment inherent in engaging 
in such criminal actions.252 On the other hand, there are manners and patterns of action 
which, because dangerous in the state of nature, only really emerge as practical 
motivations in the state. Thus we read that ‘Desire of Ease’ and ‘Desire of Knowledge’ 
are both manners which incline individuals to not only desire the creation of the state, 
but to, once it exists ‘obey a common power.’253 Fear, which in the state of nature was 
a motivation for violence even among those whose disposition inclined to the equality 
of all men can become, in the state, a motivation for law-abiding behaviour.  
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However, it is important not to overstate the importance of this particular 
discussion of manners in helping us to identify the Hobbesian criminal. The chapter 
can be read in two ways; it is a discussion of the kinds of manners which will tend 
towards obedience within the commonwealth, but it is also a description of the 
dispositions which will incline individuals to wish to live in a commonwealth at all. 
In some cases, this can be taken as a proxy for attitudes towards the authority of the 
law. For instance, men whose dispositions are guided primarily by fear of death, love 
of ease or desire for knowledge are likely to support the existence of the state more 
broadly. They are unlikely to attempt to overthrow the state, or even to display a 
habitual criminal disposition, as they specifically value the presence of civil 
institutions. The discussion of manners in both Leviathan and De Homine can 
therefore help us to recognise Hobbes’s framework for classifying individuals and 
their likely behaviour. However, it cannot be our principle source for understanding 
the potentially negative consequences of certain dispositions; dispositions which do 
not necessarily incline to the creation of the state may or may not result in criminality 
within it.  
In order to discover the passionate roots of crime, therefore, we need to apply 
the analysis of habit formation found in Chapter 11 and De Homine to the specific 
passions discussed in Chapter 27. Of course, all crimes, like all actions, are the result 
of passion. Furthermore, if we take into account comments Hobbes makes elsewhere, 
this list of passions most likely to result in criminal behaviour is not exhaustive. In 
particular, there is a further type of disposition not mentioned in Chapter 27, that of 
the unjust man. This figure, I will argue, can act as something of an explanatory key 
encompassing the various criminal dispositions Hobbes enumerates. However, before 
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these points can be elaborated upon, it is necessary to examine the passions about 
which he was, in this context, particularly concerned.  
Hobbes cites vain-glory, anger, hate, lust, ambition and covetousnesse as being 
the passions which are ‘most frequently the causes of Crime.’254 Hobbes’s treatment 
of the latter five passions is cursory. He writes that ‘there are few Crimes that may not 
be produced by Anger’; as for ‘the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and 
Covetousnesse’, the ‘Crimes they are apt to produce, is…obvious to every mans 
experience and understanding.’255 It is precisely this universality which renders these 
last four passions so dangerous. Because these passions ‘are so annexed to [man’s] 
nature…that their effects cannot be hindered, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or 
a constant severity in punishing them’ the crimes thus provoked are especially difficult 
to both predict and to prevent.256 Hobbes explains these passions as outweighing any 
other considerations, such as the danger of punishment or concern for other citizens. 
Explaining the risk posed by hatred, he notes that ‘For in those things men hate, they 
find a continuall, and unavoydable, molestation.’257 As a result of this molestation, 
‘either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the 
power of that which molesteth him: The former is difficult; the later is many times 
impossible, without some violation of the Law.’258 Similarly, the passions of ambition 
and covetousness are defined by their perpetual nature. These are, as Hobbes notes, 
‘perpetually incumbent, and pressing’ and therefore reason, which ‘is not perpetually 
present’ has difficulty resisting them. Importantly, the consequence of this lack of 
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reason is that ‘whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed.’259 
Finally, in the case of lust, because ‘what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the 
vehemence’ it ‘sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain 
punishments.’260 In each of these cases, the passion overrides either fear of 
punishment, or an awareness of moral obligation to the laws. In the cases of hatred 
and lust, the law and the consequences of breaking it are entirely disregarded. Crimes 
motivated by ambition and covetousness, on the other hand, occur because when an 
individual’s deliberation turns to punishment, it does not consider the aversion thus 
provoked to be relevant; instead, acts are committed at times when the individual 
sincerely believes that there is ‘hope of impunity.’  
It is this latter feature of ambition and covetousness which links them most 
closely to the case of vain-glory, the passion or manner to which Hobbes devotes the 
most space in Chapter 27. Here, the consequences of a vainglorious disposition are 
quite different to those presented earlier in Chapter 11. In that discussion we see that 
there are primarily two types of vainglorious men: those who, because fully aware of 
their limitations, are ‘enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt’, and others 
whose self-confidence means that they are ‘enclined to rash engaging.’261 This latter 
type of vain-glorious man, however, is no more likely to meet success than the first; 
because they value their lives over their reputation, upon the first sign of serious 
danger they ‘retire if they can.’262 Maurice Goldsmith has suggested that that vain-
glory is a passion which results primarily in a lack of action; based on a reading of this 
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passage, he appears to be right.263 Such men are perhaps troublesome to the state, and 
not to be relied upon, but they do not appear to be fundamentally dangerous. Indeed, 
both versions of the vain-glorious man, in this chapter, appear to be versions of the 
fearful man; the final will and actions of both are primarily driven by fear of death, 
despite their precedent ‘ostentation’, a pattern of behaviour which might suggest that 
in the state men of this disposition are likely to be largely law-abiding out of a fear of 
punishment.   
In Chapter 27, on the other hand, we learn why, in the state, the passion of 
vain-glory can be particularly troublesome. Rather than acting as either an obstacle to 
action, or a spur to aborted engaging, we see that vain-glory can instead be a 
motivating passion. While Hobbes clearly disapproves of vain-glory it is only in the 
discussion in Chapter 27 that we read why the passion is likely to provoke true 
injustice in society, rather than merely inconvenience. He argues that those who 
exhibit such a ‘foolish over-rating of their own worth’ are more likely than others to 
form a ‘Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended 
generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they 
are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men.’264 Vain-glory can take a number of 
forms, Hobbes suggests, and each is dangerous in its own way.  
Those whose false estimation is prompted by great wealth ‘adventure on 
Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or 
obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards’265 while those who ‘have multitude of 
Potent Kindred’ and those who are ‘popular men that have gained reputation amongst 
the Multitude’ also break laws, but in their case their willingness comes ‘from a hope 
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of oppressing Power, to whome it belongeth to put them in execution.’266 The third 
category of vain-glorious men Hobbes highlights as dangerous are those who ‘have a 
great, and false opinion of their own Wisdome.’ These men are especially dangerous, 
for this overestimation causes them not only to believe they will be able to escape 
punishment, but also to question the judgements and actions of their rulers. As a result, 
they ‘unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse’, and suggest that ‘nothing shall 
be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so.’267 While these cases of 
vain-glory are distinct, in each case the logic underpinning the criminal action is the 
same; through a mis-judgement of their own abilities, such individuals assume that 
they will be able to avoid punishment. Thus, the capacity of such individuals to 
correctly reason regarding the likely consequences of their actions, if they live in a 
state where crime is regularly punished, is compromised. 
One of the defining components of vain-glory is that individuals experiencing 
this passion are mistaken about the true nature of their role in the world and their 
capacity to assert dominance in a given situation. Hobbes repeatedly notes that men in 
general have a tendency to overestimate their own cunning; as he writes in Chapter 13 
of Leviathan, men  ‘see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance’268 and as 
a result are apt to overestimate their own skill or power. We can read the vainglorious 
as falling into precisely this type of mental defect. Indeed, Hobbes’s assumption 
appears to be that criminal wills which have been shaped by vain-glory can be 
addressed by sovereign demonstration of the flaws in their deliberation. It becomes 
imperative, then, to design a system of punishment which does not distinguish between 
the wealthy, popular and wise on the one hand and the poor, obscure and simple on 
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the other.269 The discussion of vain-glory and its role as a motivating factor for crime 
also suggests that certain tendencies among the rich and powerful might be 
exacerbated by the practice of the sovereign if the latter does not take care to institute 
such a system. Hobbes suggests that in some cases, the rich and powerful who believe 
that it is precisely these traits which will grant them impunity are, in fact, correct.  
Leviathan was not the only text in which Hobbes displayed concern over the 
ability of the rich and powerful to avoid the consequences of their actions. In De 
Homine he noted that ‘Riches, if immense…are useful’ because they ‘are almost 
certain protection.’270 Hobbes does not here suggest that this is specifically protection 
from justice or punishment, but given his earlier comments about the vainglorious 
wealthy, we can perhaps assume this is one thing which he had in mind. We also read, 
in an argument that to some extent echoes the cases of the popular criminals and those 
with potent kindred that ‘Moderate wealth, to those willing to use it for protection, is 
also useful; for it acquires friendships; friendships, moreover, are protection.’271  
These passages suggest that Hobbes was actively worried about sovereigns 
instituting a model of justice in which social role or other advantages could be used to 
insulate their holders from the consequences of their actions. He also emphasises that 
certain dispositions which lead to criminal behaviour on this basis arise from the 
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experience of living in the commonwealth. While, as we saw, a reluctance to act 
according to natural equality was a type of disposition already present in the state of 
nature, personal attributes such as nobility and civil power, which can lead to the kinds 
of vainglorious criminal actions described above, exist only in the state. Later in the 
same text Hobbes writes that ‘dispositions are frequently made more proud by riches 
and civil power.’272 This occurs because ‘those who can do more demand that they be 
allowed more, that is, they are more inclined to cause injuries, and they are more 
unsuited for entering into a society of equitable laws with those who can do less.’273 
This is not to say that Hobbes advocated the abolition of the aristocracy; in the same 
passage he notes that such disruptive behaviours are particularly common among new 
members of the nobility, while those who make up the ‘Ancient Aristocracy’ are far 
less likely to act according to these types of vain-glory. But he is worried that such 
behaviour might be encouraged. This version of nobility is characterised by a 
reluctance to act according to civil laws rather than according to individual desires; 
the sovereign, then, must take particular care that such men do not in fact become 
criminals, and that the description of the consequences of wealth and powerful 
friendships, cited above, is not one which is applicable in his state.   
The final passion which Hobbes suggests can lead to crime is fear. While fear 
is most frequently the means by which men are encouraged to keep the law, fear which 
is not justified by a direct threat to one’s life may nonetheless provoke criminal action. 
Thus to the case of the threatened individual who nonetheless has the opportunity to 
seek sovereign protection, outlined above, Hobbes adds those of men who fear for 
their reputation and are thus inclined to seek private revenge, and of men who ‘stand 
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in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given 
to other men.’274 These three types of crime-provoking fear in turn correspond to 
different manners of men which Hobbes has previously listed in Chapter 11. The 
individual whose diffidence leads him to unwarranted aggression is one type, as we 
saw above. The man who fears for his honour has some similarity with the competitive 
man for whom honour and reputation are chief concerns,while superstitious men can 
also be classified as ignorant of ‘naturall causes’ and thus prone to ‘suppose, and feign 
unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible.’275 Fearful action can therefore 
be understood as a mode of behaviour prompted by other passions which are more 
clearly dangerous.  
These three types of fear are the consequences of manners as contradictory as 
diffidence and competition. But they are nonetheless linked in a way which 
distinguishes them from the prudent fear which the sovereign aims to cultivate in 
citizens. All three consist in the refusal to accept the claims of the sovereign power, 
trusting instead one’s personal experience and opinion. Thus, the diffident man 
implicitly rejects the commonwealth’s promise of protection, the competitive man 
ignores the lawmaker’s judgement that injuries against honour are not to be punished 
as crimes, and the superstitious man either ignores or has not sought out accurate 
accounts of natural science which might assuage his fears. 
Finally, there are passions which Hobbes discusses elsewhere in his texts 
which mirror the pattern of law-breaking but which are not explicitly listed as passions 
which are likely to lead to criminal activity. Cruelty plays a minor role in Hobbes’s 
psychology; it does not appear in his discussion of the passions in the Elements, and 
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in De Cive it is simply defined as the violation of the natural law stipulating that 
revenges consider future good rather than past evil.276 It is only in Leviathan that 
Hobbes comes to consider it a passion proper; here it is defined as ‘little sense of the 
calamity of others…proceeding from Security of their own fortune.’ However, while 
cruelty is described as a reason to ignore the suffering caused by, for instance, one’s 
crime, Hobbes was sceptical about its capacity to provoke actions as such. He did ‘not 
conceive it possible’ that  ‘any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harmes, 
without other end of his own.’277 Cruelty would therefore appear to be a passion which, 
when combined with others such as fear, anger or covetousness, might incline an 
individual to crime, though not provoke it on its own.  
The passion of courage, on the other hand, is one which Hobbes considers 
extensively in his work, and it is one which, I will argue, he sees as potentially 
dangerous to the state despite its not being included among those passions which 
provoke crime. Before discussing Hobbes’s treatment of courage as such, it is 
important to note that the passion does appear, obliquely, in Chapter 27. Anger 
throughout Hobbes’s works is defined as ‘sudden courage’, and, as mentioned above, 
anger was certainly a passion capable of provoking crime.278 However, it is not only 
sudden courage which is problematic to the state; just as criminal ambition and 
covetousness are defined by their longstanding presence, so too is lasting courage a 
dangerous passion. 
Hobbes’s description of this particular passion is equivocal. When Hobbes 
defines it in the Elements he tells us that it is simply ‘the absence of fear in the presence 
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of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common meaning, it is contempt of 
wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.’279 The question, 
then, turns on what ‘end’ the courageous man has set himsef. The Review and 
Conclusion to Leviathan tells us explicitly that ‘amongst the passions, 
Courage…enclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the 
unsetling of the Publique Peace.’280 As we have seen, fear is the primary means by 
which the prudent man is encouraged to not only enter the commonwealth, but to also 
ensure that his behaviour is consistently law-abiding in order to avoid precisely the 
‘wounds and death’ which constitute punishment. While Hobbes does admit at the 
very end of Leviathan that there is not necessarily a contradiction between ‘Courage 
for the Warre, and a Fear for the Laws’281 he is clearly interested in the ways in which 
this absence of fear can be turned to negative ends. 
This theme is one to which he repeatedly turns in Behemoth. He notes that 
while fortitude is ‘necessary in such priuate men as shall be soldiers’ for most men 
‘the lesse they dare, the better it is, both for the Common wealth and for 
themselues.’282 Elsewhere he states that courage, even among those for whom it is a 
necessary trait, poses a risk over time. The means by which this can happen, through 
the potential interplay between courage and ambition, is highlighted in Hobbes’s 
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discussion of the potent subject, an echo of the warning about vainglorious men with 
potent kindred. In Chapter 29 of Leviathan Hobbes argues that ‘the Popularity of a 
potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity,) 
is a dangerous Disease.’283 One of the key elements which can contribute to such 
popularity is ‘Military reputation’, which is described as one of the traits which 
‘disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them.’284 
Displays of courage, therefore, may well lead to popularity. As a result of these risks, 
Hobbes is clear that the sovereign should do all he can to punish any individual who 
attempts to, ‘by reprehension of public actions, affect popularity and applause amongst 
the multitude.’285  
As we can see, therefore, there are a number of different passions which 
Hobbes believed were especially likely to lead to crime. We can nonetheless draw 
parallels between those which he highlights, either in Chapter 27 or elsewhere in his 
writing, in order to suggest a root cause of why some passions incline to criminal, 
though not rebellious, behaviour. In other words, we are here concerned with those 
passions which might incline one to break the original commonwealth-instituting 
covenant, while nonetheless not repudiating it. As we saw with the three forms of 
criminal vain-glory and with the various types of fear which lead to crime, criminal 
passions are those which encourage an individual to put trust in their own opinion of 
either the likely consequences of a crime, or the necessity of the crime, above the 
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sovereign’s own pronounced judgement. In the cases of ambition, covetousness, 
hatred and lust, we again see a similar pattern; ambition and covetousness can lead to 
the criminal refusal to acquire goods or status according to the means allowed by the 
commonwealth, while hatred and lust cause the criminal to ignore the possibility of 
legal punishment entirely.  
The case of courage is slightly different. Here, similarly to cruelty, we can see 
it as a passion which aids and abets the more obvious criminal passions. All crime 
begins with desire, but the criminal passions explicitly listed by Hobbes suggest to the 
individual that they need not fear punishment, while cruelty and courage remove 
additional obstacles to crime from deliberation, such as consideration of the costs to 
other citizens (cruelty) or fear of consequences (courage). Ultimately, these passions 
all consist in a rejection of equality among citizens in the state, as all indicate a belief 
that either the law does not merit consideration at all, or that the consequences of law-
breaking will not be applied. Thus while we need not present a single, unified version 
of the passionate Hobbesian criminal, in all cases we find an individual who believes 
that the strength and authority of the law is relative to the individual in question, and 
that in particular the law does not apply to them. The criminal, in this reading, places 
himself above other citizens in his mind during deliberation, an attitude which 
becomes clear in the act itself.  
 
Defects of Reasoning and Understanding 
In addition to these particular passions, Hobbes also notes that there are two further 
sources of criminal motivation. These are defects in the understanding, or ignorance; 
and errors in reasoning, or the holding of false opinions.286 While Hobbes separates 
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these two causes, the distinction between them is not as straightforward as his 
presentation indicates. In fact, the errors of reasoning which are most likely to result 
in crime have their roots in ignorance; both of these factors, in turn, reflect the same 
rejection of civil equality which we found at the heart of the criminal passions.  
Ignorance of the law may be a common source of crime, but this type of 
ignorance is not a particularly promising route if we are interested in identifying 
criminal types and preventing their actions. The means, on the part of the sovereign, 
to prevent crimes stemming from ignorance (as opposed to originating in claims of 
ignorance) are fairly undemanding and while ignorance about the source of law and 
the penalties for breaking it might speak to a certain carelessness about one’s duties 
as a citizen, it does not suggest malicious intent towards the law or particularly 
problematic deliberative processes. However, if we return to the discussion of manners 
in Leviathan, we find that ignorance can be dangerous in two principal ways, which 
in turn are related both to the passions discussed above, and to the errors in reasoning 
which will be discussed below. First, we find that the ignorant are unable to distinguish 
between eloquence and flattery, on the one hand, and wisdom and kindness on the 
other.287 Thus, the ignorant are especially prone to follow the kinds of charismatic 
leaders whose courage and ambition renders them threats to the commonwealth. This 
form of ignorance, however, does not necessarily dispose such individuals towards 
criminal action; rather, they are simply more likely to support criminal behaviour in 
others.  
It is the second, related, manifestation of the risk of ignorance which is more 
interesting in the context of criminal dispositions. In Chapter 11 Hobbes notes that 
‘Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and 
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authority of others.’288 This is clearly a form of ignorance linked to the one just cited, 
but here Hobbes suggests that it will have slightly different consequences. As a result 
of this type of ignorance, men are likely to form false opinions; he who is ignorant 
will ‘make Custom and Example the rule of his actions’ and will as a result be disposed 
to engage in arguments in which ‘the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually 
disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword.’289 Ignorance, then, is the root of the kinds 
of false opinion which make up the errors of reasoning which, Hobbes tells us, are the 
third source of criminal activity.  
If we turn back to Chapter 27, we find Hobbes arguing that there are three main 
types of error which lead to crime. The first is the result of an individual holding false 
principles. While there are numerous opinions which Hobbes cites throughout his 
works as being dangerous to the continued existence of the commonwealth, regarding 
crime he cites in particular the belief that ‘in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions 
have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them.’ 
Men prone to this error think that because ‘potent men’ break through the ‘Cob-web 
Lawes of their Country’, it is only ‘the weaker sort, and those that failed in their 
Enterprises’ who are considered ‘Criminals.’290 In linking criminality with the state’s 
response rather than with the action itself they come to think that ‘justice is but a vain 
word’,291 a proposition clearly linked to the idea, assimilated by the ignorant, that the 
doctrine of right and wrong is under dispute. Such reasoning leads to the conclusion 
that ‘no Act it it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by 
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the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be vertuous or vicious, as Fortune 
pleaseth.’292  
This failure to punish may occur for the reasons outlined above: sovereigns 
may be lax in monitoring corruption, or may consistently pardon the powerful. They 
may also simply lack the ability to consistently punish wrongdoing, allowing 
numerous criminals to escape the consequences of their actions. The crucial flaw in 
this reasoning is to allow such failures to undermine one’s recognition of the nature of 
law. This erroneous reasoning may also be a spur to revolution. Punishment, criminals 
may hope, might be avoided through more sympathetic leadership: ‘what Marius 
makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caeser (the same Lawes standing) 
turn again into a Crime.’293 Thus, individuals may be tempted to effect a change in 
government in order to ensure that the laws will be applied, or not applied, in ways 
which are most beneficial to themselves.  
Here, then, we have a type of criminal reasoning which is distinct from from 
that cited above, which emphasised the roles of particular passions. Crimes which are 
principally driven by passion and those encouraged by errors in reasoning are both 
caused by the criminal’s anticipation of being able escape punishment. It is this hope 
which principally overcomes the fear of punishment and allows the desire to commit 
the crime to become the will of the individual. However, while in the case of the 
passions, as we saw, this hope for impunity was related to a belief that civil institutions 
could be ignored or temporarily overcome, here the hope is that the very structures of 
the commonwealth, such as the identity of the sovereign or the application of the laws, 
can be modified.  




This certainly looks much more like treasonous, rather than simply criminal, 
intention; as Hobbes notes, such endeavours, when successful, would result in the 
‘perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.’294 Importantly, this error 
of reasoning is similar to the deliberation of the vainglorious criminal who, as we saw, 
also hoped to ‘unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall 
be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so.’295 The passion of vain-
glory might, here, provide the confidence required to operate according to this error 
of reasoning, demonstrating yet again that while Hobbes drew clear lines between 
different causes of crime, he was clearly interested in the ways in which they might 
reinforce and encourage each other.  
Hobbes’s second and third erroneous motivations for crime follow a similar 
pattern. He notes that, as a result of false teaching one might believe that the civil laws 
and natural laws are in contradiction, and hence that the civil laws are not to be 
followed. Finally, he suggests that among some men who are not necessarily disposed 
to crime, there can be a tendency to assume that determining right and wrong is simply 
an application of ‘common experience, and a good naturall wit.’296 We might read this 
final case of erroneous opinion as a version of vain-glory; Hobbes notes that men 
prone to this type of error have ‘a great opinion of their own understanding.’297 
Nonetheless, as with the cases of ignorance cited in the same chapter, Hobbes seems 
less concerned about this final source of crime than about the passions, or the first two 
sources of error. While such an individual might be mistaken regarding right and 
wrong as they have been defined in the commonwealth, there is no indication that they 
are particularly attached to their definitions and will refuse correction when it is 
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offered. More importantly, Hobbes does not suggest that this type of error is equivalent 
to, or a version of, that which argues that right and wrong are, despite the sovereign 
institution, entirely subjective. 
While Hobbes does not provide a similar discussion of criminal errors of 
reasoning in De Cive, he does note that there  
are some who think that those acts which are done against the Law, when 
the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe, are expiated, if the 
punished willingly undergoe the punishment…as if by the Law, the fact 
were not prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price, whereby 
a licence might be bought of doing what the Law forbids.298  
 
This case suggests a fourth type of false reasoning, and one to which, like certain types 
of vain-glory, those who are particularly able to endure punishment might be 
susceptible. In such cases, importantly, we again see that while there is no hope of 
impunity, the criminal believes that because they have certain characteristics—such 
as ability to pay a fine—they have a ‘licence’ to disobey the law.  
How, then, do these errors of reasoning help us to identify the deliberative 
processes of criminals? Unsurprisingly, given their intertwined nature, these errors of 
reasoning operate in a similar way to the criminal passions. There are clear parallels 
between those whose false reasoning suggests that they will be able to influence the 
application of the law, and those whose vain-glory results in the same conclusion. 
Similarly, the fearful, superstitious and the ignorant will be particularly disposed to 
believe in the false teaching of those who argue that right and wrong are in perpetual 
dispute.  
The question remains, of course, as to why these particular passions and errors 
are described by Hobbes as leading to criminal, rather than to treasonous behaviour. 
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punishment might legitimately be regarded as a debt to be paid. 
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In Leviathan, as we shall see in Chapter 5, rebellious acts are defined as the renouncing 
of subjection, one element of which might well be the rejection of the idea that the 
commonwealth, through its promulgation of law, is the only legitimate source of moral 
judgement. In Chapter 29 of Leviathan Hobbes included among those seditious 
doctrines which are ‘Diseases of a Common-wealth’ the contention that ‘every private 
man is Judge of Good and Evill Actions.’ He notes that ‘from this false doctrine, men 
are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-
wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they 
shall think fit.’ While such an attitude towards the law is not immediately destructive 
to the commonwealth, it nonetheless ‘distract[s] and weaken[s]’ it.299 Moreover, in the 
case of the criminals who suffer from the first type of error in reasoning, their acts go 
somewhat beyond simply determining whether or not to act according to the law; such 
individuals aim to change the common application of the law, and thus seek to not 
only act according to their private opinion, but also to subject all other members of the 
commonwealth to it.  
However it is not clear that Hobbes actually sees both the holding of such 
opinions and acting upon them as treasonous. On the one hand, this doctrine is labelled 
‘seditious’ and ‘poyson’ to the body of the commonwealth.300 Actively teaching such 
doctrine was, Hobbes asserts, one of the causes of the civil war in England.301 On the 
other hand, Hobbes clearly believes that these opinions lead to crime, a category of 
behaviour quite distinct from rebellion. Here we must draw an important distinction. 
The individual who commits a crime in the hope of being able to unsettle the 
commonwealth at some point in the future is still a criminal. Such an individual clearly 
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believes that they will be able to avoid punishment, but this belief is not in and of itself 
treasonous; as we have seen, it is characteristic of all the criminals examined thus far. 
However, the plan which is intended to gain this impunity is rebellious, unlike 
attempts to bribe judges or appeal to powerful friends and family. Thus, holding the 
belief that either justice as determined by the state need not apply equally (as we saw 
in the case of the criminal passions), or that in individual circumstances men should 
act according to their own understanding of good and evil is not in itself treasonous. 
However once an individual attempts to impose their own moral judgement upon the 
state, as a secondary act to the original crime itself, they can be labelled a traitor. 
This analysis will become especially relevant to the case of the unjust man and 
the Foole, treated below, but first it is important to note that these errors of reasoning 
have at their heart the same basic misconception of what it means to live in society as 
the criminal passions; here, again, we see a rejection of equality under the law, with 
individuals believing either that their own wisdom means that they need not spend as 
much time as others contemplating the nature of good and evil, or that they may, in an 
attempt to avoid the legal consequences for their actions, overthrow the public, and 
publically agreed, conscience.302  
 
The Foolish Unjust Man 
Hobbes’s presentation of dispositions suggests that while there may be a multitude of 
potential motivations for criminal behaviour experienced by individuals, these can 
largely be reduced to patterns of thought which allow citizens to ignore or minimise 
the threat of punishment which would otherwise dissuade them from committing 
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crimes. It is these deliberative processes with which, thus far, this chapter has been 
concerned. This analysis has suggested that we can best understand the criminal 
disposition as one which, consciously or not, rejects civil equality. The evidence for 
this assertion has largely come from Hobbes’s explicit statements on the causes of 
crime. However, Hobbes elsewhere in his writing presents a different, and broader, 
model for distinguishing between dispositions, and it is a model which reinforces this 
suggestion that while specific criminal motivations may differ between individuals, 
we can nonetheless analyse conceptual categories which explain the vast majority of 
criminal thought patterns and behaviours. This consists in the distinction he draws 
between the just man and the guiltless man. 
Hobbes consistently differentiates between those who are motivated to obey 
the law for its own sake, and those who obey largely, or even purely, because of the 
risk of punishment. In doing so, he was drawing on a distinction between types of 
motivation which would have been familiar to any readers acquainted with Aristotle’s 
account of human behaviour, and which was repeatedly addressed by the neo-
Aristotelian Scholastics for whom Hobbes had so much criticism. However, his use of 
the just man/guiltless man distinction allowed him to come to very different 
conclusions than others using the same categories. In order to trace this shift, it is 
necessary first to examine how earlier theorists treated this tradition before examining 
Hobbes’s own usage.  
In Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics we read that ‘it is the nature of the many 
to be amenable to fear but not to a sense of honour, and to abstain from evil not because 
of its baseness but because of the penalties it entails.’ 303 He suggests that it is possible 
for some men to be taught to act virtuously out of goodness rather than fear, but in 
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such cases ‘the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation of habits, 
so as to like and dislike aright.’304 As a result of this difference in character, ‘it is 
proper for the lawgiver to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds, in 
the expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will respond, yet 
he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and ill-
conditioned.’305 Thus while Aristotle does not use the terms just and unjust to 
distinguish between these two types of motivation, we nonetheless see him opposing 
those obey the law out of a sense of justice, and those who do so from a fear of 
punishment.306  
This distinction between two different kinds of motivation to obey the law was 
subsequently adopted by the theorists of the Second Scholastic. These writers believed 
that law was a necessary feature of human society; as Suárez writes, ‘men as 
individuals have difficulty in ascertaining what is expedient for the common good’ 
and thus require the law to ‘[point] out what should be done for its sake.’307 However 
while all men require law, it will affect them in different ways; a differentiation 
between the guiding and the coercive forces of the law is thus linked to a wider debate 
over the nature and possibility of human freedom.308 It is according to this distinction 
that these thinkers  distinguish between those who act according to the law out of a 
recognition of the value of law-following, and those who act out of conformity to the 
law and its coercive power. Thus Francisco de Vitoria claims that while ‘everyone is 
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guided by law…not everyone is compelled by law…no one escapes the guidance of 
the law [but] a man may escape the law’s compulsion if he is directly responsible to a 
higher law.’ Those who are ‘truly upright people are not, strictly speaking, compelled, 
for they observe the law not so much for fear of punishment as for love of justice,’ 
phrasing which, as we will see, finds a clear parallel in Hobbes’s work.309 Domingo 
de Soto  makes the same point when he writes that ‘the just who have habits of virtue 
are not subject to the law, since they do nothing because of compulsion which belongs 
to power, but do everything of their own free will.’310  
In the passages above, Aristotle equates virtue with law-abiding behaviour 
motivated by such love of justice. However these categories were complicated by 
writers such as Suárez and de Soto. For these later theorists, lawful behaviour 
prompted by the coercive power of the law was virtuous. But while such actions 
indicated the virtue of a good citizen, they did not display the degree of virtue of those 
who freely obeyed the law. It was the role of the state to help citizens attain this second, 
more advanced degree of virtue by providing both motivations for obedience. Thus 
we see Suárez arguing that ‘more is needed for the virtue of a good man than for the 
virtue of a good citizen’ because ‘although the virtue of a good citizen is moral and 
honourable as far as it goes, viewed absolutely, it is only good up to a point…and it is 
not enough in itself to make a completely virtuous man.’311 An individual whose law-
abiding behaviour is compelled is a just citizen;  this limited virtue is all that the state 
can expect from actions motivated by the fear of punishment. Nonetheless, it is the 
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task of the state to enable the just citizen to become a just man who obeys the law 
because it is the right, and not merely the most advantageous, thing to do.312  
Hobbes’s treatment of different motivations to obey the law uses similar 
language. However, his model of the just man dispenses with any sense that we can 
consider such an individual free from obligation. The question, for Hobbes, is which 
obligation will take precedence in an individual’s deliberation: obligation arising from 
their own agreement to take the sovereign’s laws as authoritative, or obligation arising 
from one’s own fear of punishment.313 Nonetheless, he appears to see some value for 
his theory in adopting the language and categories we find in the work of these 
Scholastics. Before analysing how these categories can aid in our understanding of the 
Hobbesian criminal, it is necessary to first set out the basic elements as he presents 
them, and examine some shifts in his theory. 
These dispositional categories are first introduced in the Elements where, he 
writes, when the terms ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ are attributed to actions they ‘signify 
the same thing with no injury, and injury; and denominate the action just, or unjust, 
but not the man so.’314 Such judgements about actions correspond to our ability to 
label an individual guilty or not guilty of a specific act. On the other hand, ‘when 
justice and injustice are attributed to men, they signify proneness and affection, and 
inclination of nature, that is to say, passions of the mind apt to produce just and unjust 
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actions.’315 As a result, ‘when a man is said to be just, or unjust, not the action, but the 
passion, and aptitude to do such action is considered.’316 In speaking about just and 
unjust men, then, we are describing a manner or disposition; the topic under 
consideration has moved from a judgement of a particular act to the question of 
motivation. The just man and unjust man are so defined because of their tendencies 
towards different patterns of deliberation.  
Turning to Hobbes’s definition of justice, we see in that it is also defined 
consistently. In the Elements, we read that ‘the breach or violation of covenant…is 
therefore called Unjust’317, while De Cive states that ‘unjust action’ is ‘breach of 
Contract and trust.’318 The just man, therefore, is primarily concerned with keeping 
covenants; in particular, he will be concerned with keeping the covenant which has 
created the state, and will be largely law-abiding. During the deliberations of the unjust 
man, on the other hand, the need to keep contracts will not take precedence; the threat 
of sanction is what motivates his actions. Thus while their actions may be the same, 
the deliberative processes which have led to them are different. As Hobbes writes, 
there is an ‘oderunt peccare [hatred of sin] in the unjust, as well as in the just, but from 
different causes; for the unjust man who abstaineth from injuries for fear of 
punishment, declareth plainly that the justice of his action dependeth upon civil 
constitution, from whence punishments proceed.’319 
The explanation for the just man’s actions provided in the Elements would 
seem to support the interpretation that the just man displays a just manner or 
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disposition, and we can therefore presume that he will have a habit of performing just 
actions. While, as noted above, the language of dispositions and manners is not explicit 
in the text as whole, and thus perhaps should not be expected in the comments on just 
and unjust men, in describing individuals’ motivation to perform just or unjust actions 
as an ‘inclination of nature’ Hobbes certainly points the reader in this direction. 
However, just as in later texts manners and dispositions are indications of likely rather 
than guaranteed behaviour, this ‘proneness and affection’ is not in itself an assurance 
of law-abiding behaviour. Hobbes notes that because of the distinction between just 
men and just actions, ‘a just man may have committed an unjust act; and an unjust 
man may have done justly not only one, but most of his actions.’320 Hobbes thus 
suggests that actual behaviour may not tell us much about patterns of individual 
motivation. We might witness an unjust act and presume the guilty party to be largely 
motivated by the kinds of motivations towards criminal activity which have already 
been discussed; similarly, we might witness a case of justice and extrapolate from it 
that the individual concerned is just. In both cases, our assumptions would, while 
apparently based on evidence, be potentially false.  
Hobbes’s presentation of this distinction in De Cive is similar, though 
increasingly framed as consisting of breaches of two different types of law: natural 
and civil. He writes that, because of this difference in applying the terms to men and 
to actions, ‘he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person, 
but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not therefore say he is 
an unjust, but guilty man.’321 He defines justice in humans as ‘to be delighted in just 
dealing, to study how to doe righteousness, or to indeavour in all things to doe that 
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which is just.’322 By the same standard, to be ‘unjust’ is to ‘neglect righteous dealing, 
or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present 
benefit.’323 Hobbes highlights the different categories to which the terms just and 
unjust may be applied when he concludes by noting that ‘the justice or injustice of the 
mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing; that of an action, or omission, another.’324 
The extent to which this difference exists is highlighted in his statement that as a result 
of this distinction,  
Innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust 
man, just: But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things 
because the Law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his 
infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth 
righteousness for fear of punishment annext unto the Law, and 
unrightousnesse by reason of the iniquity of the mind.325 
 
This distinction is repeated elsewhere in De Cive. In Chapter 14, ‘On Laws 
and Sins’ Hobbes writes that ‘a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through 
humane infirmity, although he desire to fulfill them, and yet his action as being against 
the Lawes, is rightly blam’d, and call’d a Sinne.’326 On the other hand, unlike such 
temporarily weak men, ‘there are some, who neglect the Lawes, and as oft as any hope 
of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts and betrothed 
faith can withhold them from their violation.’327 As a result, not ‘only the deeds, but 
even the mindes [ingenia] of these men are against the Lawes.’328 Hobbes draws a 
distinction between those ‘who sinne only through infirmity’ and who are ‘good men 
even when they sinne’ and those who ‘even when they doe not sin, are wicked.’329 He 
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notes that while ‘both the action, and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes’, they should 
be distinguished, with ‘the irregularity  of action’ labelled an ‘unjust deed’ and that of 
the ‘mind’ termed ‘injustice, and malice.’ The former is the result of ‘the infirmity of 
a disturbed soule’, while the latter demonstrates the ‘pravity of a sober mind.’330 
Finally, this distinction is repeated in Leviathan, where Hobbes writes of the 
labels just and unjust, ‘when they are attributed to Men, they signify Conformity, or 
Inconformity of Manners, to Reason’ and that therefore a ‘Just man…is he that taketh 
all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is that 
neglecteth it.’331 Again, we see the same assertion that the individual actions, just or 
unjust, of men are not enough to determine their disposition.332 However, Hobbes’s 
explanation of the just man differs slightly in Leviathan from the earlier texts cited. 
He explains this particular disposition by noting that among just men we find ‘a certain 
Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found), by which a man scorns to be 
beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise.’333 Leviathan 
is also where we read the most extended discussion of the unjust man. He notes that 
‘the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice 
before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured.’334 
As we can see, Hobbes’s presentation of the just man and the unjust man, while 
in many ways largely consistent, does undergo some modification over the course of 
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the three texts highlighted here. In particular, the explanation of the motivation of each 
figure appears to be slightly different. Thus while in the Elements we see almost no 
mention of the just man’s motivation for action,335 by De Cive we read that he both 
delights in and strives for justice. However, as the definitions in both Elements and 
Leviathan remind us, to delight is simply to experience ‘contentment, or pleasure’ with 
regards to some object; the desire to perform just acts, then, may be the result of any 
number of motions or passions which in turn produce this pleasure.336 By Leviathan, 
however, we see a much more detailed explanation of why just actions cause delight 
in the just man. This is because they allow him to ‘scorn...fraud or breach of promise’, 
which in turn allows him to experience ‘Joy, arising from imagination of [his] own 
power and ability.’ Just acts allow the just man to glory in himself, and it is this which 
motivates his desire to keep contracts. 
There is a long tradition in the literature of taking this final iteration of the just 
man as the only version of this disposition, and analysing his features on that basis.337 
Such discussions skirt over the fact that the introduction of forms of ‘courage’ as the 
explanation for the just man’s motivation is in fact a somewhat curious one, given the 
equivocal nature of courage discussed above. Earlier versions of the just man limit 
deliberation to a question of whether or not a given act is just according to the 
commonwealth’s determination; the just man is simply unusually aware, on this 
reading, of his own prior obligation. Alternatively, he might derive his ‘delight’ from 
justice through a number of passions or manners some of which, such as pity, are 
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consistently associated with peace and law-abidingness. In the later version, however, 
we have the suggestion that the just man’s actions are motivated not simply by the 
knowledge of his covenant-based commitments to justice but rather by a form of self-
regard. This would appear to undermine the suggestion that the just man’s deliberation 
is one which is wholly in line with the kinds of deliberation which should be promoted 
by the state.  
Rather than simply closing off certain criminal patterns of deliberation, the just 
man in this model deliberates by alternating between desire for a good which can only 
be obtained dishonestly and the potential for joy from self-regard, a model which 
appears to leave a gap for that criminal behaviour which also satisfies this self-regard. 
The example of the duel, cited in Chapter 1, would appear to be one case in which the 
requirements of a just disposition might come into definitional conflict with a manner 
defined by ‘Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage.’  Such self-regard appears, then, 
to be little protection against the forms of personal judgement which Hobbes has 
elsewhere suggested might be the origin of crime. Indeed, it is worth noting that in the 
Latin Leviathan Hobbes appears to return to his earlier emphasis on delight; the just 
man, in the 1668 text, ‘loves justice’.338 In De Homine we find that ‘those who do just 
works and give alms only for glory or for the acquiring of riches or for the avoidance 
of punishment are unjust even though their works are very frequently just’, again 
equating glory with injustice.339 The noble just man found in the English Leviathan, 
therefore, may not be the best guide to the disposition Hobbes outlines. 
Despite these shifts in the presentation of the just man, that of the unjust man 
remains fairly static; in all cases, he is afraid of punishment and so his law-abiding 
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nature is entirely dependent upon his holding the belief that he will be punished should 
he break the law. As a result, if or when he does break the law it reveals the presence 
in his deliberation of one of the criminal passions, or one of the associated errors of 
reasoning. Importantly, the unjust man is therefore prone to the same basic error, 
whether or not he commits crimes, as those individuals who do display criminal 
dispositions.  
It is here that we might wish that Hobbes had further distinguished between 
the unjust man and the prudent man discussed above. In both cases, as we have seen, 
their law abidingness is determined by the threat of punishment. Nonetheless, it 
appears plausible that prudence regarding law breaking might be a behavioural manner 
of the type described in De Homine; through habit, the prudent man might never or 
rarely break the law because his deliberative processes will not even consider the 
possibility. The description of the unjust man presented above suggests, in contrast, 
that he is someone who measures all his actions by their present advantage, and who, 
when he does commit crime, does so from a wicked disposition. This version of the 
unjust man appears to be far closer to those who have already been described as having 
criminal dispositions. In particular, the unjust man is presented as regularly engaging 
in precisely the debate over the ‘commands of the Common-wealth’ and whether to 
‘obey, or disobey them’ as those prone to vain-glory and errors of judgement. The 
unjust man in this reading, then, is precisely the kind of individual who is always ready 
to substitute his own opinions of good and evil for that of the commonwealth and thus, 
again, denies that he should be subject to the same legal and social standards as his 
peers. The only difference is that the innocent unjust man has little hope of impunity, 
and hence will avoid criminal actions.  
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On this reading of the unjust man, he is always potentially criminal because of his 
internal rejection of state-defined justice as an absolute guideline for behaviour. He 
also begins to seem much closer Hobbes’s presentation of the Foole, a figure who 
makes his first appearance in Leviathan. The just man, unjust man and Foole all appear 
in the same chapter, though they are not explicitly linked. We read that the  
Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no thing as Justice; and sometimes 
also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, 
and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no 
reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: 
and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, 
was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.340 
 
Importantly, the Foole ‘does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they 
are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called 
Injustice, and the observance of them justice.’341 Thus, he does not deny that there are 
objective standards which other people will understand and adhere to; he is not foolish 
in the manner of those who cannot govern their own lives, cited above, and nor does 
he wish for the destruction of the commonwealth. Because he does not believe that a 
return to the state of nature would beneficial to him, he can be distinguished from 
those ‘needy men’ who are ‘not contented with their present condition’ or who are 
‘ambitious of Military command’ and are thus ‘enclined to continue the causes of 
warre; and to stir up trouble and sedition.’342 However, ‘he questioneth, whether 
Injustice…may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man 
his own good.’343 Crucially, the Foole’s logic hinges upon the idea that he will be able 
to ‘sometimes’ escape the consequences for his breaking of covenants; in the absence 
of this belief such actions would not stand with reason. The Foole, then, is precisely 
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the unjust man; given that Hobbes suggests, in Leviathan, that just man are ‘rarely 
found’ he may be indicating that the majority of men are fools of this kind.344 At the 
very least, it is difficult for men, including the sovereign, to distinguish between the 
just and unjust, and hence between the wise and the foolish.345 
The topic of the Foole and the adequacy of Hobbes’s response to him have 
been the subject of extensive discussion in the literature.346 In linking the Foole and 
the unjust man, this chapter is not attempting to resolve these discussions. Rather, I 
suggest that if most citizens are either unjust or must be treated as if they are, then the 
problem of the Foole becomes both much more widespread, and more prosaic, than 
has previously been recognised. The problem of the Foole, according to this reading, 
is not, or is not simply, that of how to convince individuals to join the commonwealth, 
or of how to combat the logic of potential traitors.347 Importantly, Hobbes’s famous 
answer to the Foole can seen as an attempt to respond to the reasons for crime listed 
                                                   
344 Bernard Gert suggests that ‘Hobbes’s pessimism about the number of just men is not primarily 
due to his belief in rareness of courage but to his awareness of the strength of man’s passions and 
his conviction that most people had not been properly educated and disciplined.’ Gert 1967, p. 
514. The ways in which education aims to inculcate justice is explored in Chapter 4. 
345 See Hobbes 1983, p. 33.  
346 Much recent discussion has focused on whether Hobbes is primarily concerned with ‘explicit’ 
Fooles who, in announcing their foolish philosophy render themselves destabilizing forces within 
the commonwealth, or with foolish reasoning patterns, whether or not these are made explicit. See 
Hoekstra 1997, Hoekstra 1999, Hayes 1999, and Brito Vieira 2009 on foolishness as action; a good 
overview of these debates is found in LeBuffe 2007. Rhodes 1992, on the other hand, argues that 
the Foole is a prudential thinker who falsely believes that his prudence is true reason, or science. 
Springborg 2010, p. 31 also argues that the problem with the Foole is that he is guilty of ‘cognitive 
failure’ and thus easily led astray. Among those who emphasise the Foole’s problematic 
deliberative processes, there is debate over the consequences of these; Lloyd 1992, p. 95 suggests 
that the figure of the Foole should be primarily understood as representing the problem of rebellion, 
rather than ‘the general problem of crime’ while Rhodes 1992 explicitly links the Foole with the 
reasoning processes leading to criminal behaviour.  
347 For a discussion of the Foole which locates him in the state of nature, see Kavka 1986, pp. 137-
44. See however Pasquino 2001, pp. 408-9, which emphasises that in the Latin Leviathan the Foole 
is located within the state: he has both made an agreement, and is subject to a power able to compel 
his following through on it. See Hobbes 2012, pp. 224-5; in the English text Hobbes’s response to 
the Foole concerns the prudence of justice in situations where ‘one of the parties has performed 
already; or where there is a Power to make him performe’ while the Latin text argues for covenant-
keeping ‘where there is a power that compels, and one party has fulfilled his promise.’ Emphasis 
mine.  
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above, whether these are passions or errors of judgement. It is not simply an argument 
for general covenant keeping. In responding to the Foole, Hobbes is not attempting to 
convince unjust men to be just; the Foole’s errors have already demonstrated that he 
is unlikely to be convinced by such reasoning. Rather, Hobbes wishes to transform the 
unjust man into  a prudent man in whom fear inculcates not only a temporary desire 
to keep the law, but also a habitual manner of law-abidingness.348 It is therefore 
structured around an attempt to make the Foole accept that he may be mistaken 
regarding his foundational belief justifying his injustice, that he will be able to escape 
punishments.  
One element of Hobbes’s response is that those who are found to be habitual 
covenant breakers, or even those who simply believe that agreements may be broken 
upon convenience,  ‘cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for 
Peace and Defence.’349 However, it is not clear how convincing such an argument will 
be to the Foole, or indeed to unjust men generally. Such unjust fools are already fully 
aware of the risk of being found out; it is for this reason that they only act upon hope 
of impunity. Their foolishness, when it presents itself, consists precisely in believing 
that this impunity is possible; this is why Hobbes classifies the most-discussed 
criminal passion ‘vain’ and why the reasoning leading up to the criminal act is riddled 
with errors. The most effective response to the unjust Foole is therefore the assertion 
that in cases where an individual is able to achieve their ends solely through accident, 
they should not presume that this success ‘make[s] it reasonably or wisely done’.350 
Thus, a vainglorious criminal should not assume that just because a judge accepts a 
                                                   
348 I therefore depart from Gauthier’s analysis, which suggests that the response to the Foole is 
intended to demonstrate that only the just are fit for society. Gauthier 1982, p. 24. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Hobbes, 2012 p. 224. Lloyd 1992, p. 98 labels this a ‘narrowly prudential reason’ to act on 
one’s political obligations. Harvey 2002, p. 85 also emphasises that Hobbes’s response to the Foole 
can only be framed as an appeal to the latter’s self-interested nature and unjust reasoning processes.  
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bribe and they are able to escape punishment that the criminal act was therefore, at the 
time of committing, a reasonable act. The judge may just as easily have refused the 
bribe and added a further charge of corruption. The response to the Foole, therefore, 
is designed to convince him not to act upon hope of impunity, rather than according 
to the standards of justice; this may not transform his nature and render him just, but 
it will reduce the chance that he will ever be guilty.  
The unjust man is frightened of punishment, and in Hobbes’s reading, this 
renders him simultaneously prudent and foolish. He is prudent regarding his short term 
interest, but he is unable to recognise that his disposition provides no protection 
against his desires when he sees any hope of impunity for his crimes. Even when this 
hope is not justified, it will impact his deliberative processes in the ways outlined 
above. Hobbesian criminality, therefore, can be characterised as a rejection of the 
sovereign’s standards of justice, and hence an improper continuation of deliberation. 
As Katharine Maus has noted, this idea that criminal actions could be classified as 
rooted in a specific error, in which inward mental processes did not correspond to 
outward action was in some ways characteristic of Renaissance English jurisprudence. 
She argues that this ‘monstrous inwardness’ was ‘equally applicable’ as an 
explanation for ‘murder, theft, treason…so that an accusation of one particular crime 
tends to slide easily into an accusation of generalized criminality.’351  
Hobbes’s emphasis that the requirements of civil duty allow for a degree of 
disjuncture between inward beliefs and outward actions has been noted by numerous 
                                                   
351 Maus 1991, p. 39. See for example Hall’s emphasis that the honest man ‘hath but one heart’; 
his actions are a reflection of his true intentions, rather than the result of a prudential calculation. 
We can thus draw a parallel with Hobbes’s just man who acts on the basis of justice rather than 
fear, and who has no need to conceal a desire to commit crime absent legal punishment. The honest 
man is contrasted, in Hall’s taxonomy, with ‘The Hypocrite’, who has ‘oft times two hearts’. The 
hypocrite is itself a broad category, linked to profanity and the inability to recognise higher 
authority. This inability, for Hall, is at the root of all other vices. Hall 1608, p. 71.  
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readers. In some cases, this is recognised as simply a matter of public decorum. In 
others, we see such permitted ‘hypocrisy’ presented as evidence for Hobbes’s 
tolerance.352 However, the case of the foolish unjust man reminds us that for Hobbes 
those deliberative processes which concern justice are of concern to the state.  
 
Passion, Disposition and Criminal Responsibility 
The analysis of the three reasons for crime cited above, passion, error and ignorance, 
suggests that in each case, crime is the result of flawed deliberation. Through the force 
of habit, specific passions or errors of reasoning, necessary considerations regarding 
the consequences of actions may never take place, leading to either hope of impunity 
or disregard towards the law. In setting out this analysis of the causes of crime, Hobbes 
implies that law-abiding citizens can be understood as being motivated in one of three 
ways. They can be, like the foolish unjust man, frightened of immediate detection and 
punishment; they can be, like the prudent unjust man, aware that punishment generally 
follows crime; or they can, like the just man, desire to act justly out of a recognition 
that they have a moral obligation to consistently follow the law. However, Hobbes 
also recognises that even a just disposition is not enough to guarantee just action; in 
Chapter 27, as we saw, he notes that in some cases crime is the result of ‘some sudden 
force’ of passion. His shifting treatment of such crimes, and the allocation of 
individual responsibility for them, will conclude this chapter.  
Before examining Hobbes’s account of such crimes, it is worth noting that the 
English common law recognised a distinction between those crimes which were the 
result of previous consideration and those which followed immediate passion. In the 
                                                   
352 See discussions in Runciman 2008, Brito Vieira 2009, Frost 2001 and Frost 2004.  
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Institutes Coke noted that a charge of murder required both malicious forethought on 
the part of the murderer and a lack of provocation on the part of the victim. 
Manslaughter, on the other hand, even when voluntary and hence not a case of self-
defence, could nonetheless be the result of ‘some sudden falling out’ with another. In 
such cases, the subsequent killing was to be understood as taking place during the 
period when the ‘blood kindled by ire’ had ‘never cooled till the blow was given.’353 
As a consequence, murder was always a felony, but the classification and punishment 
of manslaughter was more flexible, with manslaughter, unlike murder, classified as a 
clergyable offence.354 This stance was also common among jurists more broadly. 
Grotius, for example, wrote that ‘offences occasioned from such Affections’, by which 
he meant immediately-provoked passions such as fear and anger, are ‘in Truth less 
odious’ than those which are the result not of sudden emotion but of settled 
dispositions such as the ‘Desire of pleasure.’ Grotius concludes with the suggestion 
that ‘the more Judgment is hindered in making its Choice, and the more natural the 
Causes are by which it is hindered, the less is the Offence.’355 
The differentiation between crimes which are the result of sudden passion and 
those which are the result of general dispositions, such as vain-glory, is not made in 
Hobbes’s discussion of the causes of crime. However, as the indicated by the 
discussion of the just men who only commit crime through weakness, the idea that 
there is a difference is regularly hinted at in his political writings. The just man, as we 
saw, is unlikely to engage in crime which requires a settled disposition conducive to 
crime. Those crimes which such men are prone to are crimes caused by ‘sudden 
                                                   
353 Coke 1669, p. 55. On the ways in which early modern courts and juries treated such cases see 
Herrup 1987, pp 179-80. 
354 Dalton 1618, p. 222. 
355 Grotius 2005, p.1009. See Flynn 1998 for a discussion of Aquinas’s argument that sins 
provoked by sudden passion were less serious than those following long consideration. 
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Passion, or mistake of Things, or persons.’356 Notably, the just man’s crimes are not 
motivated by hope of impunity; indeed, he is characterised by the desire to repent even 
upon having committed secret sins.357 This type of crime, when presented through an 
explanation of just and unjust dispositions, therefore appears to be of a different type 
than crimes caused by the criminal passions or errors discussed above, with a 
corresponding difference in the degree of responsibility allocated to the criminal. 
However, this is not a position which Hobbes held consistently throughout his 
works.358  
In order to fully examine Hobbes’s explanation of such crimes of immediate 
passion, it is necessary to briefly return to his account of deliberation. In his discussion 
in the Elements, Hobbes writes that we should label as ‘voluntary’ those ‘actions that 
proceed from sudden anger, or other sudden appetite, in such men as can discern of 
good and evil.’359 This is because while the onset of the passion itself, and hence the 
motivation for action, may not have resulted in a lengthy consideration before acting, 
in such men who are capable of determining general principles of action ‘the time 
precedent is to be judged deliberation.’360 Hobbes notes that actions which are the 
result of sudden, overwhelming passion can therefore still tell us something about the 
deliberative processes of the individual, or of their habits of deliberation. The 
precedent deliberation Hobbes describes is not necessarily linked to the specific 
circumstances an individual finds himself in; rather, it tells us what a person has 
                                                   
356 Hobbes 2012, p. 226. 
357 Hobbes 2012, p. 227.  
358 Hobbes’s discussion of crimes provoked by sudden passion has received little attention in the 
literature; where readers have remarked upon such crimes, they do not comment on Hobbes’s 
shifting account. Thus we see David van Mill and Alice Ristroph arguing that such acts are simply 
a demonstration that for Hobbes contemplated actions are a better reflection of man’s will than 
sudden acts, while Frost emphasises the alterative model presented in the Elements and Of Liberty. 
See van Mill 2001, p. 57; Ristroph 2012, p.102; Frost 2004, p. 19.  
359 Hobbes 1969, p. 62. 
360 Ibid.  
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determined regarding ‘in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action 
proceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.’361 According to the model of 
passion and action set out in the Elements, therefore, acts arising from sudden passion 
conform to patterns of thought and opinion already held by an individual, whether or 
not these are even known to the individual in question. In turn, those observing such 
acts can deduce from them a degree of knowledge about the offending individual’s 
thought patterns, and may even be able to predict future behaviour based on such acts.  
This passage in the Elements is not applied to the case of crime as such, and 
Hobbes does not the address the topic in De Cive. In fact, Hobbes only ever applied 
the logic of the Elements to the civil context when pushed to do so as part of a debate 
over his theory of the will with Bishop Bramhall, and in this instance, his theory 
remains unmodified. In 1645’s Of Liberty and Necessity Hobbes expands on the ideas 
expressed in his earlier writings. He notes that ‘A judge in judging whether it be a sin 
or not, which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action than the 
will of the doer.’362 This logic holds not only for crime, but rather reflects Hobbes’s 
understanding of spontaneous action more generally. He goes on to elaborate the point, 
writing that ‘when it comes into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, 
if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or the abstaining necessarily follows the 
present thought he has of the good or evil consequences thereof to himself.’363 This 
‘present thought’ can be read as analogous to the precedent deliberation cited in the 
Elements; it is the result of the consideration of hypothetical situations and principles 
which are then applied in a situation which will not allow for a re-evaluation through 
lengthy deliberation.  
                                                   
361 Ibid. 
362 Hobbes 1999, p. 29. 
363 Hobbes 1999, pp. 35-6. 
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His discussion of previously deliberated action in this text goes further than 
that found in the Elements, and foreshadows the comments on manners from De 
Homine,  as Hobbes goes on to argue that this description also applies to situations 
where ‘a man has time to deliberate but deliberates not, because never anything 
appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion 
of the goodness or harm of it.’364 This point, that in some cases individuals will refrain 
either from all deliberation or will refrain from fully considering, or reconsidering, a 
given situation, predicts his later argument in which manners or characters can be 
understood as a deliberative short cut. Actions proceeding from these forms of 
precedent or curtailed deliberation are, Hobbes asserts, ‘voluntary’, in contrast to 
Bramhall’s label ‘spontaneous.’365 Later in the text, Hobbes defines ‘spontaneity’ as 
‘inconsiderate proceeding’, phrasing which, while it might suggest a lack of 
deliberation, must be understood as reflecting deliberation that is in some way 
deficient or otherwise curtailed.366  
As a result of this model of voluntary action, Hobbes argues that it is 
‘reasonable to punish a rash action, which could not be justly done by man to man 
unless the same were voluntary.’ As he has already explained, such actions are not to 
be understood as being ‘without deliberation’ despite their sudden nature, ‘because it 
is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life whether he 
should do that kind of action or not.’ In a conclusion that echoes the both the language 
and the logic of the passage in the Elements, Hobbes writes that ‘hence it is that he 
that kills in a sudden passion of anger shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because 
all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall 
                                                   
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Hobbes 1999, p. 39. 
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be held for one continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be adjudged 
to proceed from election.’367 
According to this account, the fact of the action lends a certain colour to the 
rest of the criminal’s life; clearly, if he had spent ‘all the precedent time of his life’ 
under the impression that he would happily commit a crime of this kind, he cannot 
have been a consistently just man. Essentially, Hobbes here suggests that the 
possibility of the just man (a category which does not appear in this text) committing 
a crime is itself a contradiction. Hobbes, then, implies that any understanding of crime 
which differentiates between that which is provoked by sudden passion and that which 
is not essentially demonstrates a failure to understand the operations of the will. 
However, Hobbes appears to have slightly shifted his position by the writing 
of Leviathan. His stance on the necessary and voluntary nature of all human actions 
does not change in the later text. At no point, however, does Hobbes in his discussion 
of the passions feel the need to emphasize that actions proceeding from sudden passion 
are equally voluntary, as he did in the Elements. We might read this as an indication 
that his position on such cases had not changed, and that he felt that his exposition of 
deliberation and the voluntary nature of all acts meant that such a conclusion should 
be clear to the reader. However, in Chapter 27 Hobbes specifically returns to the case 
of acts motivated by sudden passion, and his explanation differs from that offered in 
the 1645 text. 
In Leviathan he notes that ‘A Crime which ariseth from a sudden Passion, is 
not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation.’ This is because, he 
suggests, ‘in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity 
of human nature.’ On the other hand, ‘he that doth it with praemeditation, has used 
                                                   
367 Hobbes 1999, pp. 36-7. 
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circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the 
consequence thereof to humane society; all of which in committing the Crime, hee 
hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite.’ He thus discards the logic 
presented in the earlier texts, that an individual’s earlier deliberation upon principles 
suggests that the crime of passion is no different to any other crime. However, Hobbes 
has not fully rejected the model of deliberation presented in the earlier texts. He goes 
on to note that despite the difference in the severity of crimes, ‘there is no suddenesse 
of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of 
the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; 
because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions 
continually.’368 
As readers, then, we are left with a puzzle. Hobbes’s approach to crimes of 
passion appears to have evolved, or at the very least his emphasis undergoes a change. 
But there is no corresponding reason internal to the theory of passions and deliberation 
that can itself explain this shift. Moreover, this shift has major consequences for how 
we should understand the Hobbesian criminal and the idea of the criminal disposition, 
and perhaps Hobbes’s theory of dispositions and manners more broadly. The 
presentation in the Elements and Of Liberty suggests that, because all actions are the 
result of deliberation they reveal something about individual deliberative patterns. In 
particular, the analysis of the criminal individual presented here has suggested that 
there are particular assumptions about impunity and hence about civil equality that 
underpin crime in general, whether or not the individual displays the particular 
criminal dispositions related to dangerous passions and mistaken reasoning. The case 
of the crime of passion as presented in Leviathan, on the other hand, suggests that in 
                                                   
368 Hobbes 2012, p. 474.  
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some cases crime is not the result of a hope for impunity, and nor does it necessarily 
indicate anything about one’s general attitude towards justice. 
While we should never discount the possibility that Hobbes simply changed 
his mind, it remains curious that he did not modify other elements in his theory of 
deliberation in his attempt to make space for a specific category of action which is the 
result of overwhelming passion. On the other hand, introducing the crime of passion 
does allow him to resolve one key issue raised in the case of the just man. By 
introducing a distinct category of crimes of passion, Hobbes allows for the type of 
crime committed by the just man to be considered, while criminal, an act that will not 
fundamentally remove the character of the just man. At the same time, he is able to 
emphasize the dangerous nature of crimes that proceed from a hope of impunity. While 
we may not know which type of crime Hobbes considered to be more frequent in the 
commonwealth, his analysis of the means by which individuals might attain such hope 
demonstrates that this was this type of criminal he considered most dangerous to the 
civil peace. It is crimes arising from a hope of impunity which Hobbes’s systems of 
punishment and education, explored in the next chapter, are designed to prevent.  
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Chapter 4: Hobbes on the Purpose of Punishment 
Introduction: The Necessity of Punishment 
Throughout his works Hobbes repeatedly informs his readers that a well-designed and 
consistently employed system of punishment is one of the necessary conditions of civil 
stability. In Chapter 30 of Leviathan he emphasises that it is one of the duties of 
sovereign power to ‘make a right application of Punishments’369 because society can 
only be provided with common standards of justice through  such ‘coercive’ 
enforcement of judgements.370 As we saw in Chapter 2, it is the sovereign 
authorisation which obliges members of the commonwealth to obey the civil law. 
However Hobbes consistently argues that it is the threat of punishment, or the 
‘vindicative’ aspect of the law, which ensures that they will actually do so.371 
Punishment thus plays important roles in the commonwealth: it assures law-abiding 
subjects that their security will be protected by the sovereign, and it indicates to all 
                                                   
369 Hobbes 2012, p. 542.  
370 Hobbes 2012, p. 220. See also Hobbes’s assertion, in the Elements, that men require the security 
of knowing that their sovereign will employ punishment before they will willingly enter the 
commonwealth:  
The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the 
right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which 
he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so 
relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when 
he can forsee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be 
deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected 
themselves. Hobbes 1969, p. 110. 
371 See, for example, his comment that ‘in vain doe they [the laws] also prohibit any men, who doe 
not withall strike a fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore is the Law, unlesse it contains 
both parts, that which forbids injuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them.’ 
Hobbes 1983, p. 172. Hobbes’s definition of law does not require the attachment of a threat or 
sanction, a point emphasised by Goldsmith 1996, p. 276. However, Hobbes clearly means subjects 
to understand that in breaking either the positive or the natural law they are automatically liable to 
punishment, as he notes in his statement that ‘Punishment is a known consequence of the violation 
of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the 
Law’ the criminal is ‘subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment.’ Hobbes 
2012, p. 456. See also Hobbes 2005, p. 14, where the Lawyer clarifies that by laws, he means 
‘Laws living and Armed’ whose breach will be punished. 
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subjects which actions their sovereign takes to be cases of criminal injury.372 Both of 
these functions, however, come about because of the practice’s primary purpose. As a 
deterrent to law-breaking, punishment brings together the will of the sovereign, as 
expressed through laws, and the wills of individual citizens when they consider their 
own security and well-being. It thus provides a concrete and short-term reason to 
consistently obey the law, and hence encourages subjects to behave according to their 
pre-existing obligations.373  
As we saw in Chapter 2, punishment can only take place within the 
commonwealth, as it requires the existence of a common or ‘publique’ authority. This 
punishing authority, in turn, is tasked with acting according to natural law and, most 
importantly, in ways which will protect the state from both external threats and internal 
criminals. Punishment, according to Hobbes, should thus be understood as an 
institution which seeks to preserve the community as a whole, according to the 
standards set in the laws promulgated by the sovereign. As a result of this commitment, 
Hobbesian punishment is primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace 
throughout the commonwealth. It therefore emphasises the harm posed by crime to 
the state rather than to individual victims or to God.374 Therefore, in responding to 
                                                   
372 On punishment as providing a guarantee of security, and hence enabling men to follow the 
natural laws, see Warrender 1957, p. 207. 
373 The suggestion that, in enforcing subject’s own commitments, punishment ‘supplies what is 
defective in the rationality of ordinary men’ is a helpful way of thinking about its purpose. 
Minogue 1972, p. 78. 
374 Indeed, according to the definition of crime as an offence against the commonwealth, the state 
should be seen as the casualty of crime’s ‘injury’, or breach of contract, while the victim 
experiences ‘damage.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 228. As the commonwealth’s representative, therefore, the 
sovereign is empowered to punish the wrongdoer. Runciman 1997, p. 19 argues that this 
presentation is illogical: if the nature of injury is the breach of contract, then subjects cannot 
logically injure the sovereign, just as, famously, the sovereign cannot injure them. The true victim 
must be, he argues, every single natural person who participated in the original covenant. However, 
if we understand the victim of crime to be the commonwealth, which is constituted by the multitude 
as represented by the sovereign, then the problem disappears. It is precisely the commonwealth 
who is injured by the criminal breaking their contract with all members of the original covenant. 
As we shall see, however, the question of the identity of the victim is largely irrelevant to Hobbes, 
who proposes a theory based on what is required for civil peace. Defining the injury of crime as 
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injury the state’s correct response is a forward looking theory of punishment which 
discourages injurious acts, rather than one which takes as its justification the 
subjective experience of wrong faced by victims.  
Hobbes is remarkably consistent in his various discussions of the means by 
which the judicious application of punishment reinforces sovereign authority. He 
repeatedly emphasises punishment’s role in shaping individuals’ outward behaviour 
into that of good, law-abiding citizens. As we shall see, however, while punishment 
has a major role in the theory, in that it restrains and regulates human interaction, its 
ability to provide reasons for adhering to the sovereign nonetheless remains limited. 
Punishment can encourage prudential behaviour, but it cannot consistently provide 
true knowledge regarding the necessity of civil peace and what this requires. It is 
therefore, Hobbes argues, an institution which must be supplemented by a system of 
public education emphasising the doctrine found in his works.375 
 
A Forward-Looking Theory of Punishment 
From his first forays into political theory Hobbes repeatedly emphasises the 
necessarily forward-looking nature of punishment, grounding this aspect of the 
practice in natural law. As we saw in Chapter 2, once the commonwealth has been 
established it provides enough security for this law to be practiced by individuals, 
including the sovereign, in foro externo as well as in foro interno. These laws provide 
                                                   
being directed against the state emphasises the illegitimate nature of private revenges, but Hobbes 
does not emphasise that it is the experience of injury which legitimises the state’s punishment of 
criminals. This reading, which de-emphasises the location of the injury of crime, is consistent with 
Hobbes’s own ambiguity. In Chapter 27 of Leviathan, for instance, he notes that ‘in almost all 
Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to some Private men, but also to the Common-wealth.’ 
Hobbes 2012, p. 480. Emphasis mine.  
375 Hobbes closes the section of Leviathan titled ‘Of Common-Wealth’ with the hope that ‘this 
writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign’ who will use it as the basis of a programme 
of ‘Publique teaching.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 574.  
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general guidelines for human conduct, and not simply for those interactions which 
citizens have with their state and its representatives. Nonetheless, they become 
particularly important when defining activities, such as punishment, which can only 
ever take place within the commonwealth and by public authority. They are, it 
becomes abundantly clear as we read through Hobbes’s list of laws, not merely a 
means of creating the commonwealth but of maintaining it. Peace is both the impetus 
for entering into the commonwealth, and the end to which the instituted sovereign 
acts.376 However, the sovereign’s unique role in the commonwealth means that his 
actions, specifically, should pursue this goal through a concern for the salus populi.377 
Subjects regulate their own conduct in accordance with natural law to reduce ill-
feeling and disagreeable interpersonal interactions. The sovereign, however, has a 
responsibility to actively promote law-abiding behaviour in the population as a whole, 
and to do so in such a way as to encourage civil peace. As a result, the sovereign not 
only has a duty to treat his subjects with equity in his dealings with them, but also to 
take steps to ensure that civil institutions do not encourage those passions which would 
undermine the state as a whole.  
As a result, those natural laws which concern acts of revenge, retribution and 
punishment are specifically directed towards the sovereign power as the unique holder 
of the punishment right. As Hobbes notes, ‘private’ revenges are to be disallowed in 
the commonwealth, even when conducted according to the natural laws outlined 
                                                   
376 Hobbes notes in Chapter 15 of Leviathan that he has listed ‘the Lawes of Nature, dictating 
Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes.’ As such, they concern ‘the doctrine 
of Civill Society’, and thus indicate how men should behave towards each other. Hobbes suggests 
that there are further laws of nature addressing forms of intemperance, which, while still indicating 
what is ‘destructive of [a man’s] life’, are essentially guides to his individual conduct and are thus 
irrelevant to a discussion of social life. Hobbes 2012, p. 198, 238.  
377 In Chapter 30 of Leviathan we read that ‘The OFFICE of the Soveraign…consisteth in the end, 
for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the 
people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 520. 
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below. Hobbes no doubt worries that acts of private revenge would, if either threatened 
or carried out, increase precisely that sense of insecurity which characterises the state 
of war, and believes that they should be banned for this reason.378 However, there is a 
second reason, which is related to the capacity of punishment to act as a form of harsh 
instruction. As we shall see, for Hobbes the threat of punishment is an inducement, 
aimed both at the offender and the population as a whole, to behave in a certain way. 
As such, in the political sphere it should only ever be carried out in order to encourage 
behaviour according to standards set by the sovereign.379 Punishment undertaken by 
anyone other than the sovereign would risk forming the people’s wills according to a 
potentially subversive set of doctrines.380 
Before turning to Hobbes’s account of the ways in which punishment acts as a 
deterrent, however, we must examine his discussion of why this can be the only 
justification for the practice. As Jean Hampton has argued, deterrence is an implicit 
part of all punishment in legal systems in which the law is reinforced with threats.381 
It was certainly an explicit element highlighted in a range of sources, both classical 
and early modern, available to Hobbes when constructing his own account. As John 
Witte Jr. and Thomas C. Arthus have noted, deterrence was a major feature of early 
Protestant discussions on the purpose of human law. Jean Calvin, for instance, vividly 
illustrated the role of the law in the Institutio Christianae religionis [Institutes of the 
                                                   
378 Hobbes makes numerous references to the danger posed by private revenge to the 
commonwealth and the rule of law. See Hobbes 2012, pp. 464-6, 476, 530, 1132. Hobbes’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge, let alone unleash, the violent passions of individual subjects will 
be discussed below, as a feature of his account of the correct purpose of punishment.  
379 For a discussion of the ways in which the educative discipline of children by parents should be 
used to instruct the former according to the sovereign’s principles see Bejan 2010, pp. 619-20.   
380 The danger, of course, was not simply that individuals, even powerful ones, would ‘punish’ 
according to their own standards. Importantly, the Ministers of the Church should have no right to 
punish crimes independent of those rights granted to it by the sovereign. See Hobbes 2012, p. 782. 
Hobbes’s discussion of punishment thus directly parallels his account of teaching and preaching, 
in which the sovereign alone has the right and duty to determine what is to be taught to the people. 
See for instance Hobbes 2012, p. 272. 
381 Hampton 1984, p. 211.  
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Christian Religion] (1536), writing that it ‘is like a halter to check the raging and 
otherwise limitlessly raging lusts of the flesh…Hindered by fright or shame, [men] 
dare neither execute what they have conceived in their minds, nor openly breathe forth 
the rage of their lust.’382 This argument found its way into accounts of punishment. In 
1647 Jeremy Taylor wrote that ‘all punishment in a prudent government punishes the 
offender to prevent a future crime, and so [punishment] proves more medicinal than 
vindictive.’383 Similarly, in his 1678 text The Laws and Customes of Scotland in 
Matters Criminal George Mackenzie argued that ‘Punishments are inflicted, not only 
to satisfy, either the public revenge of the Law, or the private revenge of the party, but 
rather to deter others for the future.’ In arguing that ‘what is done can no more be 
helped’, Mackenzie asserted that deterrence and satisfaction justified punishment, 
whereas simply aiming to make the criminal ‘insensible’ did not.384  
Other sources choose to simply note punishment’s deterrent effect, rather than 
describing it as the practice’s correct purpose. In his 1676 Advice to Grand Jurors in 
Cases of Blood Zachary Babington notes that ‘example and terrour to others’ are ‘oft 
the end of punishment.’385 This assumption that a major purpose of punishment was 
deterrence was not limited to learned treatises. The idea also underpinned more 
popular discussions and was found in both sermons and in the the cheap pamphlets 
which regularly accompanied public executions. In a 1616 sermon Charles 
Richardson, for instance, argued that while ‘the better sort are directed by loue…the 
greater sort are corrected by feare…euen the worst that are, will abstaine from euill 
for feare of punishment.’ As a result, ‘by the punishment of malefactors, others will 
                                                   
382 Witte Jr. and Arthus 1993-4, p. 436. See also Sommerville 1992, pp. 101-2. 
383 Taylor 1861, p. 522. See James Morice’s similar assertion, in 1590, that ‘Penaunces…are not 
taken to be pane but medicine…all corrections are or should bee medicines for the amendement 
of manners.’ Morice 1590, p. 23.  
384 Mackenzie 1678, p. 557.  
385 Babington 1676, p. 53. 
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be admonished to walke more warily’, and it is for this reason that ‘publicke 
chastisements and punishments’ are ‘very profitable’.386 Similarly the anonymous 
1670 pamphlet The Execution of the 11 Prisoners that suffer’d at Tyburn notes that in 
their execution the ‘lamentable and to be deplored Miscreants’ became ‘Examples of 
Trophies of offended Justice’ which would ‘restrain, all leud persons from their evil 
course, that they may turn back from those pernicious pathes, that tend to Death and 
Hell.’387  
What is striking about Hobbes’s account, therefore, is not that he insists upon 
the importance of deterrence, but rather his assertion that this is the only possible 
motivation which, on its own, can legitimate punishment. In presenting this argument, 
Hobbes set himself against a tradition of thought which emphasised the ways in which 
punishment could also be used, in a retributive manner, to acknowledge the experience 
of crime’s victims. In doing so, he was actively rejecting a long-standing distinction 
in the philosophy of punishment between retribution as taking active enjoyment in the 
suffering of another and retribution as a practice with a social purpose. Importantly, 
this second form of retributive punishment was not a call for unleashing the violent 
passions of anger, revenge and hatred against convicted criminals. As Grotius notes in 
his own discussion of the purpose of punishment, both classical and Christian 
traditions had long condemned the exacting of punishment for its own sake as 
irrational and hence illegitimate. Citing, among others, Plato, Seneca, Cicero and 
Aquinas in support, Grotius argues that it is a commonly held precept that ‘it is 
contrary to Nature, for one man to be pleased and satisfied with the Pain or Trouble 
                                                   
386 Richardson 1616, pp. 7-9.  
387 The Execution 1670, p. 8. We also find this sentiment in art; the caption to Pieter Brughel the 
Elder’s print Iusticia (1559) reads ‘the aim of the law is to correct the punished one, or that their 
punishment should improve others, or that, once evildoers are removed, the rest should live in 
greater safety.’ Quoted in Cohen 2010, p. 44. 
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he brings upon another.’388 This is the case even when this pain or trouble is to be 
inflicted upon an individual who has harmed another through injustice.  
Nonetheless, this did not mean that retribution was simply equated with violent 
revenge; it could also be a rational, socially useful practice. According to thinkers who 
espoused this idea, the harm suffered by the punished individual had both backward 
and forward looking purposes. It re-established the standards of justice which had been 
flouted by the perpetrator, and it allowed for a series of reconciliations: between victim 
and perpetrator, and between both of these and society more broadly. As O. F. 
Robinson has emphasised, this way of thinking about punishment had a long history 
by the time Hobbes turned his attention to it. Robinson notes that while in classical 
Rome ‘there was fairly widespread agreement among philosophers…that the prime 
purpose of punishment was deterrence’, the practice was also considered a means of 
                                                   
388 Grotius 2005, p. 960. In The Laws Plato compares having a criminal disposition to being sick; 
as a result, ‘the unjust man deserves as much pity as any other sufferer’ and in punishing him one 
must ‘restrain and abate…anger, instead of persisting in it with the spitefulness of a shrew.’ Anger 
is only an appropriate response to ‘complete and unmanageably vicious corruption’, which is not 
the case when dealing with ordinary crime. The correct curative and deterrent aim of punishment 
is emphasised in the Gorgias, where Plato argues that ‘it is fitting for everyone undergoing 
vengeance and rightly suffering vengeance from another either to become better and be benefited, 
or to become an example to the rest, so that when others see him undergoing whatever he 
undergoes, they will be afraid and become better.’ Plato 2004, p. 150; Plato 1979, p. 104. On 
Plato’s corrective theory of punishment, see Mackenzie 1981, especially pp. 140-203. In his De 
Ira Seneca argues that ‘Anger…is hungry for payback; the presence of this lust in a human 
being’s…breast in no way accords with nature’ and, in accordance with Plato, that the role of 
punishment is to be a form of instruction in the requirements of virtue and justice. Seneca 2010, 
pp. 18-9. Cicero argued in De Officiis that there is no place for anger in punishment, which should 
be designed to be ‘useful to the republic’, as ‘a man who is angry when he goes to punish will 
never maintain that intermediate course between too much and too little…our prayer should be 
that those in charge of the republic be like the laws, which are led to punish not through anger, but 
through fairness.’ Cicero 1991, p. 35. Thomas Aquinas, in considering whether vengeance is 
lawful, concludes that it is not, if ‘intention [of the punishing individual] be centered chiefly upon 
the evil done to the recipient and is satisfied with that’, as ‘taking delight in evil done to another is 
in fact a type of hatred.’ Vengeance, however, is lawful when it aims at ‘the correction of the 
wrongdoer, or at least in restraining him and relieving others.’ Aquinas 1972b, p. 117. In light of 
these discussions, Reynolds’s assertion that hatred is a passion which is utterly incompatible with 
peace because it demands  the utter subjugation of the hated, is suggestive of why hatred is 
inappropriate in punishment. Reynolds writes that ‘Hatred contenteth not it selfe with the death of 
an Enemie, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, 
insulting with pride and indignities over the dead bodie.’ Reynolds 1640, p. 160. 
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‘maintain[ing] the dignity and esteem of the victim.’. This maintenance was required 
in order to ensure ‘social stability’, rather than the ‘social safety’ achieved by 
punishment’s deterrent function.389 Eirene Visvardi has emphasised a similar theme 
in Greek sources, noting the extent to which punishment was seen as a means of 
righting a communal moral balance.390 As a result, the two directions in which 
punishing could ‘look’ converge: for reconciliation to take place, justice had both to 
be done and seen to be done.  
This retributive logic could be presented both in abstract terms, as an example 
of the demands of justice, and in emotional ones, in which the passions of the victim 
could be addressed.391 We consistently see, however, that these two forms are 
presented as mutually reinforcing. Aristotle argued in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
punishment is a necessary means of addressing the inevitable anger experienced by 
victims, and as a result society should not shy away from using it for this purpose. 
Writing that ‘the very existence of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity; for 
men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with evil’, he suggests that when 
men are unable to engage in punishment of this sort, they ‘feel they are in the position 
of slaves’, rather than of full citizens.392 These aims, though able to justify punishment 
on their own terms, were frequently presented as complementary to deterrence. 
Plutarch, in his essay ‘On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance’ argued that while 
‘chastisement…serves as a check to future crimes’, this is not the practice’s only goal. 
Rather, punishments are also ‘the greatest comfort to the injured.’393 Taking account 
                                                   
389 Robinson 2007, p. 181.  
390 Visvardi 2015, p. 108.  
391 George Mackenzie’s division, cited above, between the public revenge of the law and the 
private revenge of the injured party is a useful way of considering this distinction.  
392 Aristotle 1934, p. 281. On the retributive aspect of Aristotle’s theory see Allen 2003, pp. 282-
91.  
393 Plutarch 1959, p. 185.  
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of the emotional consequences of crime, therefore, could act as a means of 
encouraging future social peace. Such sentiments continued beyond the classical 
period. Tuckness and Parrish have noted Aquinas’s emphasis on ‘satisfaction’ as 
something which both heals past sins and prevents future ones,394 and Esther Cohen 
has emphasised the extent to which the writings of medieval civil law jurists presented 
state punishment as a form of retribution on behalf of the victims of crime.  
By the time we come to seventeenth century discussions, we find that that the 
rational anger of the individual victim has been applied to the community as a whole, 
and that the punishment of malefactors is presented as required to maintain moral 
standards within it. Edward Reynolds’s 1640 Treatise of the Passions notes that anger 
is a normal response to the feeling that one has been shown contempt; the example he 
gives is the rightful anger of the community of the ‘lawfull’ against the criminal.395  
We see a similar sentiment in Richardson’s sermon; alongside deterrence, he notes 
that punishment has a role in comforting the law-abiding. He writes that ‘where 
wicked men escape vnpunished…there the good are griued and discouraged…he 
hurteth the good, that spareth them that are euill…[for] it cannot be, that men should 
liue peaceably and quietly’ in states where the wicked are not punished.396 Punishment 
was not simply intended to reconcile the law-abiding with the institutions of justice, 
however. According to George Herbert’s 1652 text A Priest to the Temple the criminal 
is to be recognised not as an ‘enemy’ but as a ‘brother’, with punishment a ‘humbling’ 
process enabling his return to the community.397  
                                                   
394Tuckness and Parrish 2014, p. 121; Cohen 2010, p. 45.  
395 Reynolds 1640, pp. 317, 331. On early modern punishment more generally as a form of 
‘community…revenge’ see also Herrup 1987, p. 5 and Friedland 2003. 
396 Richardson 1616, pp. 6-7.  
397 Herbert 1652, pp. 104-5. J. A. Sharpe notes the ways in which the rituals surrounding 
punishment could enact a symbolic reconciliation between the punished individual and the 
community as a whole. In his account of the early modern custom of the condemned making 
speeches from the scaffold he argues that such spectacles were considered useful not only for their 
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It is also in this period that we see an increasing emphasis on a further 
permutation of retributive punishment: that which demanded the punishment of 
criminals in order to meet the strictures of divine justice. In this case, however, 
punishment was held to be necessary to reconcile society as a whole to God, rather 
than to the crime’s (human) victim. As Patricia Crawford has highlighted, this 
phenomenon emerged from the application of Mosaic principles to human justice, and 
was used, notably, to apply the concept of ‘blood guilt’ to Charles Stuart. According 
to this theory, the shedding of ‘innocent blood’ served to pollute the criminal. When 
this ‘man of blood’ was the head of the state, this required human punishment to ensure 
that God’s wrath would not ‘fall upon the whole nation.’398 Once accomplished, 
punishment thus brought human society closer to divine standards of justice, and 
removed from it the stain of sin. Thus punishment received its justification from man’s 
obligation to God, rather than out of an interest in purely human utility, or in a process 
of human reconciliation.  
While the prevalence of this rhetoric becomes especially notable in the context 
of a rise in millenarian beliefs in the late 1640s and 1650s, it is important to stress that 
the duty of the state to enact divine justice was a theme pre-dating these religio-
political developments.399 Again, the case of Richardson is instructive. In the same 
                                                   
deterrent effect, but also acted as public demonstrations of criminals’ acceptance of ‘the legitimacy 
of the power which had brought them to their sad end.’ Sharpe 1985, p. 156. The ritual of execution 
thus included within it the opportunity for the criminal to be reconciled to both civil and religious 
authority. Such speeches were frequently printed and distributed, occasionally even before they 
were given. The two aims of such speeches, deterrence and social reconciliation, were thus spread 
beyond the spectacle’s immediate audience. On the ways in which these printed sources depicted 
the punished criminal see Faller 1987, especially pp. 91-2 and Rosenberg 2004. Some writers were 
explicit about the deterrent aims such texts; the author of a 1657 collection of tales of murder, for 
instance, writes in the Preface to readers that his ‘intent, desire, and prayer is, that…perusing and 
reading of these Histories may confirm thy faith, and thy defiance of all sins in general and of 
murder in particular.’ Reynolds 1657.  
398 Crawford 1977, pp. 43-4. See also Baskerville 1993. On early modern punishment understood 
as a means of ‘restor[ing] the purity and integrity of the social body’ see Graves 2008, p. 40.  
399 See Capp 1972, pp. 39-43 and Farr 2014, pp. 82-4 on the growth of millenarian beliefs in the 
1640s and 1650s, and their relationship with calls for legal reform along Mosaic lines. 
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sermon which cited deterrence and the needs of the human community as justifications 
for punishment, he argues that ‘when men are suffered to transgresse without 
punishment, the wrath of God is prouoked, and publike calamities are pulled down 
vpon the land.’ The nation is thus ‘defiled’ and it is only when justice is ‘executed’ 
upon ‘wicked doers’ that ‘the wrath of God is turned away, and he is pacified and 
appeased.’400  
As we examine Hobbes’s account of the justification of punishment, however, 
it will become clear that it is precisely to avoid any concession to these forms of 
reconciliation that he designed a purely deterrent theory.401 It is to this account, 
therefore, that we now turn. Hobbes’s singular focus on deterrence is apparent in his 
treatment of punishment in the natural laws which, as we saw, structure the definition 
of punishment. In the Elements Hobbes writes that it is a law of nature ‘That no 
revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past, but of the benefit to 
come; that is to say, that all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person 
offending, or of others, by the example of his punishment’.402 The comment in De 
Cive that, according to the sixth law of nature, ‘in revenge and punishments we must 
have our eye not at the evill past, but the future good’ picks up this theme and 
strengthens punishment’s orientation towards the future, no longer allowing that a 
punishing individual might have some concern with the ‘offence past.’ The 
requirements of the practice, however, remain the same. According to this natural law, 
                                                   
400 Richardson 1616, p. 5. See also George Lawson’s assertion that ‘The just execution of 
judgement is a means to avert God’s wrath, to protect the just, to preserve the state, and procure 
God’s mercy.’ Lawson 1995, p. 89.  
401 George Lawson, explicitly challenging Hobbes’s account, notes that punishment aims to 
‘vindicate the power of the Law-giver, and the honour and force of the law, to manifest Justice and 
the hatred of evil’ which will ‘procure the peace and tranquility of the community’. Lawson 1995, 
pp. 87-8. That Hobbes’s theory did not suggest this role for the practice thus seems to have been 
recognised by his contemporaries.  
402 Hobbes 1969, p. 86. 
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it is lawful to punish for only two purposes, ‘that the offender be corrected’ or that 
‘others warned by his punishment may become better.’403 We see a similar comment 
in the list of natural laws presented in Leviathan, where we read that ‘in Revenges, 
(that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, 
but the greatnesse of the good to follow.’ As a result, we again discover, punishment 
is forbidden unless its aim is ‘the correction of the offender’ or the ‘direction of 
others’.404  
This principle is also repeated throughout Hobbes’s political writings as a 
simple statement of fact, without reference to the natural laws. Thus the definition of 
punishment in Chapter 28 of Leviathan requires that it be inflicted ‘to the end that the 
will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.’405 As a result, ‘all evill 
which is inflicted without the intention, or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or 
(by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of 
hostility.’ In the 1688 Latin edition, Hobbes repeats the point, noting that punishment 
has for its purpose the ‘reforming’ of the citizenry, and that ‘it is the essence of 
punishment that the fear of it should dispose citizens to obedience.’406 As Alan 
Cromartie has noted, this stricture does not make an appearance in the Dialogue.407 
But this should not be taken as an indication that Hobbes had changed his mind. As 
Cromartie points out, the principle appears to be implied in that text’s distinction 
between restitution and punishment, as when the Philosopher claims that ‘dammages 
awarded to the party injur’d, has nothing in common with the nature of a penalty, but 
                                                   
403 Hobbes 1983, p. 67.  
404 Hobbes 2012, p. 232. We should note that Hobbes’s use of the term ‘retribution’ should not be 
taken as an endorsement of backward-looking theories of punishment. As Tuckness and Parrish 
2014, p. 147 notes, such terminology was common among natural law theorists to discuss forward 
looking theories of punishment, rather than to equate punishment with retaliation.  
405 Hobbes 2012, p. 482. 
406 Hobbes 2012, p. 484. 
407 Cromartie 2005, p. xlv.  
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is meerly a Restitution, or satisfaction due to the party griev’d by the Law of 
Reason.’408 Restitution may have an incidental deterrent effect, but the primary aim is 
the satisfaction of the victim; it therefore cannot be classified as punishment, or 
‘penalty.’409  
 Punishment, then, can only every be justified on the principle of social utility: 
it must encourage law-abiding behaviour either in the punished criminal or in the 
citizenry more broadly.410 While Hobbes does not directly deny that punishment may 
have further socially beneficial consequences other than deterrence, such as 
restraining or incapacitating a dangerous individual,411 deterrence is a necessary and 
                                                   
408 Hobbes 2005, p. 41. 
409 In what follows, I will refer to those directly affected by crime as its ‘victims.’ It is important 
to note, however, that this is not the vocabulary Hobbes himself used. As we saw above, he 
preferred to note the distinction between those ‘injured’ by crime and those ‘endammged’ by it.  
410 Hobbes also argues that divine punishment is primarily aimed at deterrence, writing in 
Leviathan that God engages in ‘Exemplary’ punishment. Hobbes 2012, p. 710. This point is 
presented in more detail in De Cive, where Hobbes writes that ‘the institution of eternall 
punishment was before sin, and had regard to this onely, that men might dread to commit sinne for 
the time to come.’ Hobbes 1983, p. 80. This was an anomalous position for Hobbes to take. 
Tuckness and Parrish 2014, p. 141 notes the ‘key retributivist premises of Christian theology’, 
pointing out that it was common for theologians such as Anselm and Augustine to argue for 
deterrent human punishment and divine retributive punishment. Augustine 1998, p. 215, for 
instance, states that while human justice should not be retributive, ‘retribution is to the Divine 
judgement which is passed upon sinners.’ We also see this tendency among natural law theorists. 
Grotius 2005, p. 958, for example, states that ‘God inflicts punishments sometimes upon profligate 
abandoned Sinners, for no other Reason but to punish them.’ On Grotius’s account of divine 
punishment see Blom 2005. 
411 This possible end of punishment was commonly cited in the Classical, Protestant and Catholic 
traditions, including as a justification for the death penalty. See Calvert 1992 on Aquinas’s 
justification of the death penalty along these lines, and Tuckness and Parrish 2014, p. 101 for a 
discussion of Augustine’s views. See Hill 1991, p. 156 for discussion of the Calvinist belief in the 
justified incapacitation of ‘the wicked and pestilential man, whome…nothing will reform but 
death.’ This justification is also frequently found in natural law accounts of the purpose of 
punishment, as when Grotius 2005, p. 965, notes that ‘it is less evil’ for men of ‘incorrigible 
Tempers’ to die than to live. On the early modern use of justifications of incapacitation to 
determine who to punish for exemplary purposes see Beattie 1986, p. 448. However Hobbes never 
mentions this as a possible outcome of punishment, and it is easy to see why. Physical 
incapacitation, according to Hobbes, is a means of removing corporeal liberty, though not the 
liberty of the will. Incapacitation alone, therefore, ceases to dispose the wills of men towards 
obedience once this external impediment to action is no longer present. Hobbes could certainly 
have listed this as an entirely alternative justification, separate from an account emphasising the 
impact of punishment on man’s deliberative process. But physical incapacitation alone, if 
separated out from the deterrent function of punishment, is a practice that can only ever work in 
perpetuity. As such, it would appear to be akin to a form of internal banishment from the 
commonwealth. Thus, to argue for incapacitation as a (primary) justification of punishment would 
undermine Hobbes’s commitment to presenting punishment as a civil action meted out to citizens. 
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sufficient condition for the fulfilment of the natural law. Moreover, Hobbes 
specifically disallows some consequences of punishment that, as we saw, alternative 
traditions had understood as necessary.  
In Leviathan we read, in a statement that seems to echo the longstanding 
stricture against inflicting suffering for its own sake, that ‘the end of punishing is not 
revenge, and discharge of choler.’412 Hobbes does not limit himself, however, to a 
repetition of commonly agreed platitudes, as becomes clear when we examine his 
definition of ‘revenge.’ While he suggests in his account of punishment that revenge 
can be understood simply as a ‘retribution of Evil for Evil’, his analysis of the human 
passions in the Elements defines ‘REVENGEFULNESS’ as ‘that passion which 
ariseth from an expectation or imagination of making him that hath hurt us, to find his 
own action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same.’ Revenge is thus 
something more than simply making ‘one’s adversary displeased with his own fact’. 
This goal can be easily accomplished, in language echoed in Leviathan, by ‘returning 
evil for evil.’ Rather, revenge is the closest Hobbes comes to describing something 
similar to the reconciliation which other theorists suggested can be a central aim of 
punishment. This is because, if successful, it directly equates in the perpetrator’s mind 
the pain inflicted on the perpetrator with the suffering and wrongdoing experienced 
by the victim. However, according to Hobbes, most men would ‘rather die’ than 
recognise the suffering caused by their crimes. To attempt to inflict revenge is thus to 
engage in an attempt at ‘subjugation’ and ‘triumph’ over the self-conception of 
                                                   
There is nothing to suggest, however, that Hobbes was unaware of this potentially beneficial side 
effect of the practice of punishment.  
412 Hobbes 2012, p. 542. This point is repeated later in the text, when Hobbes notes that ‘the 
purpose of lawful punishment is not to satiate people’s anger against someone, but, so far as 
possible, to prevent injuries, for the benefit of mankind.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 1202. Hobbes provides 
a concrete example of hatred driving punishment in Behemoth, in his account of the treason charges 
against Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. Hobbes 2010, p. 195.  
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another. It thus brings direct conflict back into the commonwealth.413 This is not, 
Hobbes asserts, a useful or rational activity for the state to undertake or abet. There is 
no future benefit to enabling such interpersonal conflict between citizens, as it will be 
unlikely to result in the satisfaction of the victim, and may only provoke grievance in 
the perpetrator. As Monica Brito Vieira has put it, revenge, according to Hobbes, 
simply leads to an ‘operatic spiral of violence.’414  
In presenting revenge in this way, Hobbes appears to collapse the two different 
forms of retribution we examined above: that which assuages victims’ emotions and 
social standing, and that which simply glories in the suffering of another. This 
understanding of revenge is implicit in the discussions of punishment in the 
subsequent texts, even where they use the term to mean something akin to punishment. 
Revenge, we read in De Cive, is ‘nothing else but a certain triumph, and glory of 
minde’ if it considers only the past crime and not any future purpose. It proceeds from 
‘vaine glory’ and is without reason. Such actions are worse than useless: they can 
actively threaten the commonwealth. As Hobbes writes, ‘to hurt one another without 
reason introduces a warre’ and as such ‘is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature.’ 
It is for this reason that  it is a precept of the law of nature that ‘in revenge wee look 
not backwards but forward’ and that the breach of this law is called cruelty.’415 The 
point is repeated in Leviathan.416 
                                                   
413 Hobbes 1969, p. 39. See the parallel definition at Hobbes 2012, p. 86, of revengefulness as the 
‘Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own’ and Hobbes 1998, 
p. 57 which describes ‘the desire for vengeance’ as ‘the constant and long-term will of doing evil 
to someone so that he will repent of the supposed injury done by him, or it will frighten others 
away from doing injury’. 
414 Brito Vieira 2009, p. 116. 
415 Hobbes 1983, p. 67. Emphasis mine. 
416 Hobbes 2012, p. 232.  This consistent desire to ensure that punishment does not, through its 
application, encourage those passions which themselves are dangerous to civil peace explains 
Hobbes’s argument that it is a consequence of the law of nature which demands that ‘no man 
reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem of any other’ 
that those who ‘sit in place of judicature’ do not ‘grieve’ those who ‘are accused at the bar.’ Despite 
the fact that a display of ‘hatred and contempt’ might well serve a deterrent function, Hobbes 
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Thus Hobbes appears to have no place in his theory for the comfort of the 
injured.417 We might consider the socially useful form of retribution to in fact be 
forward-looking; the types of reconciliation discussed might prevent future conflict in 
the state. This certainly seems to one motivation behind such theories. However, 
Hobbes’s only discussion of the means by which a victim might derive satisfaction 
from the offender is that of revenge, and he presents any attempt to do so as an 
emotionally violent struggle which is in any case unlikely to result in genuine 
acknowledgement of the victim’s suffering. It is significant that Hobbes’s definition 
of repentance, which immediately follows that of revenge, is that it is a ‘passion that 
proceedeth from opinion or knowledge that the action [an individual has] done is out 
of the way to the end they would attain.’ All that it is, in other words, is the recognition 
of miscalculated action and a desire to to adapt future behaviour. There is thus, in 
contrast to the aims of revenge, no necessary link between it and a recognition or 
acknowledgement of the suffering of the injured party. Given the difficulty of enacting 
revenge, repentance might be the best that can be achieved through punishment or the 
threat of it. Punishment’s actual, and only, capacity is to weigh on the deliberative 
                                                   
argues that such acts are ‘no part of the punishment for…crime.’ This refusal to employ public 
shame, a standard early modern form of deterrence, can only be explained by Hobbes’s intense 
concern with those ‘signs which we shew to one another [which] provoke in the highest degree to 
quarrel and battle.’ Hobbes 1969, p. 86. See Hobbes 1983, p. 68 for a repetition of this point. This 
is a Ciceronian point: in De Officiis we read that punishment should never be ‘insulting.’ Cicero 
1991, p. 35. Visvardi 2015, p. 51 also emphasises that one of the messages of Thucydides’ History 
is the damage done to social cohesion by the infliction of shame upon citizens. See, however, 
Bacon 1853, p. 403 which recommends, on the other hand, that ‘there be, besides penalty, a note 
of infamy or punishment by way of admonishing others, and chastising delinquents, as it were, by 
putting them to blush by shame and scandal.’ For discussion of the use of shame in early modern 
punishment practice, see Ingrams 2004, Beattie 1986, p. 468 and Nash and Kilday 2010.  
417 There is one passage in the Elements in which Hobbes appears to acknowledge a popular desire 
for retribution. He writes that a ‘thing necessary for the maintaining of peace, is the due execution 
of justice.’ If those who ‘are the magistrates ordained for the same by and under the authority of 
the sovereign power’ do not perform their duties correctly, because they have been ‘corrupted by 
gifts’ or by the ‘intercession of friends’, then the people, ‘grieved by their injustice’ may ‘take 
upon them to make their own revenges.’ However, such actions are, while provoked by sovereign 
mismanagement, nonetheless an illegitimate ‘disturbance of the common peace.’ Hobbes 1969, p. 
182. The people, here, are presented precisely not as victims whose experience of injustice 
legitimates punishment, but as dangerous instigators of disorder. 
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processes of individuals and render crime a less beneficial option than it would be 
otherwise.418  
It is perhaps unexpected that repentance may be Hobbes’s desired outcome of 
punishment, given Hobbes’s discussion of the relationship between pardon and 
punishment. The connection between these two ideas is somewhat ambiguous, as the 
requirements of deterrence which Hobbes repeatedly outlines may initially appear to 
come into conflict with the natural laws which require the forgiving of of the penitent. 
Nonetheless, Hobbes consistently presents the one as emerging from the other, and it 
is my contention that, once we have properly understood this relationship, we have 
further evidence that a major component of Hobbes’s theory is the rejection of 
punishment justifications based on the emotional states of crime’s victims.  
 Like revenge and punishment, pardon is also a consistent feature of Hobbes’s 
political theory. In the Elements we discover that it is a law of nature ‘That a man 
forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong, upon his repentance, and caution 
for the future… PARDON is peace granted to him, that…demandeth it.’419 It is 
precisely because of this law that ‘no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of 
the offence past, but of the benefit to come.’420 The same theme is repeated in Hobbes’s 
later works. In De Cive we read that the reason why punishments should be aimed at 
the ‘future good’ is that ‘each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one 
another.’ It is the fifth precept of the natural law that ‘we must forgive him who repents, 
and asketh pardon for what is past’. This pardon is the ‘remission of an offence’, and 
is the granting of ‘peace’ to the ‘penitent’ individual. It therefore precludes any 
                                                   
418 See also Grotius 2005 p. 966 which states that ‘The Benefit, that arises from Punishment to 
him, against whom the Offence was committed, consists in this, that it prevents for the Future the 
like Offence against him, either by the same Person or by others.’ 
419 Hobbes 1969, p. 85. 
420 Hobbes 1969, p. 86. 
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punishment for the crime, despite the guilt of the offender. Crucially, pardon is offered 
in the recognition that the ‘mind’, or intentions, of the individual in question are no 
longer ‘hostile’, something which can only be demonstrated through giving ‘caution 
for the future.’421 We see the same general justification in Leviathan, where Hobbes 
writes that the law commanding that ‘Revenges’ look to the ‘good to follow’ is 
‘consequent to’ the sixth law of nature, which ‘commandeth Pardon, upon security of 
the Future time.’ This law, in which the granting of pardon is again presented as the 
granting of peace, is thus presented as a means of maintaining social harmony, and as 
the reason why punishment can only ever be forward looking.422  
As we saw above, repentance is defined as the recognition that one’s actions 
have undermined one’s aim, and that such actions should therefore be avoided in the 
future. In this case, it therefore consists in the realisation, through either the experience 
of punishment, or the fear of punishment to come, that one’s actions (crime) are in 
contradiction with one’s aim (security). As a result, one is deterred from future crime 
through a better understanding of how best to achieve one’s true goals. According to 
Hobbes’s basic principles repentance is therefore a possible consequence of both the 
threat of punishment and its application.423 This account, however, initially appears to 
be in contradiction with the presentation of the natural laws cited above. Any 
individual who is able to correctly identify that the punishment they are liable to 
undergo will consist of suffering greater than the benefit derived from their crime will 
experience genuine repentance. This is a category of persons which, for Hobbes’s 
                                                   
421 Hobbes 1983, p. 67. 
422 Hobbes 2012, p. 232. Emphasis mine. 
423 It is worth pointing out that Hobbes’s account of repentance is atypical for this period. As Cohen 
2010, p. 41 points out, it was commonly held that true repentance could not be the result of fear 
alone; repentance consisted of a transformation of attitude, rather than simply a recognition that 
one’s aims and actions were contradictory. See for example Babington 1676, p. 53 which maintains 
that only ‘grace’ and not ‘terror, or example’ can work a ‘Reformation’ on hardened criminals. 
Repentance is thus associated with spiritual transformation, rather than rational calculation. 
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theory to work, must consist of most citizens. But if criminals, including the repentant, 
are not consistently punished, punishment may fail in its aim of deterring law-breaking 
among the population as a whole, and future criminals will gain a dangerous hope of 
impunity. The forgiving of today’s penitents may well reduce the degree of future 
deterrence. The two natural laws, then, seem to be pulling the sovereign in opposite 
directions: punishment should deter the general population, but he may only be 
allowed to punish the relatively small percentage of criminals who at no point prior to 
their punishment understand that they have failed to calculate their own best 
interests.424  
 However, not only does Hobbes not present these two laws as being in conflict 
with each other, but he argues that the forward-looking nature of punishment grows 
out of the requirement to offer pardon and forgiveness. Hobbes is able to escape this 
paradox by his emphasis on the requirement that the individual in question give 
caution for the future. It is not enough to experience repentance. The convicted 
criminal must also find a way to display it, and in such a way as to demonstrate that 
they have indeed understood the error of their ways and will thus be deterred from 
further crime. By requiring the pardon only of those who can demonstrate their 
repentance, Hobbes was regularising the use of a mechanism already available in the 
English common law: that of binding over criminals, or recognisance. Not technically 
a form of post-conviction punishment, recognisance consisted in the demand by a 
magistrate that an individual who was, it was thought, liable to commit a future crime 
should pledge a surety, such as a sum of money, as security against that possibility. 
Past crimes, importantly, were seen as evidence of potential future actions. Individuals 
                                                   
424 This possible contradiction has been noted by Kavka 1986, p. 252. Kavka does not remark, 
however, on the fact that Hobbes not only presents these two laws as consistent, but argues that 
one emerges from the other.  
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who were thus bound over could be required to keep the peace, to demonstrate good 
behaviour, to refrain from certain actions, or to perform others. These requirements 
could be directed towards the community as a whole, or towards specific individuals, 
such as the victim of the initial crime.425  
 In the act of providing this security, Hobbes suggests, we have evidence of 
repentance and a pledge to avoid similar behaviour in the future. As such, the victim 
of the crime may receive no punitive satisfaction at all, as there is no concrete 
imposition of suffering upon the convict. However the aim of the state’s legal system, 
the maintenance of peace, is achieved. Any punishment which does take place, 
therefore, is only directed towards those who have not provided other evidence of 
being deterred from crime. There might, therefore, not be a paradox at all: the practice 
of binding over itself operates as a deterrent, and hence the imposition of harm on 
citizens can be avoided.426  Even if there is widespread failure of punishment to deter, 
this is immaterial: the absence of deterrent punishment is itself evidence that an 
alternative deterrent practice, conditional forgiveness, has already achieved 
punishment’s aim.  
  This definition of punishment, and the natural laws upon which this definition 
is based, in turn places certain requirements upon the sovereign in designing a penal 
system. Even if the sovereign’s purported purpose in punishing is deterrence, this 
alone is not enough to meet Hobbes’s standards. The commonwealth’s legal system 
must also plausibly achieve its aims: as we saw, punishment must not only have the 
                                                   
425 Hindle 2002, pp. 99-101. As Shoemaker 1991, p. 95 notes, recognisance was frequently 
employed as an alternative to indictments, and hence as a means of resolving disputes. On the use 
of previous crimes as evidence of future behaviour in the context of recognisance, see Walker 
2003, p. 26.  
426 Ristroph 2012, p. 97 suggests that for Hobbes, punishment is an ‘occasion for regret.’ This is 
particularly insightful in light of punishment representing both a breach of the covenant and the 
failure of this alternative form of justice.  
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intention, but also the logical ‘possibility’ of disposing citizens towards law-abiding 
behaviour. One element of this is that men should have the means of determining their 
behaviour according to the law.  Thus it ‘is only equitable that…law should plainly 
define both what is the crime that is condemned, and what is the method of 
punishment’ because it is through such definitions that ‘evil man [are] deterred from 
evil-doing by the expectation of punishment.’427  
In addition, the system will only be effective if the designated punishment for 
a crime be determined in relation to what most men would regard as the crime’s 
appeal. As Hobbes notes, if the ‘harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or 
contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm’ is not to be 
understood as punishment, as it is simply the ‘Price, or Redemption’ of the crime. This 
is precisely because ‘it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, that disposing 
of men to obey the Law.’ If the punishment is ‘lesse than the benefit of the 
transgression’ it will not achieve this end, and may even encourage law-breaking.428 
As we saw above, punishment should also extend beyond the simple restitution of the 
victim’s loss. Such an action, in looking primarily towards the specifics of the past 
‘evill’ and lacking an element of suffering, will not provide a reason to avoid engaging 
in the same behaviour in the future. 
                                                   
427 Hobbes 2012, p. 1202.  
428 Ibid. See also his comment that, in cases where the sovereign fails to design appropriate 
punishments, he is, by discounting the deterrent purpose of punishment, responsible for any crimes 
which result:  
deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniencies, 
and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting; where, that which is more 
weighty, doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us. If therefore 
the Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime, then will make our feare more 
considerable with us, then our lust; that excesse of lust above the feare of 
punishment, whereby sinne is committed, is to be attributed to the Legislator.  
Hobbes 1983, p. 166.  
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While Hobbes here suggests a means of calculating minimally effective 
punishments, he never indicates that punishment should be limited to the minimum 
degree of suffering required to deter individuals from committing a specific crime. 
Nonetheless, he does introduce an element of proportionality into his theory by 
repeatedly arguing that not all crimes are to be regarded as equal breaches of the law. 
Alan Ryan has suggested that one of the tenets of Hobbes’s theory of punishment is 
proportionality, by which he appears to mean some understanding that punishment 
should be limited according to the severity of the crime.429 There is, however, no 
explicit evidence for this claim.430 Hobbes certainly believes that not all crimes are 
equal, and thus that they should not all be punished in the same manner, but there is 
no sense in his account that a sovereign could not justifiably institute a system of 
universally harsh punishments, proportionate with regards to each other but utterly 
disproportionate to the crimes themselves. In the Dialogue Hobbes rejects the 
‘Opinion of the Stoicks…that all faults are equal’ and the resulting inference that ‘there 
ought to be the same Punishment for killing a Man, and for killing a Hen.’431 Thus 
there is some evidence that any proportionality built into the system is the result not 
of a direct consideration of the nature of the crime past, and of the relationship between 
the punishment and the crime itself, but rather that punishments should be determined 
with reference to each other, to reflect the parallel range of severity found in crime. 
Proportion, therefore, is a secondary consideration following the requirements of 
                                                   
429 Ryan 1996, p. 233. See also Malcolm 2002, p. 531 which suggests that later developments in 
penal theory, according to which only the level of punishment required to deter a given crime was 
necessary, are ‘Hobbesian’. Hünig 2007, pp. 224-5, on the other hand, limits Hobbesian 
proportionality to the relationship between punishments.  
430 Hobbes 1995b, p. 64 notes that cruelty ‘exacts immoderate punishments’, which hints at a 
concern for proportionality. It is striking, however, that this formulation is not repeated in the 
political works.  
431 Hobbes 2005, p. 113. Hobbes makes the same argument at Hobbes 2012, p. 466. 
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deterrence, rather than something connected directly to the quality of the crime 
itself.432  
 A Hobbesian system of punishment, therefore, is one which emphasises that 
the punishment must be in proportion to the crime committed, in that it must be greater 
than any benefit derived thereby. It must also only ever punish if there is a chance that 
the punishment will either deter the punished individual in question, or others, from 
committing further crime. This need not imply that punishment should be public, 
something which Hobbes never comments upon.433 But it does suggest that the 
sovereign has not only an interest in, but a duty to, publicise individual instances of 
punishment: it is not merely the theoretical possibility of punishment, but also specific 
instances of its practice, which are to provide the deterrent function. This forward 
looking aspect of punishment is, on occasion, referred to by Hobbes as correction. It 
is therefore necessary to consider the specific ways in which Hobbes envisages 
punishment as acting upon, or correcting, citizens’ wills.  
 
Punishment and the Deterred Will 
As Hobbes writes in the Elements, the mind has two powers, the cognitive and the 
motivational. While distinct, these powers are of course related: the motive power is 
that which ‘giveth animal motion to that body wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are 
                                                   
432 As a result, punishments for lesser crimes will be less than those meted out for greater breaches 
of the law. However, this consideration is a consequence of other commitments in the theory, 
rather than a governing principle. For precisely the opposite view, see Grotius 2005, p. 951 which 
states that ‘that greater Offenders are more severely punished, and lesser Offenders more lightly, 
falls out by Accident, and is not primarily and of itself intended: For that which is simply and in 
the first Place intended, is an Equality between the Offence and the Punishment.’ 
433 See however Overhoff 2000, p. 26 for the suggestion that pictures are more likely to impact the 
will than abstract considerations. Despite not linking publicity to the purpose of punishment, 
Hobbes was fully aware of the popularity such spectacles, and sought to explain the phenomenon 
in De Homine. He writes that ‘men are wont to hurry together to the spectacle of death and danger 
to others’ because it ‘gives pleasure to see evil befall another.’ Hobbes 1998, p. 51.  
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our affections and passions.’434 These passions are the result of our cognition. One 
important aspect of cognition is memory, or what Hobbes calls ‘remembrance’: the 
ability to ‘imagine a thing past.’435 It is through consideration of these past things, or 
experiences, that men are able to predict the consequences of their actions, and hence 
modify their behaviour in such ways that they will never have need to repent of the 
gaps between their actions and their true aims. One of Hobbes’s preferred means of 
illustrating this cognitive process is punishment. He writes in the Elements: 
No man can have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future 
is not yet. But of our conceptions of the past, we make a future; or rather, 
call past, future relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to 
see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth 
the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there 
should follow it the same that followed then. As for example: because a 
man hath often seen offences followed by punishment, when he seeth 
an offence in present, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto. 
But consequent unto that which is present, men call future, And thus we 
make remembrance to be prevision or conjecture of things to come, or 
EXPECTATION or PRESUMPTION of the future.436 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, this Hobbes repeated this example in 
Leviathan.437 These accounts of the relationship between memory and prediction 
are examples of deliberation, or the the process of arriving at the final passion which 
forms the human will. In deliberating, as we saw earlier, the ‘Appetites and 
Aversions are raised by the foresight of the good and evill consequences, and 
sequels of the actions whereof we Deliberate.’ In considering crime, therefore, men 
consider the ‘evill consequences’ of capture, conviction and punishment, and weigh 
these against the benefit they expect to derive from crime. While all men may not 
be able to see clearly to the end of this chain of consequences, those who, through 
either ‘Experience, or Reason’ are able to foresee the ‘greatest and surest prospect’ 
                                                   
434 Hobbes 1969, p. 28. 
435 Hobbes 1969, p. 11. 
436 Hobbes 1969, p. 15. 
437 Hobbes 2012, p. 42.   
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of their actions’ consequences will be able to deliberate most effectively, and 
separate out good from evil.438 Thus the clearer the consequences of actions, the 
more reasonable, and thus predictable, will be the deliberative processes of men.  
 Given that the fear of punishment is the passion to be reckoned upon in order 
for a deterrent penal system to function, it is a duty of the sovereign to provide his 
subjects with as much information about the consequences of law-breaking as 
possible, and to do so regularly. This includes not only the nature of the law and the 
punishments attached to them, but also the assurance that, if they are convicted, they 
will indeed face consequences for their crimes. As Hobbes notes in De Cive, ‘the fear 
whereby men are deterred from doing evill, ariseth not from hence, namely, because 
penalties are set, but because they are executed; for we esteeme the future by what is 
past, seldome expecting what seldome happens.’439 As we saw in Chapter 1, while all 
laws are assumed, through the presence of a coercive power, to have a penalty attached 
to them, these penalties need not be explicit in order to be carried out. Nonetheless, 
the model of deliberation Hobbes presents indicates that fear of a specific punishment 
may well be more effective in encouraging law-abiding behaviour than a more 
ambiguous promise of some arbitrary future evil.  
 In considering fear, however, we come to a second question concerning the 
operation of deterrent punishment upon the will, that of individual human freedom. 
Hobbes consistently notes that those actions which men perform ‘upon appetite or 
fear’440 are voluntary. Indeed, his entire political system requires that this be the case, 
the archetypal voluntary action motivated by fear being man’s entry into the 
commonwealth. Nonetheless, at various points he seems to indicate that the fear of 
                                                   
438 Hobbes 2012, p. 94. 
439 Hobbes 1983, p. 167.  
440 Hobbes 1969, p. 62. 
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punishment can actually remove the voluntary nature of the will to behave according 
to the laws. In Leviathan he suggests that the ‘coercive Power’ of the sovereign can 
‘compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some 
punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant.’441 
In what way might fear ‘compel’? One possibility is that fear, like other strong 
emotions, behaves as an impediment to the will, and thus removes human liberty. This 
is suggested by Hobbes’s discussion of deliberation in De Cive, in a seeming departure 
from his earlier assertions. 
 In Chapter 9 of De Cive we read that there are two forms of impediment to 
motion which can restrict the will, those which are ‘externall, and absolute’, and those 
which are ‘arbitrary.’442 At this point in his thinking, Hobbes appears to consider fear, 
such as the fear of punishment, an impediment of the second kind.443 Moreover fear, 
as an impediment of this kind, is able to create obligation, and hence limit possible 
action. Thus in describing man’s awareness of God’s overwhelming power, Hobbes 
writes that  
there are two Species of naturall obligation, one when liberty is taken 
away by corporall impediments, according to which we say that 
heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe obey the common Lawes of 
their Creation: The other when it is taken away by hope, or fear, 
according to which the weaker despairing if his own power to resist, 
cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinds of obligation, that 
is to say from fear, or conscience of our own weaknesse (in respect of 
the divine power) it comes to passe, that we are obliged to obey God 
in his naturall Kingdome.444  
 
                                                   
441 Hobbes 2012, p. 220.  
442 Hobbes 1983, p. 125.  
443 At Hobbes 1999, p. 30 Hobbes distinguishes between necessitation and compulsion; actions 
necessitated by fear are compelled, while actions necessitated by all other passions are not. Both 
compelled necessitated action and uncompelled necessitated action are voluntary.  
444 Hobbes 1983, p. 187. Contrast this with the discussion at Hobbes 2012, p. 558 in which it is the 
‘excellence’ of God’s power which confers his right, rather than obligation arising from man’s 
fear.  
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Those men who obey the law from fear of punishment, therefore would, on the 
De Cive account at least, thus appear to be obliged to obey the law. However this 
move, problematically, appears to eliminate the voluntary nature of those actions 
committed out of fear.445 Quentin Skinner, in a recent discussion of this question, has 
argued that arbitrary impediments of this kind should therefore be understood as 
removing man’s freedom of choice, rather than his freedom of action: our deliberation 
takes place in the recognition that certain options are simply impossible, due to fear, 
but this in no way limits our corporeal freedom, nor does it, strictly, render our actions 
coerced.446 By the later versions of the theory, however, Hobbes seems to reject the 
notion that our passions can be understood as impeding either our choices or our 
actions, returning to a model of liberty which simply contrasts liberty as a lack of 
obligation, rarely possessed in the commonwealth, with corporeal liberty, which is 
much more common.447 
The notion that fear can only encourage us in certain actions, rather than 
compelling us, is bolstered by Hobbes’s description of how exactly experience 
encourages us to act upon or forego certain desires. In the Elements Hobbes suggests 
                                                   
445 See Hobbes 1983, p. 58 for the assertion that actions undertaken through fear are nonetheless 
voluntary.  
446 Skinner 2012, p. 138. Freedom of choice, it should be noted, is a type of freedom distinct from 
freedom from obligation. A citizen, on Skinner’s account, could have the freedom of both choice 
and action to commit a crime, assuming he is not in fact frightened by punishment, but he could 
never have a freedom from his obligation to obey the law. On this point see also Lloyd 2009, pp. 
292-3.  
447 For a discussion of these two kinds of liberty, see Pettit 2005. While these two forms of liberty 
are distinct, the extent to which Hobbes uses metaphors of physical constraints to describe 
obligations limiting our rights is striking. See for instance his description at Hobbes 2012, p. 282 
of ‘that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power 
to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge’ and his argument at Hobbes 1983, p. 170 that ‘the 
Law tyes him being obliged, that is to say, it compells him to make  good his promise, for fear of 
the punishment appointed by the Law.’  For an alternative reading in which, in Leviathan, the fear 
of punishment takes away both individuals’ freedom and their power to commit crime, see van 
Mill 2001, pp. 58-9. Plamenatz 1957, p. 299 unhelpfully conflates obligation with necessitation, 
suggesting that because the punishments of the sovereign, and hence fear, can be ‘evaded’, subjects 
are not always obliged to obey his commands. 
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that during deliberation ‘the consequences of the action are our counsellors.’448 They 
thus work in a similar way to those human counsellors who alternately ‘do make 
appear the consequences of the action’, but who, rather than controlling their advisee’s 
process of deliberation, merely ‘furnish’ him with ‘arguments.’449 Importantly, 
counsel, as defined by Hobbes, is distinct from command in that it is a form of 
‘provisive’ speech: it is thus unable to control the will.450 If we take seriously Hobbes’s 
account of experience as providing counsel rather than command, then this would 
seem to make sense of his assertion in De Cive that ‘the end of punishment is not to 
compell the will of man, but to fashion it, & make it such as he would have it who 
hath set the penalty.’451 He is even more explicit in Leviathan, writing that ‘Feare, and 
Liberty are consistent…so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of 
Imprisonment, which because no body hindered him from detaining, was the action of 
a man at liberty.’452  
 It is clear that men, in deliberating, come to a form of knowledge about the 
best course of action to take based on their perception of the consequences of those 
actions. But it is important to note that punishment produces a relatively imprecise 
version of understanding. As Hobbes notes with regard to the man considering the 
plausible results of criminal activity, acting based on ‘experience’ requires 
deliberation based on ‘signs’ which are ‘but conjectural.’ Hobbes cautions that while 
their ‘assurance’ is ‘more or less’, they can never be taken as ‘full and evident.’ 
Experience alone ‘concludeth nothing universally.’ Clearly, the more experience one 
has, the more likely it is that one’s conjectures will prove correct. Nonetheless, it is 
                                                   
448 Hobbes 1969, p. 67. 
449 Ibid. 
450 See Hobbes 1983, p. 168 which states that to ‘follow that is prescribed by Law, is duty, what 
by Counsell, is free-will.’ 
451 Hobbes 1983, p. 166.  
452 Hobbes 2012, p. 326.  
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important to remember that this form of knowledge, or ‘prudence… taking signs of 
experience’ is always fallible.453  
 Related to prudence is the category of thought which Hobbes labels ‘opinion’, 
or those propositions which men think likely. Opinion is not true knowledge: men are 
apt to err in their reasoning, or to trust the arguments of others.454 Action which 
appears to be prudent, because it conforms to our understanding and interpretation of 
experience, may be based on nothing more than opinion, rather than on true 
knowledge. Indeed, according to Hobbes, this is more than likely. As he writes in the 
same text,  
the propounding of benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and 
punishment, is the cause of our appetite and of our fears, and therefore 
also of our wills, so far forth as we believe that such rewards and 
benefits, as are propounded, shall arrive unto us. And consequently, 
our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills. In which 
sense they say truly and properly that say the world is governed by 
opinion.455 
 
Most men, therefore, base their regular deliberation upon prudence and 
opinion. However, as we saw, prudence is not infallible, something which Hobbes 
insists upon throughout his work.456 As such, it can be contrasted with science, or 
sapience, which Hobbes defines as ‘conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the 
consequences of words.’457 The difference between these two forms of knowledge, 
Hobbes suggests, is similar to that between a ‘man endued with an excellent naturall 
                                                   
453 Hobbes 1969, p. 16. It is interesting to note, in the context of Hobbes’s critique of prudence, 
that by the early modern period it had become associated with reason of state and hence with a 
certain moral flexibility and rejection of accepted norms of justice. See Stanciu 2011.  
454 Hobbes 1969, p. 26. See Hobbes’s contrast between opinion and knowledge in his definition of 
‘repentance.’ Hobbes 1969, p. 39.  
455 Hobbes 1969, p. 63. 
456 See, for example, Hobbes’s comment in Leviathan that conjecture based on past experience, 
‘called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome’ can, ‘through the 
difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 42. 
457 Hobbes 2012, p. 98. In the Elements Hobbes defines science as ‘knowledge of the truth of 
propositions.’ As such, it is evidence of truth, which cannot be located through prudence alone. 
Hobbes 1969, p. 24. 
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use, and dexterity in handling his armes’, whose ability is equivalent to prudence, or 
experience, and an opponent who in addition to experience has the benefit of ‘an 
acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every 
possible posture, or guard.’ The former is good, Hobbes suggests, but the latter is 
better, just as science is a surer guide to correct action than experience alone.458  
 The institution of punishment, then, can provide men with good reasons for 
avoiding criminal actions. It disposes their wills to peace by encouraging a fear of 
suffering, based on the experience of having witnessed or heard about the effective 
punishment of past criminals, and hence the expectation that the same will occur to 
them. As such, punishment encourages prudence. However, on its own it cannot 
convey science.459 The institution of punishment cannot give reasons why men should 
uphold the law other than that it is probably in their immediate best interests to do 
so.460 As we saw in Chapter 3, this poses a major problem for Hobbes, as in some 
                                                   
458 Hobbes 2012, p. 76. Hobbes traces the distinction between prudentia and sapientia to a classical 
tradition. For discussion of the two forms of knowing among his contemporaries, see Jesseph 2009.  
Hobbes’s correspondent François Peleau challenged Hobbes’s view of prudence in 1656, arguing 
that, rather than being simply a reflection of experience it involves ‘analysis and synthesis’ and is 
therefore a form of reasoning. Hobbes 1994b, p. 332.  
459 It is for this reason, I suggest, that the ‘reform’ of criminals, as it was understood in the early 
modern period, is not a useful means of understanding Hobbesian punishment. The literature on 
punishment practice largely locates the shift towards such reform in the eighteenth century, with 
the increased use of prisons. Historians of early modern crime have, however, begun to emphasise 
the extent to which ‘reformation’ was cited from the sixteenth century onwards as a purpose of 
punishment distinct from deterrence. It was felt that reform, understood as the transformation of 
character, would come about through physical labour and religious instruction in houses of 
correction, or through the infliction of corporeal punishment (whipping posts were often labelled 
‘postes of refomacion’). As the result of punishment, it was hoped, criminals would not simply be 
deterred from criminal acts but would no longer desire to commit crime at all. As we have seen in 
our analysis of Hobbesian punishment as encouraging prudence, however, Hobbes thought that 
punishment as such was only capable of encouraging or discouraging actions; it could not alone 
determine character. Griffiths 2004, pp. 15, 23; Griffiths 2004b, p. 101. On the theory of penal 
reform in this period, see Dalton 1661, p 122 who writes, of criminals in houses of correction, ‘by 
labour and punishment of their bodies, their forward natures may be bridled, their evil minds 
bettered, and others by their example terrified.’ See also Coke 2003, pp. 553-4.  
460 I thus disagree with the opinion of McBride 2007, pp. 53-4, that the aim of Hobbesian 
punishment is to improve judgement, and not merely strike fear into subjects. That reason which 
a penal system is able to inculcate is limited to increasingly accurate calculations about risk and 
suffering. 
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cases men will find that it is, at least according to their opinion, in their best short term 
interests to commit a crime. They may think that they will not be caught. They may 
erroneously believe that they are too rich, or powerful, or popular, to be punished. 
Thus while punishment can, Hobbes believes, act as a deterrent to most citizens most 
of the time, all that deterrence can do is ensure that men will act as prudential unjust 
men. They may be good citizens as a result, but punishment cannot motivate law-
abiding behaviour on the basis of justice and true knowledge about the necessity of 
the commonwealth’s long-term stability. While citizens may well extrapolate from 
their experience towards general conclusions concerning the wisdom of general law-
abidingness, this is in no way guaranteed. Crucially, prudence alone cannot ensure that 
men will discover and adhere to the natural laws, which enjoin contract-keeping, and 
hence loyalty to the state.461 Any sovereign who wishes to maintain civil peace will 
therefore be forced to turn to a different but complementary institution, that of 
education.  
 
                                                   
461 In the Elements Hobbes argues that ‘we cannot from experience conclude…any proposition 
universal whatsoever.’ Experience can only teach us how terms have been used by others, such as 
how our sovereign may use the term ‘contract.’ We can thus learn to modify our behaviour 
according to our appreciation of authorised usage, and in reference to the consequences we may 
predict of contradicting this, but prudence alone cannot teach us consistently to understand and 
apply the natural laws. Hobbes 1969, pp. 16-7. In Leviathan Hobbes makes the point explicitly, 
writing that men cannot be trusted to ‘know how to look into their own hearts and read what is 
written there [i.e. natural laws]’ and that therefore ‘they learn from the written laws what things 
are to be done, and what avoided; and they do things and avoid doing things in accordance with 
whatever will seem, from the punishments they foresee, profitable or harmful to themselves.’ 
Hobbes 2012, p. 1204. See Krom 2013, p. 70 on man’s general inability or unwillingness to 
consistently act according to reason. See Lloyd 2009, p. 302 for a discussion of Hobbes’s 
distinction between reason or wisdom and prudence. Lloyd points out that the Foole in Leviathan 
is foolish precisely because he relies on the latter rather than the former. This is entirely consistent 
with my claim that the Foole is unjust, and that it is prudence rather than wisdom which 
characterises Hobbes’s unjust man.  
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The Role of Education: Complementing Prudence with Science 
Hobbes’s discussion of prudence clarifies why punishment, while encouraging law-
abiding, or guiltless, behaviour, cannot alone create the conditions for civil peace. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, the most dangerous criminals are precisely those in whom 
prudential deliberative processes have failed: they believe themselves to be immune 
from the penal aspects of the law, and thus free to break its distributive commands.462 
Punishment is unable, in such cases, to impose its own authority, as it is precisely this 
authority which is being rejected. While citizens of course remain obligated to their 
sovereign throughout their time as members of the commonwealth, they may not 
always understand or appreciate this obligation and punishment, in acting purely on 
the short-term deliberation of citizens, cannot foster such an understanding. It is for 
this reason that Hobbes suggests that education is a further, and crucial, tool in the 
sovereign’s struggle to impose civil harmony.463  
 To turn to education is not to imply that there is nothing that a deterrent system 
of punishment can do in order to reduce the assumption of immunity. Consistent and 
well-publicised punishment, particularly of criminals who might believe themselves 
to be beyond the scope of the law, is clearly an important means of increasing the role 
of fear in such individuals’ deliberative processes, and of reducing hope of impunity. 
We can therefore see it as a practical complement to Hobbes’s response to the Foole, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  It is for this reason that Hobbes insists that, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, the sovereign must consistently punish even the most 
                                                   
462 For this division in the law, see Hobbes 2012, p. 442. Punishment, on this reading, is deficient 
for reasons other than simply the state’s inability to threaten all of the commonwealth’s subjects 
all of the time. The problem is that punishment, no matter how consistently employed, cannot 
create just manners. Accounts which emphasise the capacity problem of punishment include 
Kavka 1986, pp. 250-4, Bejan 2010, p. 615 and Vinx 2012, p. 154.  
463 The point that education, and not merely coercion, is necessary for civil peace has been 
emphasised by numerous commentators, including Dietz 1990; Skinner 1996; Lloyd 1997; 
Burchell 1999; Ahrensdorf 2000; Anderson 2003; Kow 2005; Hanin 2012 and Abizadeh 2013.  
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‘rich, and mighty’ criminals.’464 However, while such actions might increase citizens’ 
prudence, they will not necessarily increase their true knowledge.465 If the aim of the 
state is to encourage not merely law-abiding but truly just action, then education about 
the principles underpinning the commonwealth will be necessary.466  
 Education has the further advantage over punishment in that it is able to not 
only teach the principles of sovereignty, but can also equip subjects with the ability to 
correctly interpret the actions of their sovereign. It is therefore a necessary 
complement not only to punishment, but also to the other aspects of the legal system 
which are structured around punishment’s deterrent function, such as the publicising 
of the laws. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the sovereign’s understanding 
of just and unjust action, as defined in these laws, is enforced by the threat of 
punishment. However, as Hobbes notes in Chapter 11 of Leviathan, ‘Ignorance of the 
causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man 
to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions.’ As a result, men may consider 
it ‘Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish’ and ‘Just, of the impunity and 
approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or…Precedent.’ Such an approach 
is fundamentally immature: men who reason in this way are akin to ‘little children, 
                                                   
464 Hobbes 2012, p. 534.  
465 See Hobbes’s contrast between the ‘The Vertue of a Subject’, which ‘is comprehended wholly 
in obedience to the Laws of the Common wealth’, and ‘the Prudence of a subject’, which is ‘to 
obey the Laws.’ The danger of relying on prudence alone, without virtue to complement it, is 
illustrated by the events of the civil war. Long-term obedience is prudent, for ‘without such 
obedience the Common wealth which is euery subiects safety and protection, canot subsist’. 
However lacking the knowledge of ‘what is necessary for their own defence’ may lead men to 
confuse their short and long-term interests, and they may come to believe that ‘it be Prudence also 
in priuate men [to] craftily to withhold from the publick, or defraud it of such part of their wealth 
as is by Law required’. Hobbes 2010, p. 165. Emphasis mine.  
466 See Frost 2004, p. 5 and Frost 2001 for an alternative interpretation of the state’s aims, 
according to which, subjects are encouraged to learn to consistently act as if they value civil 
equality as a necessary precondition for peace, rather than encouraged to cultivate a truely just 
disposition. Sorell 1986, p. 118 also argues that the true aim of the Hobbesian state is to engender 




that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from 
their Parents and Masters.’ Individuals who are unable to understand the reasons 
underpinning laws and why they should obey them are thus unable to consistently 
apply the lessons they have learned from observing the actions of the penal system. 
This is not necessarily through any fault of their own, but rather because prudential 
reasoning encourages one to think in terms of experience, and hence custom, rather 
than on the basis of the logic behind the sovereign’s laws.  
Without education in the ‘causes, and originall constitution’ of the state, 
therefore, men are not simply morally rudderless, but are able to justify acting 
according to their own desires rather than the laws. As a result of this reliance on a 
mixture of prudence and consideration of their own perceived interests,  men are 
inclined to dispute ‘the doctrine of Right and Wrong’, a stance which encourages law-
breaking.467 Moreover, from the Elements onwards, Hobbes was clearly convinced 
that, in matters of government, this tendency was particularly dangerous because in 
‘moral philosophy, or of policy, government, and laws…every man thinks that in this 
subject he knoweth as much as any other.’468 Thus men are unlikely to consider the 
possibility of errors in their reasoning, and are, without proper instruction, more likely 
to rely upon their own opinion than they might be when considering other areas of 
knowledge.  Hobbes presents a striking example of how this can occur in describing 
how men, not wishing to pay state tax, will attack the sovereign’s representatives out 
of the fear of punishment. In such cases, simply relying on the fear provoked by 
punishment actually undermines the state’s ability to carry out its basic functions, such 
as the collection of revenue.469 
                                                   
467 Hobbes 2012, p. 158. 
468 Hobbes 1969, p. 66.  
469 Hobbes 2012, p. 160.  
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 It is for these reasons that Hobbes cites ‘publique Instruction’ among the duties 
of the sovereign. In order to behave in a consistently law-abiding manner, citizens 
should be able to interpret the laws and ‘apply [them] to their own cases.’ However, 
as we saw above, this ability will not develop through the enactment of deterrent 
punishment alone.470 It is in response to such concerns that Hobbes famously asserted 
that ‘the ground of these [the sovereign’s] Rights, have the rather need to be diligently, 
and truly taught’ because ‘they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of 
Legall Punishment.’471 This is not a purely practical point about the impossibility of 
punishing all law-breakers. Rather, Hobbes wishes to emphasise that men will only 
recognise the legitimacy of the state, and adapt their own reason to that of the 
sovereign, if they also accept the natural law forbidding ‘the violation of Faith’ and 
hence enjoining ‘natural obligation.’ Without this theoretical framework underpinning 
men’s attitude towards the state, there is the risk that they will take all punishment to 
be simple ‘hostility’, which, when it is unable to act as a deterrent, will in turn provoke 
subjects’ own hostile actions.472 Thus punishment alone, both because of the danger 
that it be taken as hostility, and because it cannot teach reasons for correct behaviour, 
cannot itself be used to establish the law’s  jurisdiction.  
 It is for this reason that the right and ability of the sovereign to determine civil 
education is an element of every version of Hobbes’s theory. As Teresa Bejan has 
                                                   
470 Hobbes 2012, p. 520.  
471 A link between rebellion and a lack of education is a feature of all of Hobbes’s writings. See 
for example his comment in De Corpore that ‘the cause of war is not that men are willing to have 
it; for the will has nothing for object but good, at least that which seemeth good. Not is it from 
this, that men know not that the effects of war are evil…The cause, therefore, of civil war is, that 
men know not the causes neither of war nor peace, there being but few in the world that have 
learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace, that is to say, that have learned the rules 
of civil life sufficiently.’ Hobbes 1994a, p. 190. Unsurprisingly, this is also a major element of his 
history of the Civil Wars. He asks in Behemoth ‘if men know not their duty, what is there that can 
force them to obey the Laws?’ and suggests that the disciplining of the universities would address 
this problem. See also his famous comment that ‘the Power of the mighty has no foundation but 
in the opinion and beleefe of the people’ Hobbes 2010, pp. 183, 128.  
472 Hobbes 2012, p. 522.  
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noted, the form that this teaching was to take was, Hobbes believed, dependent upon 
the nature of the intended recipient.473 Bejan emphasises that, while instruction was 
not to be limited to ‘the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are 
accounted the most Learned’474 the practical demonstration of principles is not the 
type of public instruction that Hobbes thinks can be ‘scaled up’ to meet the needs of 
the wider population.475 As we are here concerned with education as a complement to 
punishment, it is this broader form of education which is most relevant; both are civil 
institutions addressing themselves to the citizenry as a whole.  
It is important to recognise that, while different elements of the population 
should be catered to, this was not a call for the teaching of different principles.476 
Hobbes suggests that there should be no obstacles to the ‘Common-peoples minds’ 
being able to integrate their sovereign’s teachings because barriers to learning are 
more frequently the result of individuals’ interests rather than the difficulty of the 
material itself.477 The challenge of teaching consists in the discovery and 
demonstration of how the true principles under consideration relate the audience’s 
interests; in the case of sovereignty and the wider population, the clear danger of the 
                                                   
473 Bejan 2010, p. 617. For the suggestion that Hobbes himself adapted not merely the form, but 
also the content, of his arguments to suit different audiences (and hence may have advocated the 
same strategy to his sovereign) see Hoekstra 2006, p. 617.  
474 Hobbes 2012, p. 524. 
475 Bejan 2010, p. 617.  
476 Lloyd 1997, p. 40 suggests that while the central arguments of Leviathan should be widely 
taught, attempting to spread the details of the text may be potentially ‘self-defeating.’ In this 
context, Hobbes 1994b, p. 30, is particularly suggestive: Hobbes writes in 1636 to his 
correspondent, a Mr. Glen, that  
I long infinitely to see those Bookes of the Sabbath; & am of your mind, they 
will put such Thoughts in the Heads of vulgar People, as will conferre little 
to their good life. For, when they see one of the ten commandments to be Jus 
humanum merely (as it must be, if the Church can alter it) they will hope 
also, that the other nine may be so too. For every man hither too did believe 
that the ten Commandments were the Morall, that is, an Eternal Law.  
Noel Malcolm suggests that the work referred to may be Heylyn’s The History of the 
Sabbath (1636), which argues that the observance of the Sabbath is not a feature of 
the natural law. Hobbes 1994b, p. 31.  
477 Hobbes 2012, p. 524. On the self-evident nature of the lessons subjects will receive, see 
Johnston 1986, p. 131.  
 186 
re-emergence of a state of nature via civil war could provide this link. As a result, 
there should be no major challenge in ‘the instruction of the people in the Essentiall 
Rights…of Soveraignty’.478 These lessons will include the teaching of justice, and 
hence the necessity that men ‘not…deprive their Neighbours, by violence, or fraud, of 
any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs…the People are to be taught, to 
abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of 
conjugall honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers 
goods.’479 Furthermore, in a lesson that goes further than that taught by either 
Hobbes’s response to the Foole or by the experience of punishment, men are to be 
taught that even if they are able to render themselves immune from the consequences 
of their actions through the ‘corruption either of Judges or Witnesses’, such actions 
will result in ‘evil consequences’. By such successful crimes ‘the distinction of 
propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect.’480  
Hobbes appears to envisage a system of regular public lectures in which the 
people are to be taught loyalty to government481 and to their sovereign,482 writing that 
it ‘is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein [the people] may 
assemble together, and…hear those duties their Duties told to them, and the Positive 
                                                   
478 Hobbes 2012, p. 524.  
479 Hobbes 2012, p. 530.  
480 Ibid. A useful way of thinking about the content of public education is that it teaches subjects 
to distinguish between real and apparent goods; civil peace is a true good, while the benefit 
consequent to crime is merely apparent, and may lead to ‘damage’ from the ‘evil annexed to it.’ 
Those who are ‘inexperienced’ are unlikely to understand ‘the long-term consequences of things’ 
and hence may fall into this trap. Hobbes 1998, p. 48. See also Hobbes 1998, p. 55 and Hobbes 
1976, p. 480. On the inability to distinguish between real and apparent goods as a form of cognitive 
corruption see Blau 2009. For an account of human conflict which relates it to man’s natural 
shortsightedness in the context of the state of nature, but which can also be applied to the question 
of these different types of goods in the state, see Murphy 1993. May 1992 associates Hobbesian 
justice with respect, or fidelity, to the concept of law, rather than simple obedience. Men should 
consistently obey the law because they know that this is the means to best preserve the institution 
of the commonwealth. While May does not use the terminology of real and apparent goods, it is 
clear that fidelity to the law is an example of the latter.    
481 Hobbes 2012, p. 524 
482 Hobbes 2012, p. 526.  
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Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind 
of the Authority that maketh them Lawes.’ While Hobbes provides the example of the 
Jewish Sabbath, ‘in which the Lawe was read and expounded’ as a potential model to 
follow, he notes in the Latin Leviathan that ‘it is the duty of the ruler in this matter to 
determine the places, times, and teachers.’483  
However they are organised, such compulsory assemblies are necessary, as 
Hobbes is firm in his belief that learning must be forced. He writes that the people, 
which will include both those ‘whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on 
their trades and labour’ and those ‘whome superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their 
sensuall pleasures’, will largely be ‘diverted from the deep meditation, which the 
learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other 
Sciences necessarily requireth.’As a result of this natural tendency to rely upon the 
opinions of others, they will, if civil instruction is not provided, turn to the ‘Divines 
of the Pulpit’, or to their seemingly educated neighbours and acquaintances, for their 
beliefs.484  
While such lectures may, as Bejan argues, consist of nothing more than a 
simplified version of the doctrine of sovereignty, they would, if successful, 
nonetheless fulfil Hobbes’s initial definition of teaching as ‘begetting in another the 
same conceptions that we have in ourselves.’485 Because based on genuine science, 
the education men receive through such public instruction, even if lacking detailed 
demonstration, is to be distinguished from simple persuasion, which is the result of, 
and can only ever inculcate, ‘bare opinion.’486  
                                                   
483 Hobbes 2012, pp. 528-9.  
484 Hobbes 2012, p. 532. 
485 Hobbes 1969, p. 64. 
486 Ibid. Recall the definition of opinion, offered in the Elements, as ‘all such propositions as are 
admitted by trust or error, we are not said to know, but think them to be true.’ Hobbes 1969, p. 26. 
While public lessons may consist of a form of simplified instruction, adapted to the specific needs 
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Education, then, rather than punishment is what pushes citizens to consider the 
ways in which their actions strengthen or weaken the commonwealth as a whole, and 
thus encourages their deliberations to consider their long-term interests. Hobbes 
recognises that this education can teach a lesson which punishment alone, as we saw, 
cannot. The final recommendation Hobbes offers is that the people ‘are to be taught, 
that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by 
accident hindered,) are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as 
in the irregularity of the act.’487 This is not a lesson which punishment, with its 
emphasis on correct action, can teach. As we saw in Chapter 3, the threat of 
punishment has the effect of reinforcing unjust, but guiltless, behaviour, and as such 
cannot necessarily inculcate the correct calculation of long-term interests.  
 
Classifying Hobbesian Punishment 
This discussion of Hobbes’s explanation of the purpose of punishment, and the 
specific retributive theories he was interested in disputing, indicates that we can best 
understand his project in the context in which it was formed. Early modern theorists 
of punishment were heirs to traditions in which punishment could have multiple 
purposes, including deterrence, reform, retributive reconciliation and, in extreme 
cases, incapacitation. Punishment, while a civil institution, could thus refer to 
                                                   
of the population in question, Hobbes does suggest in Behemoth that, if their teachers have been 
well-trained, the ‘multitude’ are capable of learning the correct ‘Science of Just and Vniust’ from 
‘true Principles, and euident demonstration’, indicating that teaching the public may consist of 
something more than simple reiteration. Hobbes 2010, pp. 158-9. On this point, see also Hobbes’s 
statement in De Corpore, that ‘even they also that have not learned the first part of 
philosophy…may, notwithstanding, attain the principles of civil philosophy, by the analytical 
method.’ Hobbes 1994a, p. 200. Hobbes 1998, pp. 42-3 argues that ‘politics and ethics (that is, the 
sciences of just and unjust, of equity and inequity)’ can be ‘demonstrated a priori’ and thus require 
no special knowledge on the part of the instructed.  There is thus no indication that Hobbes did not 
believe that the essential principles of his doctrine could not be taught, as opposed to simply 
promulgated. Moreover, this form of teaching is what would provide men with the capacity to both 
understand the jurisdiction and logic of the law and apply it to their particular case.  
487 Hobbes 2012, p. 530. 
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standards of justice external to the state. Hobbes’s steadfast insistence on a single 
purpose of punishment, deterrence, was an attempt to remove both violent passion and 
arbitrary mercy from the practice. He thus emphasised that punishment and mercy 
could only be wielded by the state for the benefit of the commonwealth as a whole, 
without reference to external standards, such as religion or community feeling. It is 
this natural law requirement that the state act for the benefit of the whole community 
by promoting peace, rather than a specific concern over the suffering caused by 
punishment, which underpins his focus on deterrence. 
According to this deterrent theory, punishment could be coercive, but not 
compelling. It provides reasons for actions, but does not communicate to individuals 
why certain actions are injurious to the state. It relies upon an understanding of 
punishment as suffering, but enjoins the sovereign to pardon those who demonstrate 
repentance. It thus does not require the punishment of criminals, but nor does it set 
concrete limits upon the form or degree of punishment through reference to the nature 
of the crime itself. For all these reasons, Hobbes’s theory of punishment’s purpose 
was atypical for his period. It is also difficult to classify according to the common 
categories of modern penal theory: retributive, deterrent, and corrective. 
Nonetheless, this difficulty has not prevented various readers from undertaking 
precisely this project. I will therefore conclude with a brief discussion of two 
illustrative cases of such classification, and suggest why I believe they are not only 
mistaken, but might prevent us from recognising important features of Hobbes’s 
theory. I will focus on the work of Mario Cattaneo and Alan Norrie, both of whom are 
interested in tracing the intellectual legacy of Hobbes’s theory. As a result, their 
projects go beyond simply labelling elements of Hobbes’s thought, and instead consist 
of attempts to align him with specific ways of thinking about punishment which 
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emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Cattaneo ties Hobbes’s interest in 
‘correction and prevention’ and his rejection of retribution to the Classical School of 
criminology, exemplified by figures such as Cesare Beccaria  and Jeremy Bentham.488 
Norrie, for his part, compares Hobbes to Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, arguing 
that while correction and prevention are indeed important aspects of Hobbes’ theory, 
the latter also ‘exhibits a retributivist tendency’. According to Norrie, Hobbes is thus 
‘the founding father of not one, but both the great theories of punishment.’489  
This attempt to anachronistically fit Hobbes into one or other of these schools 
of thought runs the risk of obscuring important elements both in his theory, and in 
those of the theorists with whom he is being compared. Turning first to retribution, we 
find that the central comparison is based on a misinterpretation of Hobbes’s account. 
Norrie presents the ‘idea of the individual qualifying for punishment through his prior 
legislative act’ as the key element of retributive punishment.490 Modern retribution, 
therefore, consists in more than simply the requirement that punishment only be 
inflicted on the guilty; it involves the assertion that, even if  the experience of 
punishment cannot be understood as willed by the punished individual, the right by 
which he is punished is the consequence of his reason, as demonstrated by the creation 
of a legislative system. Punishment, in this model, is enacted out of a concern for the 
maintenance of objective standards of justice external to the state, but it is carried out 
through a human institution to which the punished individual is understood to have 
consented.491  
                                                   
488 Cattaneo 1965, p. 289.    
489 Norrie 1984, p. 316. See also Norrie 1991, p. 16. See however Ristroph 1997, p. 603, who 
explicitly argues that Hobbes’s theory does not fit neatly into modern understandings of either 
retributive or consequentialist philosophies.  
490 Norrie 1984, p. 316. 
491 See for example Hegel’s statement that the ‘injury which is inflicted on the criminal is not only 
just in itself (and since it is just, it is at the same time his will as it is in itself, an existence of his 
freedom, his right); it is also a right for the criminal himself, that is, a right posited in his existent 
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It is therefore worth emphasising that, as was discussed in Chapter 2, 
Hobbesian criminals do not ‘own’ their punishment, in contrast with all other 
sovereign actions. Furthermore, as D. B. Hawkins, writing more generally about the 
origins of the theory, points out, ‘for Kant it is an evident moral principle requiring no 
justification outside itself that crime requires punishment…equivalent in kind to the 
evil done’,492 while for Hegel ‘the wrong act is a negation of right, and the negation 
has to be negated by the reaction of society in the punishment of the offender.’493 
Modern retribution theory, then, can be said to collapse the purpose and the 
justification of punishment into a single argument: the breaking of rules to which one 
has agreed qualifies one for punishment and requires society to carry it out. In 
Hobbes’s theory, by contrast, subjects have set up, through the authorising covenant, 
a legislative system that has the power to inflict punishment upon the guilty. But this 
system is, as we saw, created specifically to maintain peace in the commonwealth. 
Punishment is thus not only not required, but in many cases natural law demands that 
it not be inflicted at all. This is in direct contrast with those thinkers whom Norrie 
presents as continuing Hobbes’s legacy, both of whom present punishment as the 
correct consequence of crime in order to meet the standards of justice. Norrie’s project 
of separating out one element of retributive punishment’s purpose/justification and 
using it to suggest that Hobbes inspired certain elements of the later theory not only 
misrepresents Hobbes but retributive theory more broadly. 
                                                   
will, in his action.’ This is because ‘it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that is 
universal in character, and that, by performing it, he has set up a law which he has recognized for 
himself in his action.’ Hegel 2003, p. 126. See also Kant’s statement that ‘when I draw up a penal 
law against myself as a criminal, it is pure reason in me…legislating with regard to rights, which 
subjects me, as someone capable of crime…to the penal law, together with all others in a civil 
union.’ Kant 2003, p. 108.  
492 Hawkins 1971, p. 15.  
493 Hawkins 1971, p. 16.  
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 This is not, however, to suggest that Hobbes’s theory is better understood by 
reference to the Classical School of criminology. As we have seen, there is a long 
history of thinking about the ways in which punishment could both deter future crime 
and correct criminal impulses in the offender. The variant of this tendency which 
Cattaneo links to Hobbes, classical deterrence theory, grew out of a utilitarian concern 
with maximising human happiness and minimising human pain. Its advocates were 
primarily concerned with justifying the harm of punishment, and argued that only that 
degree of suffering which succeeds in preventing future harm can be inflicted. Thus 
we read Bentham arguing that if ‘the evil of the punishment exceeds the evil of the 
offence, the punishment will be unprofitable’ and ‘the legislator will have produced 
more suffering than he has prevented.’494 Likewise, Beccaria writes that ‘any 
punishment which goes beyond’ what is necessary to encourage law-abiding 
behaviour is ‘unjust by its very nature.’495 As we have seen above, this is not the case 
in the Hobbesian commonwealth; in the latter, cruelty is determined in relation to state 
laws, rather than to an external standard of human happiness which could be used to 
undermine civil authority.  
 The reason for these differences becomes apparent when we consider that 
Hobbes’s theory was in many ways a response to a very different set of questions than 
those which motivate Beccaria, Kant and Hegel. The Kantian and Hegelian concern 
that punishment cannot have deterrence as its primary end is simply at cross-purposes 
with Hobbes’s suggestion that deterrence is compatible with individual freedom, and 
that it is the best means a sovereign has to encourage peace in the commonwealth to 
the benefit of all subjects. Punishment, in the Hobbesian theory, is the means by which 
                                                   
494 Bentham 2008, p. 64. See also Bentham 2008, p. 72.   
495 Beccaria 1995, p. 11 
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men are taken seriously as deliberating individuals who behave according to their own 
determinations of benefit and harm. It has been suggested that it is only through a 
retributive model that the individual as a moral agent can be properly recognized: 
when one is punished for a bad action, one is treated as having the potential for moral 
responsibility.496 But as I have attempted to demonstrate, Hobbes’s theory of 
punishment is likewise able to treat his citizens as moral agents capable of making 
choices which are rational and in accordance with the needs of the commonwealth.  
On the other hand, the link in classical deterrence theory between humanitarian 
aims and consistent punishment of actions is equally alien to Hobbes’s thought. 
Hobbesian punishment, as we have seen, can be both just and harsh, as well as 
consistently forgiving.497 Both the classical and retributive thinkers to whom Norrie 
and Cattaneo compare Hobbes, I would suggest, are concerned with justifying 
punishment to the punished individual in question, either as as a consequence to his 
own prior act, or as a result of his reasonable determination regarding what is 
necessary for civil peace. Hobbes was merely concerned with punishment as a practice 
conducted upon citizens, with the aims of the state overriding all other concerns. It is 
for this reason that Hobbes’s theory of punishment is able to include within it a right 
to resist, while the two later schools cannot; in presenting punishment as a civil 
practice justified only in relation to the sovereign’s legal aims, Hobbes frees himself 
from the need to justify punishment to the punished individual, and from the 
requirement that the individual in question accept his punishment.   
  
                                                   
496 See for example Hegel, who writes to justify punishment along deterrent lines ‘means treating 
a human being like a dog instead of respecting his honour and freedom.’ Hegel 2003, pp. 125-6.   
497 Cattaneo’s argument that ‘It is difficult to avoid the inference that the ‘spirit of Hobbes’s theory 
does…really imply a rejection of the death penalty’ thus appears to be the consequence of reading 
Hobbes through an eighteenth century lens. Cattaneo 1965, p. 294.  
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Chapter 5: Rebels and Enemies: Crimes Beyond 
Punishment 
Introduction: Individuals Outside the Commonwealth 
The argument that Hobbes’s theory locates criminals outside the commonwealth is an 
appealing one; it equates either breaking the law, or resisting punishment, with total 
rejection of the original covenant, and thus seems to account for the presence of natural 
rights in the artificial state. As we saw in Chapter 2, however, law-breakers remain 
subjects of the sovereign throughout their experience of punishment. The covenant 
upon which the commonwealth is founded allows for legal resistance to punishment 
as part of the retained natural right to self-defence, and thus both crime and resistance 
to the state are presented as actions committed by citizens. In making this argument, 
Hobbes cannot help but draw our attention to those individuals who are not members 
of the commonwealth; criminals, despite the suffering they undergo, nonetheless 
remain privileged through this retained citizenship, while those outside the state have 
none of the legal protections outlined in earlier chapters. This becomes particularly 
important when we consider those whose actions effect a transformation in civil status. 
This is the case of those who are determined by the sovereign to be rebels or traitors. 
The criminal and the rebel appear in Hobbes’s theory as curiously twinned 
figures; both are sources of instability in the state and, as Chapter 3 suggested, there 
are similarities between the passions and errors of reasoning which lead to either 
criminal or rebellious behaviour. The line between the two may not always be clear, 
and, as will be explored below, it is one which ultimately depends upon sovereign 
judgement. However, it is precisely because of such similarities that drawing a 
distinction between the criminal and the rebel is crucial to understanding Hobbes’s 
criminology. The temptation to conflate criminals with rebels led some scholars to 
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fundamentally misunderstand Hobbes’s conception of the rights associated with 
citizenship, as we saw in Chapter 2. An alternative blurring of these categories, 
whereby rebels are seen to hold some of the rights of citizens, can lead the hasty reader 
to find a right to rebel in the political theory. The question of the supposed right to 
rebel will be addressed in Chapter 6. Before it can be properly examined, however, we 
need to understand how Hobbes presented the figure of the rebel, and the rights held 
by sovereigns against such individuals. As we shall see, Hobbes’s theory conflates 
rebels and enemies. Moreover, his rejection of the theory of the ius gentium, or law of 
nations, allowed him to strictly differentiate between the commonwealth as a site of 
legal rights and protections, and the international arena as one characterised by 
insecurity and potential conflict.  
Hobbes’s crucial innovation in his discussion of rebels was to draw a 
theoretical equivalence between rebels and foreign enemies. He makes this move by 
re-defining treason as a refusal of sovereign authority, and hence a crime against the 
natural, rather than civil, law. As we shall see, this label, by the time we reach the final 
versions of the theory, does not rely upon a specific conviction, punishment, 
declaration of outlawry, or even upon an identifiable threat posed by the rebel to the 
state’s security. Enmity, in Hobbes’s terminology, is simply the description of a legal 
position with regards to the commonwealth, rather than a normative category or a 
description of particular aims. As such, it is best characterised by an absence of 
political obligation, rather than by a specific attribute displayed by certain individuals. 
As he writes in De Cive, ‘whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord, or 
one to another, are enemies among themselves.’498 Individuals in the state of nature 
are therefore technically enemies, even if they are not actively attacking or working 
                                                   
498 Hobbes 1983, p. 179.  
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against each other, just as the state of nature is one of war even when all that is present 
is the ‘known disposition thereto.’499 The related proposition, that there can be no 
natural obligation, law or injustice between those who are not united under the same 
sovereign, means that once a subject is understood to have lost their civil position, any 
jural relationship between the sovereign, members of the commonwealth and the 
treasonous rebel is removed. So too are any legal limits upon the treatment by the 
sovereign of his or her new enemy. 
In arguing that the categories of rebel, traitor and enemy could be collapsed, 
with all these terms best understood as simply describing individuals outside of a given 
commonwealth, Hobbes presented a model in striking contrast both to English law as 
it existed in the seventeenth century and to early modern theories of international law, 
which drew a sharp distinction between those who were considered enemies of the 
state and those who were rebelling against a previously held political obligation.500 
Before examining Hobbes’s theory, it is important briefly to set out the fundamental 
points of law and theory which his work challenged. 
 
                                                   
499 Hobbes 2012, p. 192. Hobbes occasionally lapses into a more conventional presentation of 
enmity as the result of actual, rather than potential, conflict. He writes in Chapter 13 of Leviathan 
that ‘if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they 
become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and 
sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 
190. In this account, enmity appears to depend upon conflicting desires, rather than upon the lack 
of a common power. However, Hobbes more consistently uses enmity to refer to the latter 
conception, and this is therefore how I will treat his categorisation. Stephen Holmes takes this 
passage, which equates enmity with competition rather than with a lack of common power, more 
seriously than I do, arguing that the ‘Hobbesian enemy is the arrogant individual’ who in the state 
of nature demands more than his share. As a result of this emphasis, Holmes asserts that the 
sovereign’s ‘decisions about who is an enemy’ do not take place ‘in a norm-free zone.’ Holmes 
2010, pp. 383-5. This analysis conflates the juridical status of the enemy with the reasons a 
sovereign might have for expelling someone from the commonwealth, and thus assigns a 
normative quality to the category as a whole which it seems clear Hobbes did not think was 
necessarily applicable.  
500 Hobbes’s distinction between internal criminals and external enemies has been frequently noted 
in the literature, but rarely put into the context of early modern accounts of these categories. See 
for example Cattaneo 1965, pp. 293-4; Christianson 1968, p. 430-1; Hünig 2007, pp. 221-2; Diez 
2008, pp. 540-1 and Loxley 2010, p. 141. 
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Distinguishing Enemies and Traitors 
While English treason statutes underwent some modification over the course of the 
early modern period,501 the legal basis of what constituted treason remained largely 
consistent from the fourteenth century onwards, with the original statute of 25.Edw.3 
representing a common source of legal reasoning.502 This defined a number of acts as 
treasonous, including the compassing, or imagining, of the death of the king, queen or 
eldest male heir and the levying of war against the king or adhering to his enemies 
either in England or abroad, as well as the co-option of various marks of sovereignty. 
It was also axiomatic in early modern English law that traitors against the king 
remained his subjects during their acts, accusation and trial, as well as during the 
punishment following conviction. Treason itself was consistently treated as a crime 
defined by statute law and punished by common law courts, with the accused provided 
with the opportunity to present, to his peers, a defence according to the laws of the 
realm. This was a widely understood prerequisite, with both accounts of the law and 
pamphlets originating outside the legal sphere asserting that that the traitor was and 
remained internal to the polity despite his actions. An explicit contrast between traitors 
or rebels and enemies was therefore common in such accounts. Coke, for example, 
notes in the third volume of his Institutes that ‘the subjects of the King, though they 
be in open war or rebellion against the King, yet they are not the Kings enemies, but 
traytors; for enemies be those that be out of the allegiance of the King.’503  
                                                   
501 On the tendency of Tudor monarchs, for instance, to narrow the scope of treason statutes at the 
outset of their reigns, only to expand it over time, see Chapter 2 of Bellamy 2013.    
502 Russell 1965, p. 31. See also Bellamy 1970, pp. 59-101 for a detailed history of the 1352 statute. 
In Hobbes’s Dialogue the character of the Lawyer quotes this statute at length in response to the 
Philosopher’s request for a definition of high treason. Hobbes 2005, pp. 68-9. Orr 2002, p. 5 notes 
that developments in the English conception of treason both before and during the civil wars 
largely consisted of novel applications of the original concepts highlighted in this and some later 
statutes, rather than in replacing them altogether.  
503 Coke 2003, p. 973.  
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Coke is strict in maintaining this distinction even when such scrupulousness 
would appear to prevent the charging and conviction of those working to undermine 
the state. In his discussion of charges of treason resulting from ‘adhering to the Kings 
enemies’ he notes that ‘if A. is out of the Realme at the time of a Rebellion within 
England, and one of the Rebels flye out of the Realme, whom A. knowing his treason 
doth aide or succour, this is no treason in A. by this branch of 25.E.3.’ The ‘traytor’ 
being ‘no enemy’, A. cannot be said to have adhered to one of the king’s enemies, and 
as such is innocent of treason despite aiding a known rebel against their common 
sovereign.504 The same argument is made by Robert Holbourne when he writes that 
‘This word Enemy cannot extend to Subjects, for they are Rebels and no 
Enemies…and therefore the aiding of Rebels cannot be meant any way the aiding of 
the King’s Enemies within the Law.’505 Thus, according to the standard seventeenth 
century interpretation of the 1352 statute, rebels’ status as subjects, not enemies, 
persisted even after their identification as individuals at war with their own state.  
Dalton noted this same legal distinction in The Country Iustice, but focused 
instead on the subject status of the adherent, rather than that of the rebel. He states that 
while ‘To be adherent to the K. enemies, ayding them in his Realme, is high Treason’, 
this label does not apply to foreigners. Dalton explains the implications of this 
distinction by noting that ‘if an alien enemie come… inuade this Realme, and be taken 
in warre, he cannot be indicted of treason, but he shall be put to death by Martiall Law’ 
whereas ‘An English Traytor pleading that hee is a Subiect to a foreign Prince, shall 
notwithstanding…haue iudgement as a Traytor.’506 We find the same logic when the 
author of the anonymous 1650 tract Traytors deciphered in an answeare to a 
                                                   
504 Coke 2003, p. 972. 
505 Holbourne 1681, p. 13.  
506 Dalton 1618, p. 199.  
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shameless pamphlet argues that, contrary to anti-royalist propaganda, ‘the Kings being 
borne in another Country makes him not a forraigner, and to be a forraigner doth rather 
diminish the crime of unnaturallnesse, and merit of punishment, if the supposition had 
been true.’507 According to this view, those arguments which supported the regicide 
by suggesting that the people of England could not be subject to a ‘foreign’ king, and 
that therefore there was no barrier to his being tried and executed for treason, were 
self-defeating. If the king were a foreigner, his actions by definition were not treason, 
and could not be labelled or punished as such. This criterion, the author points out, 
applied not only to the king, but also to his subjects. The text continues by arguing 
that ‘though Princes in the highest hostilitie draw not their captive enemies to their 
[civil] tribunalls, being by the Laws of nature, and Nations incompetent judges, yet 
these being subjects, and rebelling against their King’ may be tried in their state’s 
courts and according to its laws.508 
According to these writers the distinction between enemies and traitors had 
two major implications. It determined which form of law had jurisdiction over the 
individual in question, and it forced the state to differentiate between two different 
types of threat to its security: sedition and war. As we saw in the case of Coke’s 
Subject A, to aid enemies in a war against one’s king is a more serious crime than 
helping a rebel flee the consequences of his seditious behaviour. While both pose a 
risk to the state, A is to be considered a traitor only when aiding war, rather than 
rebellion.  
This differentiation between traitors and enemies is also found in numerous 
legal treatises on international law. We read in the Digest that ‘the man who with evil 
                                                   
507 Traytors deciphered 1650, p. 20.  
508Traytors deciphered 1650, p. 48. 
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counsel and a traitor’s intention has left his patria is to be counted among our 
enemies.’509 The act of treasonous desertion is thus considered adequate to effect a 
change in civil status. However, among early-modern theorists of international law, 
including among those who turned to the Digest as an authority, the distinction 
between the two categories was largely rigid. We discover in Balthazar Ayala’s De 
jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari libri III [Three Books on the Law of War] 
(1582) that ‘rebels ought not to be classed as enemies, the two being quite distinct.’ 
Again, we see, echoing the implications of the English legal sources cited above, a 
contrast drawn between war against enemies and actions taken against traitors. As 
Ayala writes, it is because of the distinction between traitors and enemies that ‘it is 
more correct to term the armed contention with rebel subjects execution of legal 
process, or prosecution, and not war.’510 Similarly Alberico Gentili notes in De jure 
belli libri tres [Three Books on the Law of War] (1598) that the ‘enemy are those who 
have officially declared war upon us.’511 By contrast, ‘one who is a subject does not 
by rebellion free himself from subjection to the law.’512 While Gentili acknowledges 
that this terminology has the tendency to become porous, as ‘the word hostis, 
‘enemy’…is sometimes extended to…pirates, proscribed persons, and rebels’, he 
argues that such labels do not in themselves confer the legal status of enmity.513 
Grotius, in Book III of the Rights of War and Peace, notes that war, properly 
understood, can only take place between correctly identified enemies. Following 
                                                   
509 Watson 1998b, p. 404. It should be noted, however, that the Digest devotes little time to the 
question of treason and the precise legal status of traitors. Ulpian notes that unlike most crimes, 
where accusations are ‘extinguished by death’, in the case of charges of treason ‘animated by a 
hostile spirit against the state or the emperor’ (perduellio) the accused’s estate is claimed by the 
imperial treasury upon his death. This is not the case regarding  those accused of alternative 
categories of treason, indicating it was a somewhat malleable, rather than absolute, legal category.  
510 Ayala 1912, pp. 11-2. 
511 Gentili 1933, p. 15. 
512 Gentili 1933, p. 22. 
513 Gentili 1933, p. 25. 
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Cicero, he argues that this enemy must be have control of public affairs, the ability to 
command his people, and the right of making war and peace. Rebels, clearly, do not 
fall under this definition.514 
 
The Hobbesian Response: Conflating Traitors and Enemies 
In contrast to this model, Hobbes is consistent in all his works of political theory that 
those who rebel against their state are to be considered its enemies.515 In the Dialogue 
the Philosopher states that if ‘High Treason should take effect, it would destroy all 
Laws at once.’ As a result, the act ‘being done by a Subject, ‘tis a return to Hostility 
by Treachery; and consequently, such as are Traytors may by the Law of Reason be 
dealt with as Ignoble and Treacherous Enemies’.516 Hobbes always insists that treason, 
rebellion and hostility can be collapsed into the single category of enmity. However, 
over the course of his works his views about how to explain this conceptual move 
appear to have changed, with his later exposition of treason describing a much wider 
category of behaviour. This shift both corrects certain ambiguities in his theory of 
treason and brings it closer to a model based purely on sovereign prerogative. Before 
considering the implications of this broader understanding of treason for the 
identification of treasonous subjects, however, we first need to take note of the major 
differences in the presentation of this issue in the Elements, De Cive and Leviathan.  
                                                   
514 Grotius 2005, p. 1247.  
515 This move was recognised by Hobbes’s contemporaries as a direct challenge to the prevailing 
distinctions described above. See for example Hyde 1995, pp. 266-7 who writes that  
There cannot be a more pernicious Doctrine, and more destructive to Peace and 
Justice, then that all men who are not subjects are enemies; & than against 
Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judges capable to do them hurt, it is lawful 
by the orginal right of Nature to make war…[Hobbes] powerfully extinguished all 
those differences and priviledges, which all Writers of the Jus Gentium have 
carefully preserv’d between a just and unjust war, between lawfull Enemies and 
the worst Rebels and Traitors 
516 Hobbes 2005, p. 71. This text explicitly challenges Coke’s comments on treason, cited above, 
with the the Lawyer noting that Coke’s Institutes draw a distinction between enemies and traitors. 
Hobbes 2005, p. 72.  
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While the Elements does not treat the legal status of rebels as explicitly as the 
later works—despite going into detail about the causes of rebellion in Chapter 27—it 
does present a striking image of faction which, over the course of Hobbes’s writing, 
would render it very close to enmity. Hobbes writes that once the three conditions of 
rebellion—discontent, pretence of right and hope of success517—have been satisfied, 
‘one body of rebellion’ is created, ‘in which intelligence is the life, number the limbs, 
arms the strength, and a head the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same 
action’.518 This presentation of the faction as a separate, united body within the state 
immediately implies the foreignness of this seditious group. There are reasons to 
believe that Hobbes did not intend factions to be understood as fully functional 
commonwealths, not least from his assertion that such groups will collapse once their 
immediate goal has been achieved.519 Nonetheless, the appropriation of obligation 
owed to the legitimate sovereign by the ‘head’ of the faction indicates that even this 
temporary unity wages something very like war against the commonwealth.520 In De 
Cive Hobbes made the point much more forcefully.  In the later text he repeats and 
expands upon this image, stating that ‘A faction therefore is as it were a City in a City; 
for as by an Union of men in the state of nature a City receives its being, so by a new 
union of subjects, there ariseth a faction.’  In contrast to the account in the Elements, 
here Hobbes also spells out the logical consequences of this analysis, arguing that as 
‘the state of Cities among themselves is naturall, and hostile, those Princes who permit 
factions, doe as much as if they received an enemy within their walls.’521  
                                                   
517 Hobbes 1969, p. 168. 
518 Hobbes 1969, p. 175. 
519 Hobbes 2012, p. 258. See Chapter 6 for discussion of Hobbes’s presentation of civil unity.  
520 In this passage Hobbes employs a traditional image of the body of the commonwealth, in which 
the sovereign represents the head. By Leviathan he would reject this model, instead arguing that 
the sovereign acts as the commonwealth’s soul, much more viscerally uniting all the parts of the 
state. Hobbes 2012, p. 17 
521 Hobbes 1983, pp. 163-4.  
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It is however in Chapter 14 of De Cive that Hobbes makes the enemy/rebel 
conflation most explicit. Here, he defines the crime of Lèse-Majesté as ‘a word or deed 
whereby the Citizen, or Subject, declares that he will no longer obey that man or Court 
to whom the supreme power of the City is entrusted.’522 This intention can be revealed 
through a list of actions Hobbes provides, including, most importantly, through an 
attempt, whether successful or not, to do ‘violence on the Soveraigns Person, or to 
them who execute his commands’ or through an announcement that the speaker and 
other citizens are under no obligation to offer obedience to the sovereign power.523 
Such actions or statements, alongside any pronouncement to the effect that rulers do 
not have the right to undertake various acts of sovereignty including  anything ‘without 
which the State cannot stand’ are, he states, ‘Treason by naturall, not civill law’. As a 
result, such acts are to be understood in all commonwealths as treasonous. Analogous 
civil crimes of treason can occur when the sovereign power declares that specific 
actions are to be understood as such.524 A given sovereign might, therefore, declare an 
act which does not intuitively threaten the commonwealth’s existence to be 
treasonous. While these two categories are conceptually different, the outcome, for the 
traitor, is the same.  
Hobbes explicitly states in the same chapter that ‘Rebels, Traytors, and all 
others convicted of Treason, are punisht not by civill, but by naturall Right; that is to 
say, not as civill Subjects, but as Enemies to the Government, not by the Right of 
Soveraignty, and Dominium, but by the Right of Warre.’525 This extrajudicial 
                                                   
522 Hobbes 1983, p. 180.  
523Ibid.  
524Hobbes 1983, p. 181.  
525Ibid. It is important to distinguish between this punishment according to natural right, which 
takes place in the state of nature, and the punishment of breaches of the natural law in the context 
of the civil legal system. The latter is governed by the legal processes instituted by the sovereign, 
whereas the former is not.  
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punishment applies equally to those who have committed civil treason. However, 
Hobbes points out that such men, while traitors, nonetheless sin ‘lesse’ because they 
do not break ‘all the Laws at once, but one Law only’.526 Why this should be so is not 
made entirely clear. After all, the sovereign has, through the creation of such a law, 
decreed any breach of it to be equivalent to a total rejection of his authority, and hence 
of all civil obligation. Moreover, as will be explored below, Hobbes’ definition of the 
traitor as an enemy to the commonwealth depends on the latter’s having rejected the 
entire system of law, rather than simply one element of it. As is explicitly noted, the 
sin of treason breaks natural law precisely because in such cases the civil law is unable 
to impose its own jurisdiction conceptually, rather than in one particular instance. It is 
this which justifies, according to the logic of the text, the treatment of the traitor as an 
extra-legal figure.  
It is also somewhat confusing that, in De Cive, this designation only occurs 
following a conviction. While it is unclear that Hobbes intended an accused traitor to 
retain, for instance, full legal rights in the courtroom, the retention of legal language 
is telling, and brings the case of treason closer to the civil crimes from which Hobbes 
otherwise wants to distance it.  This intermediate step of a full trial and conviction 
suggests that Hobbes is unwilling, at this early stage, to apply his own logic, according 
to which the act of treason renders every law with regard to the treatment of the traitor 
‘superfluous.’527  
The result of this somewhat confusing account is that the law of treason in this 
version of Hobbes’s state is actually fairly narrow. The means by which a citizen 
reveals his intention to renounce obligation are stipulated, with the ability of the 




sovereign to declare his own definitions curiously undermined. When, however, we 
turn to Leviathan, the picture is different. By contrast with Hobbes’s earlier texts, there 
is no extended discussion of what it means to be a traitor. Rather, Hobbes limits 
himself to the statement that  
if a subject shall, by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the 
authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever 
penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be 
made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying 
subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; 
and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth.528 
 
Here we see not only that Hobbes has provided a broader definition of the 
rejection of civil obligation, but that the language of positive law itself is 
explicitly repudiated; the penalty ‘formerly ordained for Treason’ is only raised 
to note its irrelevance. The ‘Punishment as by Law’ and ‘penalty’ which ‘hath 
been formerly ordained for Treason’ which a potential traitor might expect—yet 
is no longer entitled to—refers to statute law. However, the sovereign may 
nonetheless ‘lawfully’ make such an individual suffer according to his will by 
natural law, which is what renders such cases outside the jurisdiction of positive 
law entirely. There is no mention of legal process at all; instead, we see a situation 
where the individual is expelled from the commonwealth the moment he is 
determined to have denied his own subjection. Such a charge leaves no room for 
dissenting ideas of lawfulness or challenge to the sovereign’s application of the 
law. Hobbes’s model of treason appears to increase in severity both through 
greater vagueness and greater conceptual coherence. Importantly, this model of 
the extra-legal nature of treason does not rely upon a perception of the danger 
                                                   
528Hobbes 2012, p. 486.  
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posed by a given traitor, or on the political situation within the state, but purely 
on the traitor’s repudiation of his earlier obligation.529  
There is a clear parallel between Hobbes’s argument that denying 
obligation or subjection to one’s sovereign results in one’s leaving the 
commonwealth and his discussion of those who deny their relationship with God. 
In De Cive he argues that because the atheist has, through a lack of belief, never 
subjected himself, such individuals are 
punisht either immediately by God himselfe, or by Kings 
constituted under God; not as a Subject is punished by a King, 
because he keeps not the Lawes, but as one enemy by another, 
because he would not accept of the Lawes; that is to say, by the 
Right of warre, as the Giants warring against God.530 
 
While the atheist is in this account closer to the foreign enemy who has never 
participated in the commonwealth-generating covenant, rather than the rebel who has 
broken the fundamental terms of that agreement, we might nonetheless assume from 
this passage that believers who renounce their faith would fall into the same category. 
Indeed, Hobbes confirms this reading in Leviathan. We saw in Chapter 1 that 
banishment by sovereigns could not be considered punishment proper, as it consists 
in the removal of subject status. Hobbes suggests something similar regarding 
excommunication, noting that this is not ‘properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject 
that hath broken the Law; but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth 
                                                   
529Hobbes’s account of treason as a crime against nature rather than against civil law was directly 
criticized by some of his contemporaries. Cumberland 2005, pp. 628, 748-51, argued that such a 
doctrine ‘is dangerous, and tends to sedition’. It may even, Cumberland asserts, indicate ‘a Right 
to commit Treason’. This right consists, he argues, in the liberty of men to ‘free’ themselves by 
‘Rebellion’ from the ‘condition of the Subject’, at which point he is not liable to punishment. 
Cumberland also specifically contrasts Hobbes’s theory with contemporary practice, noting that 
‘there are numerous Civil Laws in most States, particularly our own, which have enacted most 
grievous Punishments against Traytors’.  
530 Hobbes 1983, p. 179. See also his comments in Hobbes 1840, p. 294 where he repeats the point.  
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the Right of our Saviour to the Kingdome.’531 The excommunicate and the atheist are 
thus presented as conceptually similar as their secular counterparts, the rebel and the 
enemy.  
 Hobbes’s own presentation of this argument indicates the extent to which it, 
like his comments about enmity more broadly, differed from mainstream assumptions; 
in 1647 he added a note to De Cive acknowledging that ‘many find fault that I have 
referr’d Atheisme to imprudence, and not to injustice.’532 While atypical for the 
period, it is nonetheless of a piece with his analysis of treason: those who have decided 
to reject prior obligation are, by definition, no longer subject to the terms of the 
agreement creating that obligation. As such, they cannot be labelled unjust, or indeed 
subject to any of the other features of life within that agreement, such as positive law.  
 
Hobbes’s Rejection of the Ius Gentium 
As the passages above indicate, Hobbes’s account of the treatment meted out to 
enemies is extra-judicial; it is regulated by the natural law, rather than by civil law or 
a version of international law. This section will explore this idea in more depth and 
provide an account of the relationship between the extra-legal nature of treason and 
Hobbes’s account of political obligation. As we have seen, Hobbes’s argument denies 
the validity of what was, in this period, taken to be a crucial legal distinction between 
enemies and traitors. Before examining his account of the treatment merited by such 
                                                   
531 Hobbes 2012, p. 892. Alexander Ross challenged Hobbes’s claim that excommunication was 
not true punishment, writing that ‘excommunication is not a bare denouncing, but a real suffering 
of punishment.’ Ross here fails to realise for Hobbes the question does not turn upon the presence 
or absence of suffering, but upon the punished individual’s refusal to recognise the punisher as an 
authority. Ross 1653, p. 60. 
532 Hobbes 1983, p. 179. See for instance Bramhall’s view that just as ‘a rebellious Subject is still 
a Subject, de jure, though not, de facto, by right, though not by deed: And so the most cursed 
Atheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to be punished not as a just 
enemy, but as a disloyal traytor.’ Bramhall 1995, p. 118.  
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individuals, however, it is important to examine the legal structure of this distinction. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, retained citizenship is a source of protection for the 
Hobbesian subject, as it means that during conflict with the sovereign he can appeal 
to legal norms. But for those lawyers and theorists who maintained a strict division 
between rebels and enemies, this distinction served the opposite function; to be 
designated a traitor was to expose oneself to penalties far more serious than those 
applicable to official enemies. This difference in severity was enabled by a belief in 
separate legal jurisdictions governing these two types of behaviour: while the rebel 
was to be treated according to harsh provisions found in the positive law, harm could 
only be inflicted upon an enemy when justified by the law of nations, or ius gentium.  
Underpinning this differentiation, according to which disloyalty was to be 
treated more harshly than enmity, was an emphasis on political obligation and the 
consequences for its betrayal. This is clear when Coke, explaining the various 
circumstances which might mitigate a charge of high treason, notes that  
all Aliens that are within the Realme of England, and whose 
Soveraignes are in amity with the King of England, are within 
the protections of the King, and doe owe a locall obedience to 
the King, (are homes within this Act) and if they commit High 
Treason against the King, they shall be punished as Traytors, but 
otherwise it is of an Enemy.533  
 
To betray a relationship from which one has gained protection is, according to Coke, 
far worse than to act against a sovereign from whom one has not benefited. Therefore, 
the former act earns a more severe punishment. Again, we see Holbourne emphasising 
the same point when he writes that it is not only subjects ratione originis who may be 
convicted of treason; those foreigners who have received the protection of the state 
                                                   
533 Coke 2003, p. 958. 
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are considered subjects ratione loci and thus, as long as they remain within the 
territory of the state, can be charged with the same crime.534  
The distinction between the treatment of traitors and that meted out to enemies 
was hardly insignificant in English law, and could lead to defendants arguing that they 
should be treated as the latter rather than as the former. For instance, during the trial 
of James Hamilton the Earl unsuccessfully claimed that as he was ‘no Englishman’ 
and therefore ‘an alien to, and not tryable as a Traytor by, the Laws of England’, he 
should be declared and tried as a prisoner of war, or enemy, rather than as a traitor.535 
The major part of the trial consisted not in determining whether the actions the Earl 
was accused of were ‘unlawful’ but rather the jurisdiction of the court itself. The 
punishment for those convicted of high treason was both brutal and symbolic: they 
were to be ‘pulled asunder and destroyed, [as they] intended to tear and destroy the 
Majesty of government.’ Moreover, a traitor’s lands, manors and other sources of 
income, including his wife’s dowery, were to be forfeited to the crown, while his 
children were, while still subjects, rendered ‘base and ignoble’ and his blood ‘stained 
and corrupted.’536 Enemies, on the other hand, while still at risk of execution, could 
hope for better treatment with prisoner exchange and ransom, rather than execution, 
becoming increasingly common practices in European wars by the seventeenth 
century. 537 As Coke notes, ‘An Enemy comming in open hostility into England…and 
                                                   
534 Holbourne 1681, pp. 14-5. See also Forster 1654, pp. 2-3, which states that ‘The tryall against 
an Alien that lived under the protection of the King (amity being between both Kings) for high 
Treason, shall…be tryed according to the due course of common Law.’  
535 Steele 1649, p.15.  
536 Coke 1669, p. 211. See also Cowell 1607, p. 532 for a description of the elaborate punishment 
meted out to traitors.  It should be noted that according to the monarch’s discretion, the execution 
of traitors could be modified, for example to be carried out by beheading. See Hobbes 2005, 
pp.117-8 for Hobbes’s comments on the punishment for treason according to English law. Hobbes, 
characteristically, notes that the punishment, being rarely carried out and thus having no basis in 
either common law nor custom, ‘depends meerly upon the authority of the King.’ 
537 Parker 2003, pp. 160-1. On exchange and ransom see also Donagan 1988, p. 81.  
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taken’, because he ‘cannot be indicted of treason’ instead ‘shall be either executed by 
Marshall-Law, or ransomed.’538 
To gain official enemy status was, according to the sources cited above, to gain 
certain protections according to the law of nations, or ius gentium. It was therefore 
imperative, many argued, that rebels should not fall under this label. This was not 
simply to avoid blurring legal categories, but because in gaining this status rebels 
would be eligible for a standard of treatment which they did not deserve. Ayala, for 
instance, in making the distinction writes of rebels that they ‘can not proceed under 
the laws of war and so, e.g. they do not acquire the ownership of what they capture, 
this only being admitted in the case of enemies [hostes]’. Ayala is explicit that to be 
termed a rebel is to potentially suffer more than an enemy, writing that because the 
treatment of rebels is not governed by the law of war,  
all the modes of stress known to the laws of war may be employed 
against them, even more than in the case of enemies, for the rebel 
and the robber merit severer reprobation than an enemy who is 
carrying on a regular and just war and their condition ought not to be 
better than his.539 
 
In order for Hobbes to be able to base treatment standards purely on the 
presence or absence of political obligation, and thus collapse the categories of enemy 
and traitor, it was imperative that he be able to remove any suggestion of an 
overarching ius gentium from his theory. As we saw above, it is the lack of any jural 
relationship between enemies which means that they have a right to inflict any and all 
harm upon each other. The presence of a system of law superimposed upon states 
would remove this important characteristic from his account. It is thus of great 
importance in understanding Hobbes’s theoretical choices in this area of his theory 
                                                   
538 Coke 2003, p. 973. 
539 Ayala 1912, pp. 11-12. 
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that he was writing precisely at a time when discussion of the law of nations was 
becoming ever more prominent, both within England and in Europe. 
The Roman Law concept of the ius gentium was by this period considered a 
standard form of law, distinct both from the law of nature and the particular civil laws 
of various sovereign nations.540 As Suárez notes, the term could have two meanings; 
it could be understood as ‘a body of laws which individual states or kingdoms observe 
within their own borders’ but which falls under this name because ‘the said laws are 
similar and are commonly accepted’ or it could be taken as ‘the law which all the 
various peoples and nations ought to observe in their relations with each other.’541 It 
is from this latter conception of the ius gentium that the laws of war are derived, 
including rules determining, among other things, the correct treatment of hostages and 
prisoners of war, as well as who fell under such categories. Such a legal system was 
predicated upon the concept of a community of nations; as Suárez notes, this kind of 
law is distinct from the law of nature in that while it also emerges ‘from the force of 
natural reason alone’, it is ‘fitted, not for men in an absolute sense, but for men as 
congregated in some human society.’542 As such, while it did not necessarily posit an 
international system of nations, or a global sovereign, it did suggest both common 
access to reason and international cooperation.543 Moreover, by framing international 
relations in terms of law, thinkers were able to suggest that infractions of this law 
                                                   
540 In Book 1 of the Digest we read Ulpian’s assertion that the jus gentium, as distinguished from 
the jus naturale and the jus civile, is ‘the law of nations…which all human peoples observe.’ Gaius, 
in the same book, defines it as ‘that law which natural reason has established among all human 
beings’ and which therefore ‘all nations observe.’ Watson 1998a, p. 2.  
541 Suárez 1944, p. 347. 
542 Suárez 1944, p. 336. In the Digest Gaius distinguished the jus gentium from the jus naturale on 
the basis that the former only applied to humans, while the latter had jurisdiction over all animal 
life. Watson 1998a, p. 1. 
543 As Cavallar 2002, pp.173, 179 notes, the theory of the ius gentium meant that the distinction 
between the domestic and international spheres is less clear in the thought of its proponents, such 
as Vitora, Suárez, Gentili, Grotius and Bodin, than it is in that of Hobbes, as both spheres are 
governed by a concept of enforceable law. 
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could be dealt with by legitimate punishment carried out by nations, as distinct from 
responses of national self-defence. State behaviour could thus be not merely regulated, 
but also enforced.544  
The civil lawyer Richard Zouche formally distinguished between these two 
meanings in his 1650 treatise, labelling the law derived from reason and found in all 
nations as the ius gentium, and suggesting that the law used by nations in their 
interactions with each other should be termed the ius inter gentes.545 Moreover, 
Zouche suggested that the source of this latter form of law was not simply the precepts 
of reason, but rather human agreement and custom.546 The law of nations, in this 
reading, was positive: while designed in accordance with reason, it derived its 
authority from human practices, and thus implied that humans were capable of setting 
up a common system of law above those of individual nations. The terminology and 
origins of the ius gentium were therefore not necessarily stable in the early modern 
period. Nonetheless, we do see common agreement regarding the existence of a 
knowable system of law governing states’ interactions with each other, and hence with 
declared enemies.  
It is in contrast to this account that we must understand Hobbes’s own model, 
in which the possibility of a ius gentium is dismissed. In rejecting the law of nations, 
Hobbes was also implicitly arguing against the assertion that individuals are protected 
by it when they come into conflict with a foreign state. It is important to emphasise 
                                                   
544 On the relationship between war and punishment in just war theory see Langan 1984. 
545 Zouche 1911b, p. 2. The law of nations is, in this reading, the result of ‘convention and 
agreement’, and is thus distinguished from the natural law. Zouche 1911a, p. 2. 
546 Ibid. For a further example of positive international law see Grotius 2005, pp. 162-3, which 
notes that the law of nations derives its authority from ‘the Will of all, or at least of many Nations.’ 
As a result this law is, he suggests, the result of ‘continual Use, and the Testimony of Men skilled 
in the Laws’. It is therefore not a pure product of human reason, in contrast with the presentation 
in the Digest. See also Richard Hooker’s comment that ‘there is no reason that any one 
commonwealth of itself should to the prejudice of another annihilate that [law of nations] that 
whereupon the whole world hath agreed.’ Hooker 1989, p. 98. Emphasis mine.  
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this point precisely because without understanding Hobbes’s minimalist presentation 
of international norms, we might assume that Hobbes’s theory, in which traitors are 
understood as enemies, is precisely what someone like Hamilton would have wished 
for. Instead, as will be shown below, according to Hobbes those falling into this hybrid 
category should be treated according to the law of nature alone.   
David Armitage has pointed out that the question of the jurisdiction of the 
various forms of law was something which may have occupied Hobbes from his 
earliest writings.547 The 1620 volume of essays Horae Subsecivae, attributed to 
William Cavendish but which subsequent stylometric analysis by Noel Reynolds and 
Arlene Saxanhouse has suggested may have been written by Hobbes, contains, in A 
Discourse of Laws, the standard Roman division of the law into ‘three branches’: the 
law of nature, the law of nations, and the ‘Municipal Law of every Nation.’548 
However, while Armitage suggests that ‘the definitions of the laws of nature and of 
nations in the Horae Subsecivae stand in marked contrast to what would become 
Hobbes’s standard account’,549 it is notable that the definition the author provides of 
the law of nations only touches upon one of the two interpretations outlined above by 
Suárez. The text notes that ‘The Laws of Nations be those rules which reason has 
prescribed to all men in general, and such as all Nations one with another do allow 
and observe for just.’550 
The law of nations, in this reading, may only refer to generally accepted 
practices across, but still within, states, rather than to a system of law governing the 
interactions between them. As a result, it seems plausible that Hobbes, from his earliest 
thinking on the subject, was already dismissive of the idea of a system of law able to 
                                                   
547 Armitage 2013, pp. 61-2. 
548 Hobbes 1995a, p. 110.   
549 Armitage 2013, p. 62. 
550 Hobbes 1995a, p. 110. 
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govern and regulate states’ relations with each other. Nonetheless, if the Discourse is 
by Hobbes then it remains the last time he presents the law of nations as in any way 
distinct from the law of nature. By the time we come to the major political works, 
Hobbes consistently conflates the law of nations with the law of nature, rejecting the 
possibility of binding obligations outside of the commonwealth. 
 Hobbes’s initial comments on the subject are cursory. In the Elements he 
writes that ‘as for the law of nations, it is the same with the law of nature. For that 
which is the law of nature between man and man, before the constitution of the 
commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.’551 In 
De Cive Hobbes’s repeats the point, and we read that ‘the naturall Law may be divided 
into that of Men, which alone hath obtained the title of the Law of nature, and that of 
Cities, which may be called that of Nations, but vulgarly it is termed the Right of 
Nations [jus Gentium].’ However it is labelled, Hobbes insists that the ‘precepts of 
both are alike.’552 It is in the later work, however, that Hobbes for the first time 
provides the reasoning behind his rejection of a separate, international legal sphere. 
In De Cive Hobbes introduces what has been termed in international relations 
theory the ‘domestic analogy’,  according to which states in the international arena are 
in the same position as individuals in the state of nature.553 This is a theme to which 
Hobbes refers repeatedly. Thus in De Cive we learn that ‘Cities once instituted doe 
put on the personall properties of men’ and so ‘that Law, which speaking of the duty 
of single men, we call naturall, being applied to whole Cities, and Nations, is called 
the Right of Nations.’ In Leviathan he repeats this explicit comparison between 
                                                   
551 Hobbes 1969, p. 190. 
552 Hobbes 1983, p. 171; Hobbes 1984, p. 208. 
553 See for example Beitz 1979, p. 31 and Bull 1995, p. 44. For an overview of this literature see 
Singh Grewal 2016.  
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sovereigns in their relations with each other, and individuals in the state of nature, 
famously writing that while  
there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a 
condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and 
Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, 
are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of 
Gladiators… which is a posture of War.554 
 
Here we can see the two directions of the analogy. In De Cive, we see direct 
comparisons between individuals and states, as when Hobbes draws a parallel between 
‘They who go to Sleep [and]shut their Dores; they who Travell [and] carry their Swords 
with them, because they fear Theives’ and ‘Kingdomes [which] guard their Coasts and 
Frontiers with Forts, and Castles; Cities [which] are compast with Walls, and all for fear 
of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes.’555 On the whole, however, the comparison in 
the earlier text is used to suggest how states may act in the absence of any overwhelming 
power. We see the same strategy in many of the quotations from Leviathan, cited above. 
Here, however, we also see the conflict ridden world of states being used to indicate how 
men might behave, absent an all-powerful sovereign. The two sides of the domestic 
analogy are used to reinforce each other; men are like states, and states are like men. 
Conflict in either sphere can be used to understand the risk of it in the other, and in 
particular Hobbes expects that man’s observation of the international sphere will serve 
to indicate the danger of living without a common power. The practical absence of a 
binding system of international law, he implies, is obvious to anyone who bothers to 
look.  
                                                   
554 Hobbes 2012, p. 196. Hobbes was fond of the image of the gladiator; this description of states 
in Leviathan echoes the comment in De Cive that states, approach each other with ‘an hostile mind’ 
and the ‘posture and appearance of gladiators [statu vultuque gladiatorio]. Cotton translates this 
passage as simply ‘with a fighting posture and countenance.’ Hobbes 1983, 247; Hobbes 1984, p. 
277. Evrigenis 2014, p. 148 suggests that the image of the gladiator can also be discerned in the 
frontispiece to Leviathan.  
555 Hobbes 1983, p. 45. 
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In both cases, the crucial element is the absence of any power capable of 
imposing its definitions of just and unjust, including through the enforcement of 
agreements. As Hobbes repeatedly emphasises, the ‘posture of War’ need not be taken 
as evidence that states will necessarily engage in hostilities with each other, but rather 
that they have a right to engage in reasonable precaution against others when they 
perceive themselves to be at risk. As he writes in De Cive, commonwealths can be 
understood as ‘so many Camps strengthened with armes, and men against each other’. 
Importantly, the ‘state’ of these states ‘is to be accounted for the state of nature, which 
is the state of War’ because they are not ‘restrained by any common power’.556 
It is worth reminding ourselves, on this point, of Hobbes’s definition of war in 
the state of nature. As Hobbes remarks in Chapter 13 of Leviathan, ‘WARRE, consisteth 
not in Battell onely, or in the act of fighting; but in a tract of time wherein the Will to 
contend by Battell is sufficiently known…So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance 
to the contrary.’557 Thus it is a lack of enforced assurance that is constitutive of the state 
of war between nations; just as men are capable of making agreements in the state of 
nature, yet such agreements are no guarantee of their own fulfilment without a coercive 
power, so too the lack of a coercive power renders all truces and agreements between 
states ‘an uncertain peace.’558 
Hobbes’s rejection of a law of nations is found not only in his political works, 
but also in those works which he chose to translate. Thus in Thucydides’s History of the 
Peloponnesian War we read, in the Melian dialogue, the Athenians’ assertion that the 
‘security of such as are at wars, consisteth not in the good will of those that are called to 
                                                   
556 Hobbes 1983, p. 140.  
557 Hobbes 2012, p. 192.  
558 Hobbes 1983, p. 140. 
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their aid, but in the power of those means they excel in.’ They explain to the Melians 
that the latter’s relationship with the Lacedaemonians is but weak, and that the former’s 
belief that the latter will ‘not betray their own colony’ is ‘absurd.’559 The overriding 
impression is of an absence of the means to enforce agreements; in such cases, states 
must be pragmatic about recognising their own abilities and needs.  
This is not to say that states can rightfully engage in purposeless violence. The 
analogy not only draws an equivalence between the law of nature and the law of nations, 
but also suggests that just as men are enjoined to employ their natural rights only when 
required, so too are states limited in what they may do with right. Thus we read, in 
Chapter 30 of Leviathan, that because ‘the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is 
the same thing’, every ‘Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his 
People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.’ 
Hobbes emphasises, however,  that, as in the case of men ‘that have no Civil 
Government’, sovereigns are to be guided by ‘Conscience.’560 Much has been made of 
role of the natural laws in governing states’ behaviour by scholars wishing to challenge 
the image of the Hobbesian international sphere as not merely legally anarchic, but also 
persistently dangerous.561 They have argued the domestic analogy is imperfect: states 
and men are different, and commonwealths are potentially more secure in their dealings 
with each other than individual men are in the state of nature. As a result, they are also 
under greater obligation to observe the laws of nature in their actions as well as in their 
intentions.562  
                                                   
559 Hobbes 1975, pp. 382-3.  
560 Hobbes 2012, p. 552. 
561 See for example Malcolm 2002, pp. 432-56.  
562 On the imperfect nature of the domestic analogy see see Bull 1995, p. 47 and Tuck 2004, pp. 
134-5.  
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It is not the purpose of this chapter to enter into a lengthy discussion of 
Hobbes’s account of the relations between states, or of the ways in which his theory 
has been employed in modern international relations theory.563 However, it is worth 
noting two important points in response to the argument that the international arena is 
one that, while not governed by the ius gentium, is still rendered stable and peaceful 
as a result of the natural laws. The first is that I am taking the term ‘sovereigns’ in the 
above passages simply to mean any individuals who are not subject to each other or 
to the same common power. International relations, on this reading, need not simply 
mean relations between states.564 Most individuals are represented in the international 
arena by their respective sovereigns.565 But it is also evident from Hobbes’s account 
of the state of nature that he envisages a range of possible allegiances and groupings 
capable of acting in unison, however temporary these may be.566 It seems equally clear 
that, in cases where individuals or sub-commonwealth confederacies are not 
represented by a common sovereign, they should be regarded as interacting on an 
equal theoretical footing with states. The argument that states have achieved a degree 
of security unavailable to humans, therefore, does not apply to all actors on the 
international stage, who may or may not feel able to act according to the natural laws. 
Enemies, and therefore threats from enemies, can take a range of possible forms, from 
individuals to groupings such as brigands, to overarching allegiances beyond 
                                                   
563 For good discussions of how and why Hobbes came to be associated with various modern 
schools of international relations see Chapter 4 of Armitage 2013 and Christov 2016. 
564 See Hayes, 2008, p. 463 for the suggestion that according to Leviathan pirates and buccaneers 
could be understood as states in the state of nature.  
565 This applies not only to the sovereign’s rights of peace and war, but also to his right to 
regulate trade. Hobbes 2012, pp. 270, 392. 
566 As will be explored in Chapter 6, Hobbes does not think that such instances of temporary 
concord will be able to gain the relative permanency of true union, found in commonwealths. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that such groupings are possible in the state of nature. Hobbes 2012, pp. 
188, 308-12. See also Malcolm 2002, pp. 449-50.  
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individual states; ‘sovereigns’ of all types will therefore have reason to feel threatened 
in a number of ways.567 
Secondly, in this chapter I am concerned less with the possibility of 
international cooperation and regulation than with the absence of any practical 
requirement for it.568 Sovereigns may well enter into agreements of various kinds with 
each other, for both peaceful and military purposes. Nonetheless, what must be 
emphasised is that enemies, strictly speaking, have no legal standard of treatment to 
which they can appeal. The international sphere, like the state of nature, is dangerous 
not because it is an arena of perpetual war, but rather because of retained natural right 
and a lack of coordinated behaviour in the absence of common authority. As a result, 
it may not always be in sovereigns’ interests to employ their rights against enemies, 
but such rights are nonetheless a vital feature of Hobbes’s account of life outside the 
commonwealth.  
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the natural laws, while potentially 
regulating individual sovereign behaviour, are open to interpretation. It is for this 
reason that Hobbes is able to assert in De Cive, regarding crime, ‘What therefore Theft, 
what Murther, what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must be known by the 
                                                   
567 The likeliness that states will possess unequal sizes, resources and power is occasionally used 
to argue that Hobbes’s international sphere is more likely to be peaceful than the state of nature. 
For the argument that the ‘rough equality postulate’ is the major obstacle to the domestic analogy 
see Newey 2011, pp. 62-9. For the suggestion that this inequality may contribute to international 
stability, see Malcolm 2002, p. 449. It is therefore important to remember that Hobbes’s 
dangerous state of nature is also made up of individuals of varying strength. See Hobbes 2012, 
pp. 188, 190, where we read that in the state of nature ‘the weakest has strength enough to kill 
the strongest’ because of the possibility of ‘confederacy’, and that ‘if one plant, sow, build, or 
possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces 
united, to dispossesse, and deprive him’ of his life and goods. Emphasis mine. Thus powerful 
sovereigns may well have reason to feel threatened by apparently weaker actors in the 
international arena, and vice-versa. 
568 On international cooperation as a possible outcome of sovereigns’ duties towards their subjects, 
see Malcolm 2002, pp. 446-9. Larry May goes so far as to suggest that the role Hobbes assigns to 
the laws of nature in the international sphere might provide ‘partial support for international 
criminal law.’ May 2013, pp. 173, 189-95. 
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civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the supreme authority.’569 Thus 
life in a commonwealth may resemble a state of war without actually being so.570 More 
importantly for our discussion is the fact that, outside the commonwealth, different 
interpretations of the natural law, like individual perceptions of risk, are equally valid. 
Life outside the commonwealth may appear to be regulated at various times by law, 
but such occasional concord should never be taken for genuine unity. 
Through Hobbes’s removal of the ius gentium from the taxonomy of law he 
removes precisely those protections which it affords to enemies. Once a Hobbesian 
individual is declared an enemy by his sovereign, and thus removed from the civil 
law’s jurisdiction, he and the sovereign enter into a state of hostility with respect to 
each other. As a result, those requirements of natural law which characterised 
punishment are no longer binding, because the sovereign has no interest in ensuring 
that the individual in question recognise his actions as punishment. The sovereign thus 
acts purely on the basis of his power, rather than according to the requirements of the 
legal sphere outlined in Chapter 1. As we read in Chapter 28 of Leviathan,  
Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not 
under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were 
either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot 
transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be 
no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all 
the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of 
Hostility. But in all declared Hostility, all infliction of evil is 
lawfull.571 
 
                                                   
569 Hobbes 1983, p. 102.  
570 This is suggested by François Peleau, who in 1657 wrote to Hobbes suggesting that life in 
Sparta was like ‘a state of nature in the civil state…For as you know, Sir, in the Republic of Sparta 
anyone was permitted to steal whatever he might take’ and hence all men had equal right to all 
things. Hobbes 1994b, p. 424. In fact, as Hobbes points outs in his discussion of Lacedaemon in 
De Cive, such interactions are still regulated by the civil law, as such an interpretation of the natural 
law, while seemingly perverse, has been promulgated as authoritative by the sovereign. Hobbes 
1983, p. 101. 
571 Hobbes 2012, p. 486. 
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This removal from the jurisdiction of the civil law comes about because of Hobbes’s 
understanding of political obligation. Rebels are treated according to the laws of 
nature, or of war, because in denying the terms of their own subjection they have 
broken the original covenant. As we read in De Cive ‘obligation to civill obedience’, 
which is what is violated by treason, is logically prior to the civil law; therefore, such 
acts are a breach of natural law, and are to be punished accordingly.572 As Hobbes 
points out, a prince making a civil law forbidding rebellion would not get very far; in 
order for the law to be binding, a citizen must on some level accept its legitimate 
existence in the first place.573 For Hobbes, aside from the natural laws there are no 
standards governing the treatment of enemies or those outside the polity. If necessary, 
innocents may be killed, torture can be applied, and all this with the sanction of natural 
law, which requires only that the sovereign behaving in this manner believe that it is 
necessary for the safety of the people.  
Hobbes repeatedly states that traitors are to be treated according to the 
sovereign’s will; in Leviathan we read that those who ‘deliberately revolting, deny the 
Sovereign Power’ will be made to ‘suffer whatsoever the Representative will’574 while 
in the Answer to Bramhall he writes that ‘the Traytor loseth the privilege of being 
punisht by a praecedent Law; and therefore may be punish’d at the King’s will, as 
Ravaillac was for murdering Henry the 4th. of France’575 Comments such as these 
                                                   
572Hobbes 1983, p. 181.  
573Ibid. The same point is also made in Hobbes 2012, p. 522. 
574 Hobbes 2012, p. 486. 
575 Hobbes 1840, p. 294. This was not the only time that Hobbes mentions the notorious regicide; 
in the Dialogue he notes the manner of his punishment, but does not suggest that this punishment 
was specifically according to the ‘King’s will.’ Hobbes 2005, pp. 117-8.  While the trial and 
punishment of Ravaillac were well-reported in both England and France, neither English nor 
French sources printed at the time indicate that Ravaillac’s punishment was in any way understood 
to take place outside the normal legal jurisdiction of the French state. For instance, Terrible and 
Deserued death 1610, pp. 2-3 notes that Ravaillac was ‘araigned, conuicted, and condemned by 
due order of law, in the great court and chamber…in Paris, before all the Assemblies, Presidents, 
Councellors, and Commissioners, at the request of Du Viquit, Attorney generall to the King’ and 
that following the defendant’s testimony ‘the law procedded, and a most terrible sentence of death 
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indicate that the rebel is to be seen primarily as the enemy of the sovereign; while in 
Chapter 18 of Leviathan Hobbes notes that a man left, at the institution of the 
commonwealth ‘in the condition of warre’ may ‘without injustice be destroyed by any 
man whatsoever, ’576 these comments on the punishment of traitors suggest that those 
determined to be enemies by the sovereign are not simply to be understood as outlaws, 
against whom each individual in the state is understood to be at war. The relationship 
of subjects and the traitor is mediated through the authority of the sovereign, as it is 
the obligation to the commonwealth, as represented by the sovereign, which the rebel 
has broken.577  
Despite this relationship of personal enmity between the sovereign and the 
traitor, sovereigns are only to act against traitors according to their judgment of what 
is necessary for the good of the commonwealth. Thus, while ‘the infliction of what 
evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the 
Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the 
Law of Nature’, such evil should only be exercised by the sovereign ‘as conduceth to 
the good of his own people.’ 578 Of course, this caveat is somewhat mitigated by the 
fact that this right is held specifically against those enemies ‘whom the Common-
wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt’.579 Hobbes’s account of the state of nature 
consistently allows for the rightful infliction of harm upon enemies whom we believe 
                                                   
pronounced against him there, according to a generall decree of that great court of parliament.’ An 
Epitome 1639, pp. 332-3 notes that Ravaillac was ‘declared guilty, and justly attainted, and 
convicted of the crime of Lese Majestatis in the highest degree.’ While it is true that the particulars 
of the punishment were tailored to the crime, if anything the accounts published in the wake of the 
trial focus on the law’s inability to use Ravaillac’s arrest to uncover proof of a wider Jesuit 
conspiracy against the French state. On this point see Copies of a Letter 1610.  
576 Hobbes 2012, p. 268.  Hobbes makes a similar point in Chapter 10 of De Cive when he notes 
that outside the commonwealth ‘any man may rightly spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but 
one.’ Hobbes 1983, p. 130.  
577 On the King’s role as the final arbiter of what constitutes treason, see also Hobbes 2010, p. 194. 
578 Hobbes 2012, p. 494. 
579 Ibid.  
 223 
may harm us at some future point; we only lose this right upon entering the 
commonwealth and placing a protective common power over all parties. In the 
international arena, however, there is no such overarching power, and thus even 
according to natural law there are scant resources to create a model of protections for 
non-subjects.  
While in asserting that rebels are to be judged purely according to natural law 
Hobbes appears to be making a definitive break with both the common and civil law 
traditions, it is worth remembering that both of these also conceived of categories of 
men whose acts preclude any appeal to legal protection, either from civil laws or from 
the ius gentium. Cicero in On Duties wrote that ‘if an agreement is made with pirates 
in return for your life, and you do not pay the price, there is no deceit, not even if you 
swore to do so…for a pirate is not counted as an enemy proper, but is the common foe 
of all.’580 Accounting for this common foe became a major theme of the writers we 
have been looking at, and in their doing so we find arguments strikingly similar to 
those made by Hobbes to justify placing rebels outside the commonwealth and its 
laws. Gentili, for example, writes that the reason why some men do not have recourse 
to the law of nations is because ‘malefactors do not enjoy the privileges of a law to 
which they are foes. How can the law, which is nothing but an agreement and a 
compact, extend to those who have withdrawn from the agreement and broken the 
treaty of the human race [?]’581 Elsewhere, in language reminiscent of Hobbes’s 
statement that rebels ‘having been subject to [the civil law], and professing to be no 
longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it [and so are placed outside 
                                                   
580 Cicero 1991, p. 141. 
581 Gentili 1933, p. 22. See also his statement that while it is always cruel and contrary to 
‘humanity’ to slay a prisoner of war, such cruelty can be tolerated against an ‘untrustworthy and 
treacherous enemy’; by refusing to obey the common conventions of war, such enemies have 
placed themselves outside of its protection. Gentili 1933, pp. 208, 237. 
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it]’,582 Gentili states that ‘pirates are common enemies and they are attacked with 
impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the law. They are scorners of the 
law of nations; hence they can find no protection in the law…This is a warfare shared 
by all nations.’583  
In making the argument that ‘a pirat is Hostis humani generis’ Coke is 
adopting this classical idea.584 However, in the English common law tradition there is 
an even more striking example of those whose actions place them outside a particular 
legal jurisdiction. In glossing the statute of 16.R.2, on the crime of praemunire, Coke 
notes that ‘if any pursue or cause to be pursued in the court of Rome, or elsewhere, 
any thing which toucheth the King, against him, his Crown and Regality, or his 
Realm…[he] shall be out of the Kings protection.’585 Expanding on this point, Coke 
later writes that ‘the persons attainted in a writ of Praemunire  are disabled to have any 
action or remedy by the Kings law or the Kings writs; for the law and the Kings writs 
are the things whereby a man is protected and aided, so…he who is out of the Kings 
protection, is out the aid and protection of the law.’ Being ‘out of the kings protection’ 
is, in Coke’s reading, akin to outlawry; he notes that of such an individual ‘a man may 
do with him as with the enemies of the king and his realm’ and that ‘he that shall 
commit any thing against [such individuals] in body or goods or other possessions, 
shall be excused against all people.’586 Hobbes notes in the Dialogue that it was argued 
of such men that they might be ‘lawfully killed by any Man that would, as one might 
kill a Wolf.’587 
                                                   
582 Hobbes 2012, p. 486. 
583 Gentili 1933, p. 423.  
584 Coke 2003, p. 958. See also Coke 1669, p. 113 for Coke’s account of the punishment due to 
pirates. In Henry VIII’s Offence at Sea Act of 1536 (28 Hen 8 c 15), pirates were described as 
the ‘common enemy of all nations.’  
585 Coke 1669, p. 119. 
586 Coke 1669, p. 126. 
587 Hobbes 2005, p. 104. 
 225 
The concept of an enemy of all mankind, however, does not seem to be one 
with any purchase within Hobbesian political theory. The reason is that such 
individuals are simply those without recourse to the ius gentium—a category which 
includes all of humanity, in Hobbes’s account.588 The discussions of such enemies and 
Coke’s account of praemunire do suggest that Hobbes’s categorisation of those 
individuals who reject political obligation as being in some sense extra-judicial was 
not entirely without precedent. However, in his account of this expulsion from the 
commonwealth and into a pure state of nature, Hobbes reminds his readers that the 
only source of consistent protection is the commonwealth, a step which the other 
theorists we have examined were unwilling to take.   
While the figure of the Hostis humani generis is not one which is easily applied 
to Hobbes’s theory, its presence in early modern theories of international law reminds 
us that   the ingredients of Hobbesian international relations were already present in 
the ius gentium; all he needed to do was to rearrange them. Gentili’s allowance of 
cruelty towards ‘treacherous’ enemies is an attempt to assimilate within the laws of 
war what others, such as Sallust, had excused on the grounds of ‘expediency.’589 In 
line with this goal, Gentili also argues in favour of those actions which, while normally 
against the law of nations, the sovereign determines will hasten the end of war. He 
thus introduces into the law of nations precisely that element of personal judgement 
which Hobbes locates in the international sphere by removing the ius gentium from 
the taxonomy of law altogether. Hobbes’s innovation is to extend the ‘extraordinary 
and unusual circumstances’ cited by Gentili to all relations between states.590  
                                                   
588 For a contrasting argument, according to which Hobbes’s Foole can be understood as 
belonging to this category, see Jaede 2015, pp. 178-91.  
589 Gentili 1933, pp. 237-8.  
590 See Sorell 2013, p. 25 on Hobbes’s state of nature as a site of perpetual ‘emergency politics.’ 
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Hobbes’s lesson to his readers is therefore not simply that the dissolution of 
the commonwealth, through faction and civil strife, would be a disastrous return of all 
to the state of nature. He also emphasises that the sovereign has the right to interpret 
actions by citizens as treason, and that upon this classification, men are thrown back 
into a state of nature where they lack all protection. As Hobbes notes in De Cive, ‘the 
name of an enemy’ is ‘sometimes sharper, then that of an unjust man.’591 Criminals 
and rebels are thus explicitly contrasted; the rights located in Hobbes’s legal system 
are set against a background of absolute insecurity. 
                                                   
591 Hobbes 1983, pp. 179-80. 
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Chapter 6: Criminality and the Right to Rebel 
Introduction: Rebellion and the Resisting Criminal 
Hobbes frequently claimed that the principles outlined in his scientia civilis were the 
preconditions for political order. On the second page of ‘The Preface to the Reader’ 
in De Cive we read that citizens’ understanding of the ‘true Principles’ demonstrated 
within the text would prevent not only ‘offences, contentions, nay even slaughter it 
selfe’, but more specifically regicide and rebellion.592 It is particularly rebellion that 
much of Hobbes’s political theory is designed to forestall; Leviathan defines it as 
‘warre renewed’, a return to the state of nature which the commonwealth was created 
to escape.593 It seems counterintuitive, then, to suppose that Hobbes may have, 
consciously or not, embedded within his theory not only the possibility of rebellion in 
the Hobbesian state, but a genuine right to rebel held by its subjects.  
Despite this, a number of Hobbes’s readers have suggested that that this is 
exactly what we find, if we take him at his word that upon entering the commonwealth 
future subjects retain certain liberties. In 1658 Hobbes’s intellectual sparring partner 
Bramhall famously labelled Leviathan a ‘Rebells catechism’,594 while Clarendon 
argued in 1676 that Hobbes’s theory allowed his sovereign ‘very childish security’ 
against ‘Rebellion.’595 In 1673 William Lucy published A Second Part of the 
Observations, Censvres, and Confvtations of Divers Errours in Mr. Hobbs his 
LEVIATHAN. He argued that ‘all those injuries’ suffered by Charles I during the 1640s 
‘had their pretence in this horrid Doctrine of [Hobbes’s], that Kings had their power 
                                                   
592 Hobbes 1983, p. 30.  
593 Hobbes, 2012, p. 494.  
594 Bramhall 1995, p. 145. As Parkin 2007, p. 197 notes, ‘Bramhall’s account of Hobbes as a 
political theorist of resistance and rebellion quickly became the semi-official [Restoration] position 
on the interpretation of Hobbes’s political thought.’  
595 Hyde 1995, p. 87.  
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from the people…that they made him their Representative, and not liking his 
Representation, they deposed him, and would be represented by one more like 
themselves.’596 As we shall see, Lucy’s stance is atypical in its assertion that it is the 
Hobbesian sovereign’s representative function which allows for resistance by the 
people. However, later in the text Lucy picks up the standard argument that it is the 
subjects’ retained right to self-defence, rather than the nature of the commonwealth’s 
origins, which legitimates not only self-protection, but also rebellion. In common with 
both seventeenth century and modern readers, he argues not only that ‘Liberty given 
to criminals to assist one another against the sword of justice’ is ‘the greatest incentive 
to… rebellion’ but that ‘The murther of Charles the first [is] legitimated by Mr. Hobbs’ 
through the inclusion of this right in his theory.597 
Turning to more recent interpretations, we find the same basic contention. 
Peter Steinberger has stated that ‘the right of self-defense is, in Hobbes’s thought, very 
broad indeed, and forms the basis for a full-scale theory of legitimate revolution, or at 
least its functional equivalent.’598 Similarly, Alan Ryan has argued that Hobbes’s 
theory ‘must, in spite of its author’s intentions, leave room not only for individual 
resistance but also, in extremis for fully fledged revolution.’599 Glenn Burgess is more 
circumspect in his assessment, stating that while we may find in Hobbes ‘elements of 
                                                   
596 Lucy 1673, p. 58. Lucy’s original critique of Hobbes, the Examinations, Censures and 
Confutations of Divers Errours in the Two first Chapters of Mr. Hobbes his LEVIATHAN (1656) 
was, as Parkin has noted, the first of ‘a series of rambling critical commentaries’ on the text which 
were poorly received by contemporaries. Despite this, upon Hobbes’s death Anthony Wood 
included Lucy among Hobbes’s major adversaries. Parkin 2007, pp. 164, 345.  
597 Lucy 1673, p. 146. Lucy’s two interpretations of Hobbes’s account are at odds with each other. 
He appears to assume that Hobbes’s theory allows and endorses the people changing their political 
representation at will. However, he then notes that the only way in which Parliamentary actions 
could be considered legitimate is through to the right to self-defence following an initially unjust 
act. It may be that Lucy assumes that the Parliament’s initial actions did not meet Hobbes’s 
presumed standards for a just change of government, but this is unclear.  
598 Steinberger 2002, p. 857. See Finkelstein 2001, p. 358, who also links the right to self-defence 
with a right to engage in ‘revolution.’ 
599 Ryan 1996, p. 24.   
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an inchoate resistance theory’, rebellion is best understood as the ‘natural punishment’ 
of the sovereign rather than the consequence of a legitimate right held by subjects.600 
More recently, however, Susanne Sreedhar has forcefully argued that ‘there is an 
identifiable and coherent Hobbesian right of rebellion’ and that it is based on rights 
retained by individual subjects within the commonwealth.601 While many of these 
arguments are suggestive, it is my aim in this chapter to demonstrate that, once we 
have properly understood the legal standing of the rebel in relation to the 
commonwealth, we shall find that there is not, and cannot be, a ‘right’ to rebel held 
by subjects. A rebellious act is distinct from acts permitted by Hobbes as falling under 
the retained liberties of subjects and cannot be constructed from them, either explicitly 
or implicitly.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, it is most frequently in the context of the right to resist 
legitimate punishment that Hobbes presents the striking extent of subjects’ true 
liberties. As a result, it is not uncommon for readers to conflate the categories of 
Hobbesian criminal and Hobbesian rebel.  The resisting criminal is thus a crucial test 
case for delineating the limits of these liberties and therefore Hobbes’s theory of 
punishment is instructive if we wish to understand why there can be no right to rebel 
in the commonwealth. As will be explored below, early modern theories of 
punishment frequently made reference to a right to ‘punish’ tyrannical sovereigns; 
rebellion, in these theories, was an example of moral, rather than natural, punishment. 
As was explored in Chapters 1 and 2, Hobbes’s definition and account of the origin of 
the right to punish directly precludes interpreting the right along these lines. 
Nonetheless, the close connection forged by numerous early modern thinkers between 
                                                   
600 Burgess 1994, p. 64.  
601 Sreedhar 2010, p. 136.  
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rebellion and punishment, and rebellion and resistance, means that the status and rights 
of Hobbesian criminals is an important means of shedding light on the question of 
legitimate rebellion in his commonwealth.  
It is important to note at the outset that this examination is concerned with the 
importance of the theoretical right to rebel, rather than with the practical realities of 
something that Hobbes recognised as a real possibility. In Chapter 30 of Leviathan 
Hobbes writes that, as widespread acceptance of the sovereign’s rights ‘cannot be 
maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legall punishment,’ it is one of his crucial 
duties to ‘diligently, and truly’ teach the basis of the rights of sovereignty.602 That it 
is the responsibility of the ruler to prevent conditions of rebellion is made more explicit 
later in the same chapter, when Hobbes writes that acts such as the ‘instruction of the 
people’ are ‘not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger 
that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.’603  
Just as a poor understanding of the foundations of the state is one possible 
cause of revolt, it is clear that Hobbes also felt that sovereign mismanagement could 
lead to a ‘Commotion’ inspired by ‘great provocation…great fear, great need,’ a case 
that will be dealt with below.604 However, while Hobbes saw rebellion as a possibility, 
and one that places obligations upon the sovereign according to natural law, this fact 
does not  in and of itself imply a correlative right to rebel among subjects when the 
                                                   
602 Hobbes 2012, p.  522. In Behemoth Hobbes notes that one of the causes of the civil war was 
that ‘the people in general were so ignorant of their duty, as that not one perhaps of ten thousand 
knew what right any man had to command him, or what necessity there was of King or 
Commonwealth, for which he was to part with his money against his will.’ While the civil wars 
had numerous causes, one of these was undoubtedly Charles’s failure to fulfil his sovereign 
obligations. For this, he was rewarded with the natural punishment of rebellion. Hobbes 2010, pp. 
110-1.   
603 Hobbes 2012, p. 524. 
604 Hobbes 2012, p.  544. Again, we see Hobbes applying his theory to his analysis of English 
history when he writes that a further cause of the initial rebellion was the desperation of  men ‘that 
had able bodies but no meanes how  honestly to get their bread. These longed for a warre, and 
hoped to maintaine themselues hereafter by the lucky choosing of a party to side with.’ Hobbes 
2010, p. 110.  
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sovereign fails in these obligations. The point is succinctly made by Terry Heinrichs 
when he argues that ‘to suggest that the sovereign would not attempt to immiserate his 
subjects because they might rebel is not to say that they have a right to rebel by 
withdrawing their authorization if he does.’605  
While the presence of a right to rebel is a minority position within the literature 
on Hobbes, and despite the convincing argument that rebellion in a Hobbesian state 
would, be practically speaking, ineffective,606 it is nonetheless important to take the 
idea seriously. As we shall see, such a right is often presented as an outgrowth either 
of those retained liberties of subjects which Hobbes repeatedly insists upon throughout 
his works, or from the basic principles which underpin such liberties. Examining the 
supposed right to rebel can help us to understand what, if any, limits have been placed 
on these retained rights. A better understanding of the extent of these rights will in 
turn shed light not only on Hobbes’s intentions for his project, but also help us, as 
modern readers, to avoid the anachronistic tendency to read a more liberal Hobbes into 
the text than is actually to be found.  
Hobbes was deeply aware of those political theories which permitted rebellion 
under certain circumstances. By setting his account of resistance rights, or the true 
liberties of subjects, alongside such theories, this chapter aims to not only demonstrate 
that the idea of a right to rebel found within the works is internally incoherent, but that 
                                                   
605 Heinrichs 1984, p. 658. It is important to remember in this context that any right correlating to 
the sovereign’s obligation would be, according to Hobbes’s account of natural law, held by God 
rather than the people. Hobbes repeatedly insists that if the sovereign breaks the natural laws, he 
is to be held accountable by God alone; thus in Chapter 21of Leviathan we read that David’s killing 
of Uriah was ‘against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie’ and as a result was ‘not an 
Injurie to Uriah; but to God…because David was Gods subject.’ Hobbes 2012, p. 330. 
606 See Chapter 2 of Baumgold 1988. See also Zagorin 2009, p. 84 on the sovereign’s continued 
security in the face of subjects’ resistance rights, Abizadeh 2013, p. 150 on subjects’ resistance as 
‘hopeless’, and Kraus 1993, pp. 179-180, who argue that rebels, even in large groups, are likely to 
be deterred by the combined force of the power of the sovereign and the risk inherent in returning 
to the state of nature.  
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key elements of Hobbes’s political theory were specifically designed to forestall the 
most common arguments in favour of such a right, as they were being developed in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
 
Early Modern Resistance Theories 1: Individual Rights against Usurpers 
The question of whether subjects had a right to rebel, and if so, under what 
circumstances, was one that deeply occupied the political thinkers of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Distinctions were frequently drawn between different 
categories of rebels and different types of targets. One of the most common 
legitimising strategies we find in this period is the argument that, while rebellion 
against a subject’s legitimate, though tyrannical, king required specific provocations 
and processes to be lawful, action taken against a usurping power could, in the vast 
majority of cases, be carried out with right.  
This distinction between the usurping tyrant and the tyrant by conduct was 
longstanding.  In the Scriptum super Sententiis [Commentary on the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard] (1252-6) Aquinas discusses the ‘Obedience owed by Christians to the 
Secular Power and in particular to Tyrants’. In outlining his argument, Aquinas 
distinguishes two ways in which a king’s authority can be recognised as lacking divine 
sanction: there can be ‘defects’ regarding ‘the way in which authority has been 
obtained, or in consequence of the use which is made of it.’ When authority is 
‘acquired…through violence, or simony or some other illegal method’ there is in fact 
no ‘legitimate authority’ and ‘it is permissible, when occasion offers, for a person to 
reject such authority.’607 Aquinas, echoing Cicero, claims that ‘one who liberates his 
                                                   
607 Aquinas 1970, p. 183. 
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country by killing a tyrant is to be praised and rewarded’608 A century later the 
Commentator Bartolus of Sassoferrato would, in his influential treatise De tyranno 
[On the Tyrant] (1356-7), draw on both Roman law and Aristotelian political theory 
to outline the contrast between these two categories.609 According to Bartolus, kings 
can be labelled tyrannical by ‘defect of title’ or ‘on the part of exercise.’ Their 
categorisation according to this framework should in turn determine their legal 
treatment; usurpers are to be judged according to the Roman law of treason, while 
tyrants by conduct are not.610 
Thus when Suárez writes in Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore [A Treatise 
on Laws and God the Lawgiver] (1612) that it is ‘ordinarily…asserted’ that tyrants 
who have acquired their title through illegitimate means may be slain by any private 
individual, he is referring to a distinction that would have been well known to his 
readers.611 In making the claim that ‘the crime of lese-majesty is not committed against 
a tyrant of this sort, since no true majesty resides in him’, Suárez refers to Aquinas’s 
assertion that in such situations the object of the rebellion is not a king at all, but is 
                                                   
608 Aquinas 1970, p. 185. Cicero 1991, p. 107, states that the ‘Roman people…deems that deed 
[killing a tyrant] the fairest of all splendid deeds.’ 
609 Julius Kirshner has noted that De tyranno, while part of a larger series of political writings, was 
read and circulated as an independent tract. He suggests that this text is ‘the first, and remarkably, 
only monograph by a medieval jurist on tyrants’ and that its reception history indicates the work’s 
wide influence among fifteenth and sixteenth century jurists. Kirshner 2006, p. 303.  
610 Bartolus 2012. The Lex Julia on treason is relatively sparse, and simply punishes treason with 
death. However the discussion of perduellio, as we saw in the previous chapter, emphasises the 
crime’s particular heinousness. Watson 1998b, pp. 316-8. On Bartolus’s theory of tyranny, see 
Maiolo 2007, pp. 139-40. Constantin Fasolt has suggested that Bartolus’s theory, in emphasising 
the difference between the two types of tyranny, was an outcome of his earlier claim that individual 
city-states had the right to create their own law. As a consequence, tyrants could no longer simply 
be identified by their conduct in disregarding the law. Fasolt 2014, pp. 482-3.  
611 As Höpfl 2004, p. 315 notes, among Jesuit theorists tyrannicide, and the cases in which it might 
be legitimate, was ‘simply another conventional topic’ of academic discussion, and its treatment 
in their treatises was routine. 
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rather to be understood as an ‘enemy of the state.’612 As such, he is subject to 
legitimate violence by all individual members of the political community. 
We see the same approach in the writings of sixteenth century Huguenot 
theorists. In Theodore Beza’s De iure magistratuum [On the Right of Magistrates] 
(1574) we read that ‘those who, by force or fraud, have usurped a power that does not 
belong to them by law are not legitimate kings.’613 Labelling such men ‘enemies’ and 
their actions an ‘attack’, Beza writes that in such cases, if individual appeals to 
legitimate magistrates fail, ‘each private citizen should exert all his strength to defend 
the legitimate institutions of his country…and to resist an individual whose authority 
is not legitimate because he would usurp, or has usurped, dominion in violation of the 
law.’614 Similarly, the author of the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (1579) notes that the 
tyrant ‘must be one who has either usurped command by force and deception, or one 
who rules the kingdom granted freely and voluntarily to him contrary to what is right 
and proper.’615  
In the Vindicae rights against the first kind of tyrant are, as in earlier accounts, 
framed in terms of self-defence against an individual lacking political legitimacy. The 
author argues that that ‘natural law teaches us to preserve and protect our life and 
liberty …against all force and injustice’, while the ius gentium fixes borders ‘which 
everyone is bound to defend against anyone at all.’ Finally, the civil law obliges men 
to ‘resist him [who] violates the society to which he owes everything…[and] 
undermines the country.’616 Thus it is according to the ‘laws of nature, of nations, and 
                                                   
612 Suárez 1944, p. 711. Suárez also cites commentators, such as Conradus Brunus, who followed 
Aquinas in this line of argument. He does not, however, cite Bartolus on this topic.  
613 Beza 1969, p. 105.  
614 Beza 1969, pp. 105, 107.  
615 Brutus 1994, p. 140. While the body of the text does not cite Bartolus, there is a marginal note 
on this page to De tyranno.  
616 Brutus 1994, pp. 149-50.  
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the civil law’ that ‘it is lawful for any private person to oust this sort of tyrant.’617 
Implicit in these accounts is the assumption that the usurper is at war with the nation, 
and may even be an enemy of all mankind. Both Beza and the author of the Vindiciae 
make use of the Ciceronian tale of Diomedes and Alexander the Great in which, in 
Beza’s version, the captured pirate asks of the conqueror ‘What difference is there 
between you and me, except that you rob the whole world with a great navy and I with 
but a single ship?’618 
This theory, which focused on the implications of the usurper’s having no 
legitimate legal authority, constructed the right to resist directly out of individuals’ 
right to self-defence. By the time we reach the seventeenth century, however, this 
direct correlation was challenged by those who considered the right to rebel one which 
could only ever be located in the community as a whole. Turning back to Suárez’s 
account, we find him unhappy with this relatively straightforward classification, as it 
appeared to empower the individual rebel at the expense of the political community.619 
Suárez’s account of the legitimacy of resisting usurpers is thus an attempt to reconcile 
                                                   
617 Brutus 1994, p. 150. The author notes that an individual who attempts to remove a tyrant of this 
sort is not subject to the ‘Julian law on high treason’, as ‘he who attacks the 
commonwealth…without any basis in right, is not a prince; nor is he who defends his country with 
arms a traitor.’  
618 Beza 1969, p. 105; Brutus 1994, p. 149. See also Cicero 2002, p. 67. As discussed in Chapter 
5, Cicero’s categorisation of pirates as enemies of all mankind made its way into early modern 
discussions of civil law. This story also makes an appearance in Augustine 1998, p. 148.  
619 In what follows I will employ Suárez as an exemplar of this school of thought; in making his 
argument in favour of, primarily, a collective right to rebel he draws on the authority of a long 
tradition of Scholastic theorists, including Dominigo de Soto and Luis de Molina. Suárez, as a late 
theorist of this tradition, is therefore a useful means of reflecting both on the tradition’s 
development, and on self-conscious differentiation from parallel theories of legitimate resistance. 
Suárez’s analysis, while representative, was however not universal. Juan de Mariana, for instance, 
in De rege et regis institutione [The King and the Education of the King] (1599) appears to argue 
that where no other option is possible, individuals have the right to kill both tyrants by title and 
tyrants by conduct. Skinner 1979, p. 437 argues on this basis that Mariana can be understood as 
one of the originators of a theory of popular sovereignty. On Mariana’s theory of tyrannicide and 
its departures from standard Scholastic arguments, see also Braun 2007, pp. 80-91, which argues 
that while Mariana does present a more radical theory than his contemporaries, his is somewhat 
inconsistent and ‘invites multiple interpretations.’ On Jesuit theories of tyrannicide more broadly, 
see Höpfl 2004, pp. 314-320.   
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his own broader theory of the right to rebel, which equates it with a right to punish 
located in the body of the people rather than in individual subjects, with the Thomist 
characterisation of the ‘true tyrant’ as an enemy of the state and actions taken against 
him as war.  
In order to achieve this, Suárez concedes that resistance against usurpers is 
indeed best characterised as war, rather than rebellion. He suggests that, because a 
tyrant of this kind is ‘inflicting continual and actual violence upon the state as long as 
he unjustly retains the royal power by force,’ the state over which he rules ‘continually 
wages against him an actual or virtual war, not vengeful in its character…but 
defensive.’620 By definition individual actions against this enemy cannot be considered 
crimes carried out against the majesty of the sovereign. But they are nonetheless to be 
considered instances of usurpation and injustice, as there is no individual right to wage 
war in this way. Suárez is therefore able to assimilate the Thomist recognition of the 
usurper’s enemy status with a rejection of absolute individual right based on self-
defence.  
Nonetheless, Suárez suggests that, due to the state of war in which the larger 
community finds itself, there is a means to legitimise individual actions. He argues 
that the ‘public power’ which is always required to take action against tyrants, of 
whatever variety, is in such cases ‘considered to have been entrusted to every private 
individual’.621 Thus any act against a usurping power, even if carried out by an 
individual, is to be understood not only as an act of defensive war, but also as a 
manifestation of the public power inherent in the civil population as a whole. 
Therefore even among those thinkers who resisted the idea of an individual right 
                                                   
620 Suárez 1944, p. 716.  
621 Ibid. Emphasis mine.  
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against sovereigns, there was an impetus to contingently locate in individual subjects 
a right to challenge usurpers.622  
This is also the one type of ‘rebellion’ which Hobbes appears, at least 
temporarily, to endorse. Moreover, his argument parallels the Thomist/Huguenot 
construction in which the usurper is viewed as an enemy, with actions against him 
lawfully undertaken by any member of the community. In the argument provided in 
De Cive against the assertion that ‘Tyrannicide is lawfull’ Hobbes notes that ‘he, 
whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or 
without Right; if without Right, he is an enemy [hostis], and by right, to be put to 
death; but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant, but an enemy’.623 In 
designating those ruling without right as enemies, Hobbes appears to be conceding 
some ground to those who would justify certain forms of rebellion, a realisation which 
may have led him to omit the point in the parallel discussion in Leviathan. Indeed, 
Hobbes’s overarching argument throughout his political writing, that sovereigns 
derive their continued right to rule from their ability to protect their subjects,624 would 
suggest that for him the category of a hostis ruling without right would essentially 
consist only of those who, after seizing power, make an ineffective pretence of 
                                                   
622 In differentiating between authority, which is public, and power, which is private or individual, 
Suárez’s account is distinct from those, such as Beza’s, which insist that actions by individuals are 
only to be undertaken if representative magistrates are unable or unwilling to do so.   
623 Hobbes 1983, pp. 147-8.  
624 In Chapter 21 of Leviathan we read that as the ‘end of Obedience is Protection…wheresoever 
a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it.’ In the 
Review and Conclusion, Hobbes goes further and suggests that ignorance of this principle poses a 
risk to the commonwealth, with sovereigns attempting to ‘justifie the War, by which their Power 
was at first gotten.’ Such a task will nearly always fail, as ‘there is scarce a Common-wealth in the 
world, whose beginning in conscience can be justified’, and hence such discourses of legitimacy 
undermine civil power.  Hobbes 2012, pp.  344, 1135. As Quentin Skinner has noted, Hobbes’s 
arguments should be seen in the wider context of mid-seventeenth century de-factoist tracts; the 
claim that all nations have unjust origins is, for instance, also found in George Wither’s Respublica 
Angliana (1650) and the anonymous Excerciation Answered (1650). Skinner 2002, p. 250. On 
Hobbes’s de-facto theory of rule, see Hoekstra 2004.  
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ruling.625 Such a conception of the tyrannical hostis is sufficiently removed from the 
accepted category of the true tyrant that it was no doubt wise of Hobbes to avoid 
repeating this ambiguous statement.626  
For Suárez true tyrants could be resisted or removed by private individuals and 
according to private judgement, though not on private authority. According to the 
earlier Thomist and Huguenot traditions, usurpation rendered one vulnerable to 
legitimate violence from all sides. However, the case of those rulers whose sovereignty 
was legitimate yet who ruled in a tyrannical manner was more complicated; it is in 
debating the correct response to tyrannical conduct, rather than simple usurpation, that 
that we find truly competing arguments over the location or object of the right to rebel, 
and over the right’s origins and relationship to punishment theory. In contrast to 
discussions of usurpers, it was commonly argued that rebellion against a tyrant by 
conduct required the exercise of a right inherent in the collective body of a 
commonwealth. The idea that such a right could be located in individuals, on the other 
hand, was, and was seen to be, a minority position. Importantly, it was this collective 
right which Hobbes structured his theory to undermine. I will therefore outline the 
arguments which were made for this collective or group right, before turning to 
Hobbes’s argument against not only its existence, but its logical possibility. 
Despite this group right being Hobbes’s own theoretical target, many of the 
arguments made for the existence of a Hobbesian right to rebel, both early modern and 
                                                   
625 See Holmes 2010, pp. 382-3 in which such sovereign behaviour is categorised as ‘desertion’.  
626 Hobbes was not the only writer of the seventeenth century to dismiss the importance of a 
distinction between those who come to power ‘legitimately’ and those who do not. John Milton’s 
assertion that ‘A Tyrant whether by wrong or right comming to the Crown, is he who regarding 
neither Law nor the common good, reigns onely for himselfe and his faction’ makes a similar 
conceptual move, though for a very different purpose. Milton 1649, p. 19. We see similar 
sentiments in John Ponet’s charge that whether they come into power ‘either by usurpation, or by 
election, or by succession’ what matters is whether a ruler ‘seeketh onely, or chiefly, his own profit 
and pleasure’. Ponet 1642, p. 46. On Milton’s use of Ponet see Lim 2000.  
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contemporary, assume that such a right is best understood as one which adheres to the 
individual, even if the consequence of this individual right is collective action. 
Therefore, after examining Hobbes’s response to the idea of a right to rebel located in 
‘the people,’ I will analyse the ways in which the project to construct a Hobbesian 
right to rebel from individual rights emerges from, but critically misunderstands, his 
characterisation of the true liberties of subjects.  
 
Early Modern Resistance Theories 2: The People’s Right Against Tyrants 
Usurpers could be considered ‘true tyrants’ due to the illegitimate means through 
which they acquired power. But when it came to ‘true kings,’ this label could be earned 
by specific actions. Thus Christopher Goodman, in How Superior Powers Oght to be 
Obeyed (1558), writes that  
where as the kinges or Rulers are become altogether blasphemers 
of God, and oppressors and murtherers of their subjectes, then oght 
they to be [accounted] no more for kinges or lawfull Magistrates, 
but as priuate men: and to be examined, accused, condemned and 
punished by the Lawe of God.627 
 
Goodman repeats the point when he argues that it is better to have no ruler at all than 
one who behaves as a tyrant. He conflates the two situations by suggesting that, 
following such behaviour, ‘they [tyrannical kings] are no more publik persons, 
contemning their publik auctoritie in vsing it agaynst the Lawes, but are to be taken of 
all men, as priuate persons, and so examyned and punished.’628 To have a tyrant for a 
king, then, is precisely the same as to have no king at all, and any individual who 
remains on the throne following tyrannical behaviour is to be understood as a private 
                                                   
627 Goodman 1931, p. 139.   
628 Goodman 1931, pp. 187-8.  
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man usurping power.629 Among some writers, tyrannical conduct was thus itself a form 
of usurpation. Describing this alternative tradition, Suárez notes that according to 
proto-Protestant theologians John Huss and John Wycliffe ‘temporal lords lost their 
supremacy ipso facto, in consequence of any mortal sin whatsoever, and could be 
rebuked at will by their subjects, on that ground.’ He points out that one possible 
consequence of such an approach is that ‘a king ruling in a tyrannical fashion might be 
slain by any private subject whatsoever, either on the ground of just vengeance and 
punishment, or on the ground of just defence, whether of the subject himself or of the 
state.’630  
A version of this argument is found in George Buchanan’s De Jure Regni Apud 
Scotos [The Powers of the Crown in Scotland], published in 1579 but probably 
composed in the late 1560s.  Buchanan draws on the theory of the usurping tyrant as 
an enemy and, through a broad understanding of usurpation, applies this label to all 
tyrants. He writes that while there is a difference between those who seize power and 
those ‘chosen by popular election’, 631 any ruler who ‘bestows nothing of fatherly care 
upon his people, but oppresses them with arrogant mastery’ and  ‘who thinks his 
people are not given to him to be guarded but to be exploited’ is in fact ‘usurping the 
name of a king.’632 Such men are, through their own actions, ‘not united with the rest 
of us by any bond of common citizenship or of humanity.’633 The punishment of such 
tyrants is therefore legitimate and proper. Buchanan does make reference to the role 
                                                   
629 As Skinner 1979, pp. 230, 236-7 emphasises, once a tyrannical king is taken to be a private 
citizen, individuals have, from their individual covenants with God to ensure godly rule in the 
commonwealth, both a right and a duty to punish him. These arguments justifying individual action 
against tyrants, Skinner notes, are characteristic of the innovations made by English thinkers of 
the later 1550s, including Knox and Ponet.  
630 Suárez 1944, p. 707.  
631 Buchanan 1949, p. 91.   
632 Buchanan 1949, p. 94.  
633 Buchanan 1949, p. 93. In contrast to Goodman’s references to God and sin, Buchanan’s rhetoric 
is strikingly Ciceronian. See Dzelainis 2012.  
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played by the community as a whole in the original social contract, noting that all 
‘peoples which give allegiance to rulers whom they have chosen hold this common 
conviction, that the people may, for just cause, demand that any power they have 
committed to anyone shall be given back to them’.634 But this does not mean that the 
rights of punishment and resistance are located uniquely in this community. When 
faced with tyrants, it is right not only for ‘the whole people to destroy an enemy, but 
for the individual to do so.’635  
The right of the individual to resist a tyrant by conduct thus rests on a series of 
connected claims: that the tyrant, through has actions, has lost his status as a legitimate 
monarch; that there is an individual right, and in some cases duty, to act against 
usurpers of public power; and that such actions can be classified not merely as self-
defence, but also as punishment. Among those who, in contrast, locate the right to resist 
tyranny in the collective body of the people and not in individual subjects we see a 
strict maintenance of the difference between the two forms of tyranny; an account of 
the institution of the sovereign which emphasises the location of political sovereignty 
in the people as a whole; and a corresponding argument that the term ‘punishment’ 
cannot be used to describe actions taken by individual subjects against their ruler, 
however tyrannical the latter may be.636  
In arguing against an individually-located right to resist tyranny, Suárez 
contends that such claims fundamentally misunderstand the right of punishment. 
Following Augustine and echoing the Conciliarist tradition discussed in Chapter 2, he 
                                                   
634 Buchanan 1949, pp. 123-4. 
635 Buchanan 1949, p. 143. As Skinner 1979, p. 343 points out, there is no necessary contradiction 
here. According to Buchanan, the people as a whole have contracted with their future sovereign, 
instituting him in order to protect individual rights and not simply the common good. As a result, 
both the people as a whole and individuals can point to a right to resist.  
636 As Baumgold 1988, pp. 21-3 notes, in the early modern period the term ‘private rights’ was 
normally used to refer to non-sovereign rights located in the collective body of the people and its 
representatives, rather than those rights held by individuals.  
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argues that it is never permitted to slay anyone without public authorisation, and that 
therefore ‘the power of avenging or punishing offences resides, not in private 
individuals but in their superior or in the whole of a perfect community.’637 According 
to this version of the theory, as we saw, the right to punish is never held by individuals 
either in the state of nature or in the commonwealth. Even the demotion of a king to 
private person cannot sanction his killing by an ordinary citizen. As a result, ‘a private 
person who on that ground slays his prince, usurps a jurisdiction and power which he 
does not rightfully posses; and therefore, he sins against justice.’638 In such situations 
there is no genuine state of war to justify the implicit authorisation of individuals; as a 
result, the removal of a tyrant by conduct can only be framed as punishment rather than 
self-defence, and thus lacks any legitimate foundation.639   
As Suárez observes, the question of who has the authority to punish ‘private’ 
wrongdoing is intimately connected with the question of who has the authority to 
determine what constitutes tyrannical behaviour and rebel against it, While there is no 
necessary correlation between a theory positing a pre-social, or natural, right to punish 
and an individual right to rebel,640 Suárez’s overview and analysis reminds us that 
                                                   
637 See Chapter 2 for an overview of Suárez’s account of the origins of the right to punish.  
638 Suárez 1944, pp. 708-12.  
639 This stance is logically consistent with the one case in which Suárez thinks that individuals may 
take action against a tyrant by conduct. Where a prince is actively attempting to destroy the state 
and slaughter its citizens, he is usurping sovereign power and ‘the state or commonwealth itself is 
in that case engaged in a just defensive war against an unjust invader, even though he be its own 
king.’ In such cases, as in the case of the true tyrant, an individual may act in whatever manner is 
required to defend the commonwealth, ‘even by slaying him if defence cannot be achieved in any 
other fashion.’ However Suárez notes that the case of rebellion which he is actively considering, 
and which requires the most thoughtful justification, is not of this type as it involves misrule, but 
not war. Suárez 1944, p. 710.     
640 Grotius, for example, as we saw posits a natural and pre-social right to punish, but does not 
argue that following the creation of the commonwealth this is necessarily retained, either by the 
individual or in the collective. As he writes in Grotius 2005, pp. 260-1 ‘we must reject their 
Opinion, who will have the Supreme Power to be always, and without Exception, in the People; 
so that they may restrain or punish their Kings, as often as they abuse their Power’ because, 
according to both Roman and Hebrew law, it is lawful for both men and communities to ‘transfer 
the Right of governing them upon him or them, without reserving any share of that Right 
themselves.’ Any retained right, therefore, must be built into the original transfer of right, rather 
than remaining, by definition, with the community as a whole or with individuals. See Ascham 
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among early modern theorists of the state it was recognised that the sword of justice 
was double-edged. Determining the location of the original right to punish, then, was 
crucial in concluding how it could be employed in the most politically extreme of 
circumstances. In outlining the location and application of the right as collective, 
Suárez notes that in order for the people to exercise it, rather than individuals, certain 
procedures must be followed. He writes that ‘the state, acting as a whole, and in 
accordance with the public and general deliberations of its communities and leading 
men, may depose’ a tyrannical prince.641 He argues that such a process is licit through 
Roman private law, which allows for the use of force against force (vim vi repellere 
licet). More strikingly, however, he also justifies the right by noting that in such 
circumstances rebellion is necessary for ‘the very preservation of the state’, and as such 
represents an exception to ‘that original agreement by which the state transferred its 
power to the king.’ 642 Rebellion, therefore, is not simply presented as a reactive right; 
it is one built into the transfer of right upon which the magistrate’s power is based, and 
represents the employment of a retained right to punish located in the community as a 
whole.643  
                                                   
1649, p. 121 for a reading of Grotius which emphasises this aspect of his thought. While Grotius 
rejects outright any right of rebellion on the basis of punishment, he is more ambiguous with 
regards to rights of resistance grounded in self-defence. Thus while he argues that if a 
‘promiscuous Right of Resistance should be allowed, there would be no longer a State, but a 
Multitude without Union’ and suggests that ‘when People are thus oppressed, they should cry unto 
GOD for help’, he nonetheless provides some allowance for individuals, and even groups, in the 
‘last Extremity’ to resist their sovereign. Grotius 2005, pp.  338-9, 343-4, 358. On Grotius and 
resistance, see Straumann 2015, pp. 202-6 and Tuck 1993, p. 200.  
641 As Braun 2007, p. 85 points out, Mariana’s account of tyrannicide also assumes that the initial 
response to tyranny will be public deliberation and deposition of the sovereign; it is only when 
such meetings are prevented that individuals gain the right to act on their own authority.  
642 Suárez 1944, p. 718.  
643 We see the same argument made by Almain when he adds as a corollary to his theory of 
punishment, in which the right is held by the community, that ‘The whole community has power 
over a prince constituted by it, by means of which, if the king rules not to the edification but to the 
destruction of the polity, it can depose him, otherwise it would not have the sufficient power to 
preserve itself.’ Almain 1997, p. 137.  
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Suárez repeats this point in a later chapter, arguing that sedition is intrinsically 
evil; he notes that when ‘the state as a whole’ rises ‘in revolt’ against a tyrant, this act 
should not be considered a form of sedition, and hence not blameable. In this case, ‘the 
state, as a whole, is superior to the king, for the state, when it granted him his power, 
is held to have granted it’ upon a series of conditions. The most important of these is 
that ‘he should govern in accord with the public weal, and not tyrannically; and that, if 
he did not govern thus, he might be deposed from that position of power.’644  
This Scholastic theory of rebellion thus rests on three connected assumptions: 
first, that there exists a body, termed the state, people or perfect community, which is 
able to act; second, that the transfer of power from this people to the ruler takes place 
upon certain conditions; and third, that if these conditions are broken, this pre-political 
body retains a right to depose the ruler from his position. This last step is to be 
considered a form of punishment, and not simply self-defence. Because this right was 
located in the people and not in each individual member of the community, certain 
deliberative means of determining that the act really was authorised by the collective, 
as opposed to simply being the will of an individual, became necessary.  
 
Early Modern Resistance Theories 3: Corporation Theory and the Hobbesian 
Response 
It is in the work of French Huguenot polemicists that this Scholastic model of the 
people’s authority is combined with a Roman law account of the means by which a 
collective right is to be located and lawfully exercised. Over the course of François 
Hotman’s Francogallia (1573), Beza’s De jure magistratuum [The Right of 
Magistrates] (1574) and the pseudonymous Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos: Or, 
                                                   
644 Suárez 1944, p. 855 
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concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a 
prince (1579) we find the argument that rights, including the right to depose a 
sovereign, can be exercised by the representatives of a state or community due to the 
latter’s essentially corporate character. It is this insight to which Henry Parker would 
turn in order to claim Parliament’s right of rebellion and governance during the 
English civil war, and which Hobbes would ultimately appropriate and empty of all 
revolutionary potential.  
The last and most representative of these treatises, the Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos, sets out the problem clearly: in arguing that not only is it ‘lawful for Israel 
to resist, if the king is overturning the law or the church of God’ but that ‘Israel’ has a 
duty to do so, the author considers the problem of how a ‘rushing multitude’ is to 
either decide upon or carry out such acts.645 His solution is to turn to the capacity of 
the people as a whole to act through their representatives: ‘When we speak of the 
people, we mean those who have received authority from the people.’646 These men 
are ‘the magistrates’ who, while ‘inferior to the king’ are ‘chosen by the people, or 
constituted in some other way…they represent the people the whole assembled 
people.’647 It is these magistrates rather than the king or private individuals who, 
because of this representative capacity, have the right to determine when the people 
has decided that their monarch is behaving tyrannously, and that the collective will is 
to depose him.  
In phrasing that would be echoed by both Suárez and, later, Parker, the text 
asserts that while ‘As individuals the officers are inferiors to the king…all together as 
                                                   
645 Brutus 1994, pp. 45-6. The authorship of the Vindiciae is unknown; while most scholarship 
attributes the text to Philippe Du Plessis Mornay, George Garnett suggests that the text is most 
probably a collaboration between Mornay and Hubert Languet.  
646 Brutus 1994, p. 46.  
647 Brutus 1994, p. 47. 
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a whole they are his superiors’ and that ‘he who accepts authority from any assembly 
is inferior to that assembly although superior to the individuals.’648 For this balance to 
be struck, only the acts of the inferior magistrates, not those of the king or of the 
‘rushing multitude’, are to be understood as the true acts of the people as a whole. 
These magistrates, then, act with a collective right, rather than as individuals, and it is 
this fact which renders their actions legitimate.  
In explaining how this is possible, the Huguenot theorists drew on the work of 
the Medieval Commentators, and in particular on a theory of political corporations 
developed by Bartolus of Sassoferrato and his student, Baldus de Ubaldis. As Joseph 
Canning has argued, these fourteenth century jurists were crucial in developing an 
understanding of the sovereign populus as a corporate unity in two major ways. The 
first was in assigning this corporate unity, or universitas, an existence distinct from its 
collective members. Drawing on the Pauline discourse of the corpus misticum, used 
to describe the body of the church, Baldus is able to distinguish between the populus’s 
abstract existence as an organised corporation, and its material reality as a group of 
individuals. As Canning writes, ‘Baldus is careful to define the populus as a collection 
of men into a corpus misticum.’649 As a result, the populus is able to will and act in 
ways which are distinct from the the wills and actions of individuals within the state. 
Secondly, these jurists argued that this abstract corporate body was itself a persona 
and ‘thus arrived at the concept of the legal person.’650 In making this claim the jurists, 
while drawing on the Roman law language of persons, applied it in new ways The 
persona of the people, as a result, could be described as engaging in various activities 
and having rights which were available to persons under Roman private law. 
                                                   
648 Brutus 1994, p. 48.  
649 Canning 1980, p. 13. On the innovations by Bartolus and Baldus, see also Canning 1987, pp. 
185-203 and Canning 2011, pp. 153-4.  
650 Canning 1980, p. 15.  
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Importantly for the account of sovereignty and resistance, this included ownership, 
including over the commonwealth itself.  
Crucially, this account of the corporate universitas argues that this new legal 
person is able to act without the intervention of external agents, through popular 
assemblies and the appointment of representatives.651 These men, when acting in their 
representative capacity, are termed universi, to distinguish from their actions as 
individuals, or singuli.652 When it does appoint such representatives, the universitas is 
always to be understood as legally superior to these inferior officers; similarly, Baldus 
notes that the people can be understood as the dominus, or master, of its rector, or 
governor.653 Thus despite the appointment of various officers of the state, these only 
act with the authority of the universitas as a whole. Furthermore, the latter is able, in 
its capacity as a legal person, to turn to civil law procedures to ensure that its 
ownership is respected. It is to this theory of corporation to which the Vindiciae refers 
when it notes of Israel that when it entered into agreement with God, the community 
was able to act as a ‘single person’ because of its status as a ‘corporation of men.’654 
In its relations with the king, the people take on the same role, and are able to claim a 
collective right of perpetual legal ownership over the commonwealth. As such, 
Huguenot theory asserts that even when the king is in possession of sovereignty, and 
is thus maior singulis, he is nonetheless minor universis.655 When this sovereignty is 
not used for the purposes for which it was intended, the ‘vindicators’ of the 
                                                   
651 Canning 1980, p. 27.  
652 Canning 1987, p. 187.  
653 Canning 1980, pp. 29-30.  
654 Brutus 1994, p. 38. 
655 Brutus 1994, p. 156. On the ways in which Huguenot theorists used Roman private law, and 
particularly the law of ownership, to supplement those arguments built on the lex regia and transfer 
of imperium see Lee 2008. Lee argues that the most prominent set of legal ideas in these treatises 
is that of dominium and the related right of vindicare, available to owners not currently in 
possession of their property. See also Baumgold 2010, p. 30 on the use of Roman private law in 
resistance theories.  
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commonwealth ‘fight against the tyrant on the basis of their office and supported by 
their authority’. This action is undertaken ‘not [by] individuals [singuli], but all 
together as a whole [universi]’, with those challenging the king in the position of ‘lords 
[domini] who are seen to demand an account [ratio] of his deeds from their agent.’656 
In presenting this agreement as taking place between the people as a corporate 
entity, though their representative magistrates, these theorists were also able to argue 
against any individual right to resist tyrants by conduct. As the author of the Vindiciae 
argues, ‘it is not individuals who constitute a prince, but all do so together as a whole 
[universi].’ As a result, any decision to resist a tyrant by conduct requires the 
‘command of all together—of those, that is, who represent all together as a whole in 
the kingdom.’ The people is, despite being in legal fact the dominus of sovereign 
power, akin to a ward in that it cannot act without the ‘agency’ of its tutors, the 
magistrates.657  
That Hotman, Beza and the author of the Vindiciae would have drawn on the 
work of medieval corporation theory is unsurprising. The legal training of Beza and 
Hotman at the University of Orléans provided them with a background in the Bartolist 
School of jurisprudence. Hotman would go on to criticise the Bartolists as 
‘barbarians’, but as Donald Kelley argues, he nonetheless was influenced by this 
practice of ‘applying civil law to practical problems.658 In doing so, he helped to set 
the tone and argumentative strategies of the most important Huguenot tracts.659 
                                                   
656 Brutus 1994, p. 157-8.  
657 Brutus 1994, pp. 168-9. That argument that the Huguenot resistance theorists were drawing on 
Roman law concepts of corporation and representation, and that these in turn enabled them to 
restrict the right to rebel against tyrants by conduct to magistrates, or universi, has been challenged 
by McLaren 2006. McLaren argues that the author of the Vindiciae did not distinguish between 
different types of tyrants at all, and as a result intended a much broader individual right against 
tyrants than has been presented here. However, see Garnett 2006 for a convincing rebuttal.  
658 Kelley 1973, pp. 26, 184.  
659 See Giesey 1970 for discussion of the ways in which Beza and the author of the Vindiciae build 
on, and depart from, the central arguments of the Francogallia.  
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This account of legitimate resistance, in which the people’s sovereignty could 
be asserted through their representatives, quickly gained traction in England in the 
first half of the seventeenth century. By the 1640s both advocates and critics of 
parliamentarian arguments made reference to this French legacy. In his 1642 tract A 
Persuasion to Loyalty, or the Subjects Dutie the royalist David Owen accused the 
members of the Long Parliament of being influenced by, and even explicitly repeating, 
Huguenot arguments.This trend continued in 1643, with the publications of Henry 
Hammond’s Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistracie, John Bramhall’s The Serpant-
Salve; or a Remedie for the biting of an Asp and The Discovery of Mysteries by Griffith 
Williams. Such accusations were hardly unfounded. In 1643 William Prynne 
published Sovereign Power of Parliaments, which not only made reference to 
Huguenot theory, but also included, as an appendix, an English translation of the third 
questio of the Vindiciae. In 1644 Samuel Rutherford would discuss the importance of 
the Vindiciae in Lex, Rex.660 By 1648 the full text of the Vindiciae was available in 
English translation, printed by Matthew Simmons and Robert Ibbitson. However the 
first of the parliamentarian writers to make use of these terms and concepts was Henry 
Parker, who used them to bolster his argument for parliamentary sovereignty.  
In his important pamphlet Observations upon some of his Majesties late 
Answers and Expresses (1642), Parker argues that the true source of sovereign power 
is not God but rather ‘the Pactions and agreements of such and such politique 
corporations’, or people understood as a single legal entity.661 Political power is, 
Parker explains ‘nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie 
contains in it selfe’662, and is granted to kings on ‘conditionate and fiduciary’ 
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grounds.663 He notes that if this analysis is correct, then ‘the King, though he be 
singulis Major, yet he is universis minor’ and the people may impose such limits as 
they please during his institution.664 Further echoing the Huguenot theorists, Parker 
notes that if the monarch himself becomes the source of ‘unnaturall destruction… a 
mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie’,665 they are not to be 
‘tryed…by any private parties.’666 Rather, ‘the whole community in its underived 
Majesty shall to do justice’667, and in Parker’s account ‘the whole community’ is 
represented in parliament. Thus when Parker states that ‘if the King will not joyne 
with the people, the people may without disloyalty save themselves’ he is not arguing 
for an individual right to resist a tyrannical king, but rather for a collective right 
exercised through parliament’s representative function.668  
John Ponet’s A Short Treatise of Politique Power, while originally published 
in 1556, was reprinted in London in the same year that Parker published his 
Observations. With its emphasis on the ‘conditionate and fiduciary’ nature of 
sovereign power, its appeal to the Parliamentary party is clear. According to Ponet, it 
is because ‘Kings, Princes and Governours have their authority of the people’ that the 
people may revoke this authorisation, just as ‘men may revoke their Proxies, and 
Letters of Atturney when it pleaseth them: much more, when they see their Proctors 
and Atturneys abuse it.’669 Nonetheless, in comparing these two pamphlets we can see 
the impact of the integration of corporation theory along Huguenot lines. In making 
his case for parliament’s authority over the king, Parker is able to draw on a theory in 
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which the collective body of the people has a legal and political status separate from 
their sovereign, with their own representatives within the commonwealth who are 
distinct from their ruler. Ponet, on the other hand, is firmly rooted in a traditional 
political discourse pre-dating the Huguenot works. Drawing on the long-established 
metaphor of the commonwealth as a body, he legitimises rebellion by arguing that 
while ‘Kings, Princes, and other Governours’ are ‘the heads of a politique body, yet 
they are not the whole body’; it is therefore the role of the people ‘to cut away an 
incurable member, which (being suffered) would destroy the whole.’670 
One of the innovations of this model, wherein the people are understood as a 
universitas or ‘politique corporation’, was its implication that certain rights could only 
be wielded through political representation. While a right might be employed by a 
private person, its correct use, by definition, reflected the representative nature of the 
individual in question. As a result, the model insists upon the existence of the subject 
of such rights: the person of the people is a perpetual legal entity, distinct from its 
sovereign and empowered to authorise its own separate representation. It was in 
response to this idea that Hobbes formulated his alternative account of the state as a 
corporation, in which not only can the person of the commonwealth only act through 
its sovereign representative, but a separate entity known as ‘the people’ has no legal 
or theoretical existence of its own.  
The definition of a right as a ‘blameless liberty of using [one’s] own natural 
power and ability’ provided in the Elements undergoes little modification in De Cive 
                                                   
670 Ibid. Emphasis mine. On the medieval representation of sovereignty as a corporation including 
the king, see Kantorowicz 1997, pp. 363-83. Ponet is here drawing on a Ciceronian image: in De 
Officiis Cicero writes of tyrants that ‘just as some limbes are amputated, if they begin to lose their 
blood and their life, as it were, and are harming the other parts of the body, similarly if the wildness 
and monstrousness of a beast appears in human form, it must be removed from the common 
humanity, so to speak, of the body.’ Cicero 1991, p. 111.  
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and Leviathan.671 As we saw in Chapter 2, Hobbes is resistant to the Scholastic idea 
that we can distinguish between two different types of rights: those which adhere to 
individuals, and those which are created through the institution of the community or 
state and hence belong to this new body alone. As was explored above, this dual 
understanding of rights is also implicit in the Bartolist/Huguenot construction: certain 
rights, such as dominum over the commonwealth, only make sense in relation to a 
perpetual universitas. For Hobbes, on the other hand, rights can be transferred, but this 
process does not in itself create any new civil rights beyond those which were already 
located in individuals. While Hobbes employs an incorporation model of the state, his 
version of the process of incorporation and its consequences is thus fundamentally 
different from those theorists we have examined above. As we saw in the Vindiciae, 
these theorists of resistance were concerned with the problem of the ‘rushing 
multitude.’ But this was primarily due to the question of how to attribute action to that 
multitude. There is no denial of the existence of the people as such, or of its unique 
capacity to exert legal rights of ownership. In Hobbes’s model, in contrast, the political 
representative is empowered by his capacity to employ the rights granted to him on an 
individual basis. This transfer in turn binds future subjects as individuals, rather than 
as a community; those rights which are retained despite this agreement, then, are 
located purely at the individual level.  
This emphasis on the individual nature of rights is reinforced by Hobbes’s 
conception of the person of the people. In contrast to the Scholastic, and subsequently 
Huguenot and Parliamentarian, model of incorporation, Hobbes rejects the political 
value of the initial common agreement to subsequently form a commonwealth in 
favour of the more important mutual covenant to be represented by the same 
                                                   
671 Hobbes 1969, p.71; Hobbes 1983, p. 47; Hobbes 2012, p. 198.  
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sovereign. It is only through the ‘Generation of that Great LEVIATHAN’ that ‘the 
Multitude’ is united in one Person.’672 This emphasis on the multitude as lacking 
coordination is a feature of all of Hobbes’s theoretical works. In the Elements we read 
that while ‘consent (or concord)’ is possible among men with a common purpose, such 
as ‘the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a present conquest, or booty’, this 
concord only lasts as long as ‘that action endureth.’ Inevitably, it will break down 
through the ‘diversity of judgements and passions in so many men contending 
naturally for honour and advantage one above another.’673 As a result, the multitude 
‘are many, and (as yet) not one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met 
together, be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the multitude.’674 
It is only through ‘some mutual and common fear to rule them’ that this collective can 
truly become a unity.675 Thus already by 1642 Hobbes stresses that it is only through 
the unity of a common ruling power that anything resembling a ‘BODY POLITIC’ or 
‘civil society’ can exist.676 Hobbes explains that it is precisely because of this inability 
of concord to evolve naturally into unity that there can be no agreement between ‘a 
multitude, considered as one aggregate’ and a future ruler. Such an agreement, Hobbes 
argues, assumes the presence of unity, and hence sovereignty, where it can never be 
found.677  
Hobbes’s strategy against his Parliamentarian opponents is to lay claim to their 
terminology, yet put it to very different use. Thus we read in the Elements that the 
‘person civil’ is, in contrast to the multitude, a unity of individual wills.678 Hobbes 
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expands on this definition in De Cive where he writes that a ‘union thus made [through 
the submission of all individual wills to that of a single man or council] is called a City 
[civitas] or civill society, [societas civilis] and also a civill Person [persona civilis].’679 
Like the persona of the Bartolist tradition, this persona has its ‘own Rights and 
properties’680 and so can have acts attributed to it. Unlike in the earlier tradition, 
however, it can only act through a single representative, that of government. Thus 
Hobbes is able to use the same terminology as that employed by resistance theorists 
to argue that ‘The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People 
Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man.’681 The point is repeated even 
more forcefully in Leviathan, where we read that: 
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one 
man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the 
consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the 
Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One… And Unity, cannot otherwise be 
understood in Multitude.682 
 
The person of the commonwealth thus has a legal existence. However, this only 
persists so long as there is continued representation by the sovereign; not only can the 
people in no sense authorise alternative representation, but only those actions 
undertaken by the person’s legitimate representative count as actions by the people at 
all. As a result, Hobbes writes, ‘the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, 
though they be singulis majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet 
they be Universis minors, of less power than them all together’ is simply an ‘absurd’ 
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misunderstanding of the nature of the person of the people. Action by ‘all [subjects] 
together’ is impossible, and hence can never represent a power greater than the king.683  
 
The Rebel’s Catechism: The Liberties of Subjects and the Right to Rebel 
Hobbes’s explanation of the origins of political authority is designed to 
demonstrate that there is no ‘people’ in whose name a challenge to sovereignty could 
be launched.684 By disallowing any covenant either between this non-existent 
corporate entity and a future sovereign, or between the latter and the individual 
members of the commonwealth,685 Hobbes was able to present a version of contract 
theory which emptied it of the revolutionary potential identified by the thinkers 
discussed above. His theory thus responds directly to an account of legitimate 
rebellion developed in sixteenth century France and employed by the Parliamentarian 
cause during the English civil wars. Hobbes’s additional rejection of the right to rebel 
against an (effective) usurper, through his de facto account of political legitimacy and 
the purposes of government, was intended to undermine a separate justification of 
‘tyrannicide.’  
It has been the contention of numerous readers, however, that while Hobbes 
focused on undermining rebellion by the people or in their name, a right to rebel 
nonetheless entered his theory by a different door. When Bramhall stated that 
Leviathan provides the ‘bellowes to kindle the fire of a civill warre, and put a whole 
commonwealth into a combustion’,686 or when Clarendon suggested that the text 
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‘liberally and bountifully confers upon [subjects]’ a ‘liberty as no honest man can 
pretend to, and which is utterly inconsistent with the security of Prince and People’, 
they were concerned not with a right held by the people as whole and deployed by its 
representatives. Rather, they contended that in the Hobbesian commonwealth it is 
individuals who have retained too much liberty, because it is, as Bramhall put it, 
according to the ‘discretion of the subject’ to determine what security requires.687 The 
individual right to resist harm becomes, in the hands of such readers, a fully-fledged 
right to rebel against legitimately-constituted sovereign power.  As we saw above, it 
is this line of interpretation which has persisted among modern readers.  
To address these arguments, the different manifestations of subjects’ natural 
liberty, and the limits that Hobbes ascribes to them, must be examined in more detail. 
In what follows, I will argue that for Hobbes the true liberties of subjects are best 
understood as reactive and dependent on circumstance. While there is indeed a certain 
‘discretion’ implied in their use, not all actions by subjects fall under the category of 
true liberties, even when these have self-preservation as their aim. Moreover, 
employing these liberties ‘correctly’, as we saw in Chapter 2, does not itself place 
subjects outside the commonwealth. As a result, these rights, broad as they may seem, 
cannot be used to construct a right to rebel against the state or its representative.  
Before proceeding, it is important both to remind ourselves of the definition of 
rebellion, and of what makes it different from those acts which Hobbes does permit 
subjects to undertake in the pursuit of their own safety. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
Hobbes’s definition of rebellion in Leviathan is that it is the deliberate denial of 
sovereign authority; in ‘renouncing…subjection’, one removes oneself from the 
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commonwealth.688 As such, it is the open declaration, through words or deeds, that 
one no longer sees any obligation whatsoever towards the sovereign and, as discussed 
above, it is for this reason that any actions against rebels are acts of war against 
enemies rather than the punishment of citizens. Based on this definition, a Hobbesian 
right to rebel would seem to be a right to engage in activity which makes it clear that 
one is no longer subject to the authority of the state. While we might argue that such 
an act is always possible, with all the attendant risks it brings, to argue that there is a 
right to perform it is to suggest that in performing such an act an individual is in no 
way contravening his pre-existing obligations.689 This profoundly misunderstands 
Hobbes’s general theory of the true liberties of the subject, which are, Hobbes stresses, 
defined in relation to the ‘Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes’.690 Such rights are 
only meaningful within the commonwealth; in the state of nature they would simply 
be liberties.  
Once the state has been instituted, to have a right to do something and to be 
capable of it are conceptually distinct: one only has the right to act either in ways 
which are in concordance with the will of the sovereign, or which have been allowed 
by the covenant instituting him. Thus while in the state of nature our rights are limited 
only by our physical capabilities, to act according to right in the commonwealth is to 
behave in ways which cannot be punished by the law or merit treatment as an enemy. 
Just as one might have the ability to commit a crime, but to speak of a right to engage 
in criminal activity would be absurd, so too we can engage in rebellious behaviour, 
though we lack the right to do so. Those rights which do exist in the commonwealth 
are limited in such a way that they specifically disallow activities which could be 
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understood as a general renunciation of subject status. While the liberties allocated to 
subjects may initially appear to be quite broad, Hobbes’s description of their actual 
use indicates that they can and should be consistently understood as the actions of 
citizens rather than of rebels. Following a discussion of these limits, and hence of the 
true nature of retained rights, I shall discuss the ways in which the principles which 
ground them have been used to argue for a right to rebel based on material necessity. 
I will then examine one particular manifestation of subjects’ true liberties, that of 
collective resistance to the state. This example has suggested to many readers that the 
right to rebel can not only be constructed from Hobbes’s principles, but is found in the 
specific manifestations of the true liberties as well. As I will demonstrate, however, 
even the case of permitted collective resistance disallows rebellion by maintaining 
individuals’ subject-status throughout. The moment such action becomes rebellion 
proper, those engaging in it lose their civil status and are to be treated as enemies of 
the commonwealth. 
There has been some debate among Hobbes’s readers over whether resistance 
to the sovereign in the service of self-preservation is a duty, which must be adhered 
to, or a right.691 While the law of nature suggests that individuals must always act to 
preserve their lives, a more consistently accurate interpretation is that Hobbes leaves 
self-defence as an option which cannot be renounced by subjects, but which 
individuals may nonetheless choose not to act upon.692 Hobbes clearly believes that 
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there are some fates which an individual might choose death to avoid. For example, 
he argues that subjects should not be forced to execute their parents, as ‘a Son will 
rather die, then live infamous, and hated of all the world.’693 While Hobbes suggests 
that sovereigns should respect these realities on the basis of natural law, he nonetheless 
recognises that they may not. However, to fail to choose the ‘best’, or most effective, 
option to preserve one’s life is in no way to renounce the right to self-preservation 
altogether. A subject might, for instance, choose death rather than patricide, but it is 
never implied that in doing so he is renouncing his more general right, and he may 
well resist the sovereign’s men when they come to enforce the agreement. Thus 
subjects have at their disposal a range of options when it comes to self-preservation, 
the use of which is never to be seen as contrary to earlier choices and behaviour, or 
against the covenant instituting the commonwealth.  
The sovereign’s right to attack a subject, and the subject’s right to resist, are 
emphasised throughout De Cive and Leviathan. However, while physical assault is 
Hobbes’s preferred means to illustrate this right, subjects’ rights to self-preservation 
can be understood in broader terms. As we saw, starving citizens have the right to steal 
food, assuming that they sincerely believe that this is their only means of survival. 
Moreover, when sovereign power is a cause of danger rather than a source of 
protection, these rights apply even in situations in which death is not imminent, as 
during imprisonment.694 In Chapter 14 of Leviathan we read that a man cannot lay 
down his right to resist ‘Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit 
consequent to such patience…as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men 
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694 It is for this reason that punishment as such, and not merely capital punishment, cannot be 
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proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not.’ The most 
important reason, however, is that the purpose of the individual’s original entry into 
the commonwealth was the ‘security of [his] person’, which is not fulfilled through 
(punitive) imprisonment.695  While we might question the grounds on which this 
removal of liberty can be legitimately resisted,696 that it is included among the retained 
rights of subjects does indicate two important things about Hobbes’s understanding of 
subjects’ resistance rights. The first is that he seems to allow resistance at any point 
during a long-term, harmful, but not immediately life-threatening situation inflicted 
by the sovereign. Presumably, the right to resist chains can be invoked at any point 
during the imprisonment period and not simply at its commencement. The second is 
that we must take him seriously when he grounds the right to resist in the ends for 
which the original commonwealth-instituting covenant was entered into. Hobbes’s 
major justification for the right to resist such non-life-threatening penalties is, rather 
than the immediate risk of death, that there is ‘no benefit consequent’ to enduring 
these.  
It is the combination of these two points that has caused some commentators 
to suggest that they might constitute the grounds for justified rebellion on the basis of 
material necessity. It has been argued that subjects have a right to resist in situations 
which they perceive as long-term and unsustainable, but which the sovereign might 
simply regard as nothing more than an unavoidable ‘inconvenience’, the type of which 
Hobbes assures readers are inevitable in any commonwealth.697 If the right to rebel 
under these conditions is indeed among the true liberties of subjects, or can be 
constructed from them, then as a consequence such rebels remain, by definition, 
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subjects rather than enemies. Their actions should be understood as neither criminal 
nor hostile, and in turn the sovereign’s response should not include either punishment, 
or hostility.  
Sreedhar has suggested that Hobbes must allow a right to engage in rebellion 
‘from necessity’ in cases where subjects’ ongoing lives are so precarious that they can 
see no advantage to remaining within the commonwealth.698 She writes: 
Hobbes…has a general principle of political obligation committing 
him to a right of rebellion. He explicitly endorses the following 
general principle: a subject has no obligation to obey the sovereign 
if he judges that the sovereign is not providing for his security. If we 
add a plausible premise (if the sovereign is not protecting a person, 
joining forces with others in order to effect political change may be 
the best was to preserve himself), this implies a right of rebellion.699 
 
The entire question turns on Sreedhar’s addition of the ‘plausible premise’, in which 
the individual right to self-preservation is taken to include the right of joining with 
others to effect a change in government.  
It is true that, if the source of insecurity is the state, or the state’s negligence, 
then, assuming that this has already been attempted, no further appeal to the 
commonwealth need occur before individual defensive actions are undertaken. This is 
because there need not be an immediate threat to life to justify legitimate acts of 
resistance, as we saw in the case of the prisoner who can act to preserve himself at any 
point during his punishment. As a result, we might consider that the choice to join, or 
found, a rebel group to address one’s concerns could be considered as legitimate as 
resisting an attack. However, it is unclear that is indeed the the case, both on the basis 
of Hobbes’s explicit comments, and on the underlying mechanics of the theory.  
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In Chapter 30 of Leviathan we read that in the case of a ‘Commotion’ that is 
caused by ‘great need’, as we might imagine a rebellion from necessity to be, it is best 
for the sovereign enact ‘Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers…[not of] the poore 
seduced People.’700 This suggests that for Hobbes, there is a model of collective action 
driven by what is perceived to be  mutual need. However, he does not at this point 
recognise a right to engage in such action; while the people are not punished, this is 
only because their ignorance is clearly the result of sovereign mismanagement, not 
because their actions were committed with right. The leaders are most certainly 
punished, even if they themselves are simply acting in ways which they believe will 
best provide for their security (organising a ‘commotion’). Such actions are, Hobbes 
implies, criminal but not hostile; they therefore do not meet the qualifications for an 
action to be considered an expression of subjects’ true liberties, but nor are they 
necessarily rebellious.  
Hobbes therefore appears to dismiss the possibility of a right to engage in 
rebellion from necessity by outlining the legal consequences of something that looks 
very much like what Sreedhar proposes. The coordinate action of the needy is excused 
for pragmatic reasons, rather than by his theory of the liberty of subjects. Moreover, 
the structure of the theory itself also appears to preclude precisely this kind of 
rebellion, forcing us to reject Sreedhar’s adoption of the ‘plausible premise’ that the 
true liberties allow any behaviour whatsoever which the subject believes will help him 
in his goal of self-preservation.  
 While the Hobbesian self-preservation principle appears to allow any and all 
action deemed necessary by a subject, this is in stark contrast with the limited nature 
of the true liberties of subjects as described in De Cive and Leviathan. The case cited 
                                                   
700 Hobbes 2012, p. 544. 
 263 
above, of the son refusing to engage in patricide, illustrates this well. A son may 
refuse, upon questioning, to accuse his father, and may even refuse to execute him. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 2, the son has no right to defend his father from the 
hangman. The son’s wider obligation to the state remains intact despite his right to 
resist the sovereign in defined ways. This obligation in turn limits the range of actions 
he may commit with right. These limits exist despite there being a potential argument 
that the son has a right to defend his father’s life in order to preserve his own life, if 
he relies on his father’s income to survive, and from the son’s purpose in joining the 
contract, which now forces him to react passively to his father’s execution.701 From 
this hypothetical scenario, we can see that Hobbes envisages limits to defined rights 
of resistance, even if these are not always clear. The right to resist, despite Hobbes’s 
reference to broader principles, does not seem to permit unlimited resistance even in 
cases of extremity. Assuming additional rights beyond those listed by Hobbes, on the 
basis of either direct self-preservation or a lack of good to oneself, would therefore 
appear to be a dubious strategy.  
Furthermore, there appears to be an escalation of proportionate permitted 
behaviour in the employment of the true liberties. At the point of accusation, there is 
only a right to non-incrimination; while this act might frustrate the ability of the 
sovereign to carry out criminal investigations and identify and punish lawbreakers, it 
is essentially an act of passive, rather than active resistance. During the act of 
punishment itself, once the subject has been condemned and sentenced, physical 
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resistance by the punished individual alone becomes a legitimate option. At this point, 
the sovereign’s ability to employ the sword of the commonwealth is at risk, but the 
subject’s intention is primarily to protect his own life rather than to threaten the 
commonwealth’s existence. Throughout their resistance, subjects are only permitted 
to engage in activity which is a direct, proportional and necessary response to the 
situation in which they find themselves. The starving man may steal food to address 
his physical need, but there is no indication that he has the right to steal money, even 
if poverty is the condition that underpins his inability to sustain himself. Hobbes thus 
appears to regard the underlying causes of insecurity to be the responsibility of the 
sovereign, rather than the correct domain of the true liberties. Thus in the case of the 
commotion discussed above, the public protest is simply, according to Hobbes, an 
illegitimate response to need, as it does not directly address the situation at hand.702 
The aims of such an event are too far removed from the specific insecurity which is 
its cause: while Hobbes would permit large scale theft, collective violent action is 
neither proportionate to the experience of those involved, nor is it likely to result in a 
situation of greater security.  
There is a second problem with constructing, from the true liberties of subjects, 
a right to rebel from necessity. It is doubtful that those who experience lives that are 
fundamentally and consistently insecure, and who therefore come to the conclusion 
that effecting a change in government is their only option, should be regarded as 
subjects at all. Steinberger has suggested that, for people in such a situation, the state 
has essentially ceased to exist as a legitimate source of political obligation.703 Hobbes 
                                                   
702But see Frost 2004, p. 35 for an alternative reading which links the sovereign’s duty to ensure 
general welfare with a right to ‘to break the peace with the aim of rectifying a situation in which 
living itself is impossible.’ Frost here suggests that not only is direct self-preservation allowed by 
the true liberties, but so too is a defensive attempt ‘reshuffle the political order.’ 
703 Steinberger 2002, p. 858 claims that ‘for Hobbes the bonds of the commonwealth dissolve when 
it fails to achieve the ends for which it was created.’  
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himself appears to support this position when he writes that the ‘Obligation of Subjects 
to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, 
by which he is able to protect them.’704 In considering rebellion, we might wish to 
include considerations of sovereign choice as well as ability. An individual or group 
who feel that they are being actively neglected or persecuted despite adhering to the 
commonwealth’s laws might well feel that they no longer owe the sovereign any 
obligation whatsoever. Hobbes’s assertion that ‘he that wants protection, may seek it 
anywhere’ indicates that this is a correct interpretation.705 If we accept this reading, 
then there is no ‘right’ to rebel as such. There is merely a right for individuals who are 
no longer part of the state to act as they wish to best secure their interests. In such a 
scenario, it is questionable that initiating a war with what is presumably a much larger 
state would necessarily be the best course of action. But if an individual or group were 
to consider this their best chance to ensure their security, this is not a problem for 
Hobbesian theory, as such individuals are already outside of the state.  
This reading, as Bramhall notes, is indeed built upon the ‘discretion’ of 
subjects as to their security. The sovereign may consider these individuals members 
of the commonwealth, despite subjects’ own judgement of its persistent inability to 
provide for their security. However, faced with subjects’ own determination, this 
claim is irrelevant. Once we recognise this, it becomes clear, however, is that in 
expressing, through rebellion, their belief that the state has failed to provide for their 
security, subjects are also indicating that they no longer feel that they are part of the 
commonwealth. An action such as resisting punishment or stealing food is an 
expression of temporary insecurity which might well, in the future, be alleviated by 
                                                   
704 Hobbes 2012, p. 344.  
705 Hobbes 2012, p. 518. 
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the state. But these rebels are instead suggesting that it is the state itself, rather than 
contingent conditions, which they find oppressive. They are thus enemies facing the 
commonwealth, and any discussion of the true rights of subjects becomes irrelevant.  
While the principles of self-preservation do not allow for a constructed right 
to rebel from necessity, the assertion in Chapter 21 of Leviathan that ‘a great many 
men together’ who ‘have already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed 
some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death’ may ‘joyn together, 
and assist, and defend one another’706 has been taken as providing exactly this right.   
In his description of such a right, Hobbes does not label this act ‘rebellion’, an 
interesting choice given his willingness to use the term elsewhere when discussing 
attempts to overthrow the state. However, the passage has certainly suggested the idea 
both to Hobbes’s contemporaries and to some modern readers. It was specifically in 
response to this coordinated resistance to the state that Bramhall asked ‘Why should 
we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebells catechism? …T. H. alloweth 
Rebells and conspirators to make good their unlawfull attempts by armes: was there 
ever such a trumpetter of rebellion heard of before?’707 It was also in response to this 
particular right that Clarendon argued that Hobbes provides ‘very childish 
security…for his Soverign against this Rebellion.’708 More recently, Sreedhar has 
argued that ‘Not only do participants in an ongoing rebellion nicely fit this description 
[of rebels], but the original act of resistance was also a collective act of the right sort 
(‘a great many men together’ committed a certain act, namely, ‘resisting the sovereign 
                                                   
706 Hobbes 2012, p. 340. 
707 Bramhall 1995, p. 145. 
708 Hyde 1995, p. 87. See also Cumberland 2005, p. 724 and Filmer 1995, p. 11 for criticism of 
this right. Filmer notes that Hobbes’s description of the right appears to contradict his earlier 
statement, that subjects do not have the right to defend guilty men, and suggests that the right to 
do precisely this undermines the sovereign’s power to punish criminals.  
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power.’)’709 Therefore, for her, this passage represents ‘Hobbes taking the right of self-
defence to its logical conclusion, explicitly acknowledging that it permits engaging in 
collective resistance to the sovereign power.’710 
Because of such arguments, it is important to analyse this particular right in 
more depth. The passage appears to refer to two distinct groups to whom the right to 
mutual defence applies: those who are already rebels, and those who are convicted 
criminals fleeing or resisting punishment, but who are not yet considered rebels. Some 
of Hobbes’ contemporaries, such as William Lucy, argued for Hobbes’s implicit 
endorsement of the Parliamentary cause on the basis of this passage, so I will take the 
case of the rebels first, those men who ‘have already resisted the Soveraign Power.’ If 
these collectively-organised men are indeed rebels, it is difficult to see why their 
‘right’ to resist the sovereign is listed as a true liberty pertaining to subjects, as this 
term in no way applies to them. By resisting the sovereign power unjustly, they have 
already placed themselves in the category of ‘enemy’ and as such are in a state of war 
with the state. For these to continue in their attempt to resist or overthrow the state is 
a logical response to being outside the commonwealth. Given their legal status, there 
is no advantage to Hobbes in considering any further action a ‘new unjust act.’ As a 
faction in the state of nature, they have no covenant with the members of the 
commonwealth, and so injustice towards the sovereign is a theoretical impossibility.  
However, the second group, those individuals who expect death as a result of 
their crimes, are in a different position. They are engaging in a legitimate right to 
resist; the question is whether this right extends to mutual aid and, if so, if this act 
would constitute a rebellion. As we saw above, subjects’ resistance is only to be 
                                                   
709 Sreedhar 2010, p. 138. 
710 Sreedhar 2010, p. 139 
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considered legitimate when it directly responds to the risk at hand, and in examining 
this right, we find important restrictions built into it. If we return to the definition of 
rebellion, we see that, unlike the group of rebels, our hypothetical gang of murderers 
has not overthrown all obligation to the state, merely that which involves the 
obligation not to come to the defence of others against the sword of the 
commonwealth.711 Just as a man might lie to the sovereign and his agents to avoid 
self-incrimination but not on unrelated matters, these criminals have only decided to 
come to the defence of a narrow group: those who will also, directly and at that 
moment, come to their defence. Moreover, these individuals must also be facing 
execution for the right to engage in mutual defence. Such a right, especially as it only 
lasts as long as the risk from the state continues, does not appear to meet the definition 
of rebellion provided by Hobbes, which is the casting off of all obligations and 
agreements. This is a potentially dangerous right of resistance which has been left to 
subjects, but its scope is, by definition, limited to individuals who the state had already 
assumed it would have to defend itself against. Such an act does not seem to constitute 
either a rebellion in Hobbes’s sense, or in a wider one.  
Moreover, Hobbes has provided a further hint that neither the sovereign nor 
the resisting criminals should regard such a group as an enemy faction. In concluding 
his comments on this particular right, he notes that ‘the offer of pardon taketh from 
them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in 
assisting, or defending, the rest, unlawfull.’712 The sovereign’s pardon would only 
make continued resistance unlawful if these individuals are in fact subjects. The mere 
offer of pardon would not, if they were enemies of the commonwealth, create a bond 
                                                   
711 In such cases of mutual protection, the immediacy of the benefit legitimises interference with 
the sovereign’s right of punishment. We can therefore distinguish between the right outlined in 
Chapter 21, and the example of the son wishing to protect his condemned father, discussed above.  
712 Hobbes 2012, p. 340. 
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of obligation. As Hobbes repeatedly notes throughout his work, such a relationship is 
only created by the making of a covenant, and cannot be made simply through 
capturing or overpowering. A pardon is not a covenant, and so the obligation to lay 
down arms when it is offered is something which has existed throughout the period of 
resistance. This right, taken by Bramhall and Sreedhar to be the ultimate exemplar of 
an unbounded right in the commonwealth, is in fact a typical case in which resistance 
rights are to exercised in relation to, and hence are limited by, the subject’s treatment 




At the beginning of this thesis I argued that a fuller understanding of Hobbes’s 
criminology is necessary for us to properly grasp his political philosophy. I should like 
to conclude by suggesting that, once we have accepted the coherence of this element 
in his thought, we can better appreciate the nature of his political project more broadly, 
and recognise that his discussion also has important implications for the history of the 
philosophy of punishment.      
 In my Introduction I indicated that the philosophy of punishment in 
contractatian political theory is beset by two problems: how to classify those who 
break the social contract, and how to justify the infliction of harm upon those who 
have created the state through their consent. Hobbes’s solution was to limit both crime 
and punishment to a legal sphere governed by the rule of law rather than by the 
political power of the authorised sovereign. This, alongside his definition of these 
concepts according to natural law, means that he is able to limit the sovereign’s power 
against subjects if the sovereign wishes his actions to be understood as punishments 
for crimes. It is these limitations that give Hobbes’s theory of punishment its unique 
attributes.  
In particular, as we saw, the natural law prevents individuals from alienating 
their right to self-preservation, and hence they cannot ‘own’ the punishment they 
experience. Consequently, we find a retained natural right among subjects to resist the 
sovereign’s actions, even though they continue to acknowledge the sovereign as their 
authorised ruler. Punishment is therefore best understood as a practice conforming to 
specific norms rather than an authorised sovereign right.  
 Hobbes’s statements at the beginning of Chapter 28 of Leviathan indicate that 
he was not only fully aware of the complexity of the task he had set for himself, but 
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also of the fact that the right to punish was already the topic of much consideration. 
As we have seen, alongside the development of seventeenth century state theory, 
debates flourished over the purpose of punishment, the origins of the right, and the 
rights of those accused of breaking the social contract. Hobbes’s innovation was to 
insist that as a purely civil institution, the nature of punishment will necessarily be 
determined by the social contract upon which the state is founded. A Hobbesian theory 
of the state which prioritises the commonwealth’s role in ensuring individual security 
means that punished individuals cannot be expected to will or acquiesce to their own 
punishment. This insight affects both the nature of punishment’s legitimacy and its 
purpose.   
This realisation regarding the interdependence of theories of the state and of 
punishment was one that subsequent theorists were eager to employ in their own re-
conceptualizations of the nature of the punishment right. Looking forward to the 
Classical School of criminology, we find Cesare Beccaria arguing that the death 
penalty can never be employed by governments precisely because man, in consenting 
to the creation of the state, could not have ‘willingly given up to others the authority 
to kill him.’713 The ‘right to punish’ is created by men ‘surrender[ing] to the public 
repository…the smallest possible portion consistent with persuading others to defend’ 
them, and so the limits of the right are defined by the nature of the social contract.714 
It is frequently asserted or implied that it is only in the eighteenth century that 
we see the beginnings of serious philosophical reflection on these problems of 
punishment. One reason is that modern penal theory, as we saw in Chapter 4, continues 
                                                   
713 Beccaria 1995, p. 66. 
714 Beccaria 1995, p. 11. Beccaria mentions Hobbes once in On Crimes and Punishments; like 
Rousseau, however, he does to so deny the validity of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. 
Beccaria 1995, p. 5. In arguing that Beccaria employs Hobbes’s insight, I am not intimating that 
we can refer to a specific instance of influence. I am rather suggesting that we can see a set of 
shared concerns and approaches.  
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to be framed by reference to Enlightenment theories of deterrence or retribution 
Another is the related focus on a perceived humanitarian shift in attitudes towards 
criminals which some find in Enlightenment narratives.715 The result of these two 
impulses is that it is not only the practice of punishment   in the early modern period 
that is frequently understood as fundamentally alien to modern conceptions. The 
theory of the period is also assumed to be largely irrelevant to later developments in 
the philosophy of punishment.  
In questioning these assumptions, I am not, however, arguing that Hobbes 
should be primarily understood as a liberal precursor to Enlightenment theories. It is 
important to emphasise this because it is precisely his theory of crime and punishment 
which is frequently employed to present Hobbes as a liberal or proto-liberal figure.716 
I have already given reasons, in Chapters 3 and 4, for doubting this characterisation of 
Hobbes’s theory. I should like to end by noting a further reason for regarding it as a 
misreading to treat Hobbes in this way. 
Those who locate a liberal element in Hobbes’s political theory are often 
careful to clarify that he should not be understood as liberal in a contemporary sense. 
Vickie Sullivan, for instance, notes that ‘although Hobbes is not a liberal himself, 
elements of his thought point in a liberal direction.’717 Alan Ryan suggests that, 
although ‘Hobbes was strenuously opposed to many of the things that define liberalism 
as a political theory’, we should nonetheless recognise that ‘many things about his 
political theory would sustain a form of liberalism, and he held many of the attitudes 
                                                   
715 See for example Venturi 1971, pp. 99-106; Maestro 1973, pp. 3-34; Jenkins 1984; Brown and 
Esbensen 1988; Hirst 1994, p. 274; Fish 2008, p. 63; Israel 2011, p. 340. In the wake of Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, a number of scholars have explored the ways in which penal 
reform was motivated by the desire to control and reform the criminal personality, and not simply 
by humanitarian concerns. Nonetheless, such studies also take the eighteenth century, with its 
increasing emphasis on penal incarceration, as a starting point. Foucault 1991; Ignatieff 1981.  
716 See for example Cattaneo 1965, p. 297; Green 1993, p. 69; Ryan 1996, p. 233. 
717 Sullivan 2004, p. 105. 
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typical of [its] later defenders.’ 718  Ryan goes so far as to argue that it ‘is easy to feel 
that as long as nobody talked about their ‘rights,’ a Hobbesian state would be 
indistinguishable from a liberal constitutional regime.’719 According to those who read 
Hobbes in this way, these liberal tendencies are reflected in politics within the polity, 
and hence by the relationship between the sovereign and his subjects. Sullivan’s 
assertion is based on two related aspects of Hobbes’s theory: that ‘government must 
be understood as the instrument of the people themselves’ and the existence of a 
retained right to self-defence.720 For Ryan, Hobbes’s treatment of criminals is the key 
example for his assertion that ‘a Hobbesian sovereign who observes these [natural 
law] requirements will go a surprisingly long way toward recognising everything that 
human-rights advocates demand of governments.’721 
According to such readings, Hobbes’s rejection of the ius gentium is largely 
immaterial to how we should understand political rights and relations within the 
commonwealth. However, an examination of Hobbes’s criminology points to an 
important role played by the boundary between the state and the international sphere 
in both effecting and affecting the state-subject relationship. Ioannis Evrigenis has 
suggested that in Hobbes’s theory punishment acts as a constant reminder to citizens 
of the dangers of the state of nature, reinforcing their commitment to the 
commonwealth.722 I would argue that this mechanism exists, but that it is the risk of 
losing citizenship, rather than being punished, which effects this loyalty. According to 
                                                   
718 Ryan 1996, p. 237. 
719 Ryan 2012, p. 182. See on the other hand Gutmann 1980, p. 5 who states that ‘Hobbes is the 
most prominent example of a liberal theorist who, taking the liberal method of aggregating 
individual interests as one of his points of departure, does not arrive at the liberal state.’ 
720 Sullivan 2004, p. 105.  
721 Ryan 2012, pp. 178-9. A third aspect of Hobbes’s theory often marshalled for such arguments 
is Hobbes’s refusal to allow his sovereign direct jurisdiction over his subjects’ innermost beliefs, 
a concession which, to some, points to Hobbes as an advocate of religious toleration. See Owen 
2005 on this tendency in the literature.  
722 Evrigenis 2008, p. 125.  
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Hobbes, the circumstances under which one can be labelled a rebel are fairly broad, 
with the sovereign as the only figure capable of making such a determination. 
Sovereigns can not only act against their enemies pre-emptively, they can also relegate 
citizens to enemy status by the same standard. Stephen Holmes has suggested that the 
‘Hobbesian ‘enemy’ is not simply chosen by the sovereign without any reference to a 
norm…the enemy, for Hobbes, is precisely the individual who violates the fifth law 
of nature, namely, compleasance’.723 However, individuals do not to have actually 
break this law of nature for the sovereign to rightfully expel them; all that is required 
is the belief that they have rejected the state’s authority.  
In the context of this sovereign right, Hobbes’s account of the international 
sphere becomes all the more striking. By prioritising the state as the only source of 
justice and protection, Hobbes is able to present his readers with a theory of crime and 
punishment which strikes readers as ‘liberal’ precisely because it is only designed to 
address those whom the sovereign has already decided deserve such treatment. This 
model of punishment, based on due process and citizenship, is possible, Hobbes 
implies, precisely because the sovereign retains the political power to expel into a 
deeply insecure international arena those who have not simply broken, but repudiated 
the social contract. Good citizens, in this theory, are not simply defined in opposition 
to criminals, but also to those rebels who are removed from the commonwealth 
altogether. Hobbes’s theory of crime and punishment is thus set against, and derives 
its authority from, his presentation of life outside the commonwealth, and the 
sovereign’s ultimate authority to determine who is in and who is out.  
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